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VARIETIES OF WORLDLY WISDOM

By C. A. W. MANNING

THE English and American ways of life have more than a little in common. Except however when "Rhodes Scholars in reverse," Englishmen do not "major." Instead, they "specialize"—a very, very few in International Relations. Some of these do it in London. This article is on what that means.

In cricket—a staple, incidentally, of the English way of life—there are broadly two techniques for bringing a ball to "turn from the off." One, the less usual, is the "googly." Fifty years ago it was a rarity indeed. Yet the writer knew in those days a fellow-schoolboy who, bowling googlies, was unaware that not everybody did. To him, they seemed the natural way to have a ball "turn from the off."

In recent years, the writer has been reminded of that lad. He himself has for quite a while now been assuming to teach International Relations, in what had seemed to him the "natural" way. But it appears that others may do it differently. This opportunity to report upon the "London Syllabus" is, in effect, the occasion for a demonstration of his googly.

In effect, but not specifically. For the Syllabus is in fact the blueprint for the examination of the University, and not the program of the teaching given in a college. To claim, for example, that the Syllabus was worthy of its subject would not be to imply that the teaching, anywhere, was necessarily worthy of the Syllabus.[1]

What then says this London formula[2] to one who, in seeking admission, discloses a desire to have International Relations as his specialization—his "special" subject—in trying for a first degree? The relevant degree, it tells him, is known as the B.Sc.(Econ.). In the scheme for this there is a choice of "special subjects"; and his will be No. 12. Following this course, he will normally, after two years, "take" Part I, and, after a further year, Part II. In Part I, in common with all other candidates, he will be given papers in six "compulsory" and two "alternative" subjects; and in Part II he will, in his "special" subject, be given three compulsory and two optional papers. In practice he

[1] And, conversely, a student who having based his preparation on the teaching given him found himself, at the examination, unready for questions based on the Syllabus would have no cause to complain, except of course against his teachers, who, like him, should have read the "book of words."

[2] For the wording of the Syllabus, see the Regulations for this Degree published by the University of London.

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will be bound to take, whether as alternative in Part I or as optional in Part II, International Law. In practice also he will be required to take, as one of his two alternatives in Part I, The Structure of International Society. This will leave him freedom in the choice either of one alternative and one optional, or of two optional subjects. Thus there are nine papers altogether which he technically, and eleven which, in college practice, he virtually, cannot escape. These eleven are Economics, Applied Economics, Political History, Economic History, Government, The History of Political Ideas, and The Structure of International Society (all, thus far, in Part I), International Law (in either Part), and, in Part II, International History Since 1860, International Relations, and International Institutions. On his examination as a whole he may either fail, or simply pass, or be awarded lower second, or upper second, or first class honors.

There are two perspectives from which these conditions may be looked at. From without, it is a degree in Economics, having a "core" curriculum, supported by a fringe of peripherals, International Relations being one. From within, or from the candidate's-eye view, it is a course in the social sciences, focusing on International Relations as the damsel to be desired, wooed, and won, but with an entourage of prospective bridesmaids, in whose society, for the period at least of the wooing, it is prudent to find such pleasure as he can.

It is of course not necessarily safe to expect of any particular program of study that it will be found to reflect some unifying idea. Where, however, the possibilities open to a candidate are circumscribed, the thought of discovering in the pattern an informing logic may be rather confidently entertained. And in London this is as a rule the case. To inquire, therefore, into the rationale of the B.Sc. formula is not an idle undertaking. In some countries the student's choice might perhaps be less restricted. He might be free to pick his courses as from a cafeteria counter. In England, the land of liberty, he is not so free as that. Least of all has he freedom to decide for himself what International Relations proper, the subject of his choosing, shall prove to be about. If he wants the lady, he must have her for what she is. So, if on acquaintance he finds her not all that he had expected—too possessive perhaps, or too complicated, or too down-to-earth—or if he has got her muddled up with one of her maidenly entourage, or with her Oxford namesake,[3] let him call it off, like a man, while yet there is time. Not that he could have had much excuse for mistaking her

[3] "International Relations," a "further" subject in the scheme for the Final Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics.

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identity. Her sponsors for the marriage market never made any mystery of that. The "thing" denoted, the "referent" for International Relations with capital I and R, was, they clearly indicated, a branch of study, the study of relationships which, *qua* international, were themselves as decisively identifiable as are, say, interurban jealousies or intercontinental flights. And with a subject matter thus unequivocally pinpointed, the nature and method of the study and the form of the Syllabus could in their turn scarcely be other than a question of common sense.

It might seem, for example, to have been but the merest common sense that remarked the difference between the subject proper and what one might come to think of as the more or less essential "underpinners." For an understanding, that is, of international relationships, attention to them alone might not be enough. And again there was the distinction between a forthright study of the subject taken holistically, concretely, and in the round, and the semi-specialized examination, by appropriate methods, of particular aspects inviting treatment in that way. At any rate, were anything in the Syllabus to be called in question, it is to common sense and nothing more compelling that appeal for its vindication would have to be made.

To take International Relations in London is not therefore to sample a chance assortment of meats. The subject is single and distinct in itself, and its subject matter a unitary whole: the nexus, or complex, or tangle, or intertwining, of relationships between sovereign states and, as by the same token, the institutional environment within which these occur. The relation between Shylock and Antonio is a function partly of the characters of the men, but partly also of the context of their encounter. Similarly the relation between Jordan and Israel, in the circumstances of our day. International Relations becomes thus a study of the global setting within which those quasi-personalities, the members of the international family, exist, and co-exist; a study also of the situations, the types of situation, and the patterns of behavior that occur therein. In theory, a someone—France, let us say—is up to something. In reality, there is on foot a process, which curiosity may dissect, but the upshot of which, in diplomatic usage, is construed as the comportment of France.

The key distinction in this business of analyzing is doubtless that between the official and the fundamentally factual interpretation of what goes on. What in diplomatic theory we are given is the behavior of states. What in reality we get is the doings of men, influenced very deeply of course by mythological thinking on the behavior of states.

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Such thinking may be partly differentiated into what is uncritically current among the generality and what conventional among the few. The folklore of the international society will be seen to include both.

There is a point in Professor Quincy Wright's recent remarkable study[4] at which he might almost be understood as heralding an imminent parting of the ways: either, a study of international relations to the ignoring of a nascent world society, or, recognition of the world society, with international relations left aside. "It may be," he says, "that . . . disciplines based, not on *international relations*, but on a *world society* are required" (p. 42). In London, no such dilemma is acknowledged. International relations and world society are, as it were, interchangeable notions. Respect must be paid, in any pertinent analysis, to both. They are, so to say, two sides of the same coin.

Is this unduly subtle? Or is it the "natural" view?

"From time to time," reports Professor Wright, students at Chicago had complained that, "while the courses recommended usually had more or less relevance to what might be called international relations, they were not quite sure what that subject was. It seemed to branch out in various directions and the ends of the branches often seemed quite unrelated to one another. Furthermore, the courses seemed, sometimes, to rest upon different assumptions and to reach divergent conclusions, leaving the student in confusion" (p. vii).

It seems that in these circumstances the trouble was felt to lie, in part at any rate, in the formlessness of a subject still in process of being born. Could it as yet be considered a discipline at all? "Some say a discipline only exists in so far as a body of data has been systematized by a distinctive analytical method" (p. 23). Political science "was . . . less integrated at its start than was economics. . . . International relations in this respect resembles political science rather than economics." This discipline of International Relations has developed "synthetically." "In international relations . . . an effort is being made to synthesize numerous older disciplines, each with a specialized point of view, into a unity." "At least eight disciplines" have contributed to its development (pp. 32-33, *passim*).

It is with near-veneration that a mere aspirant-practitioner with the googly reads this more elaborate recipe for getting a ball to turn. To him, it nonetheless is somewhat, though of course not exactly, as if all the corpus of man's knowledge and experience were to be assembled

[4] *The Study of International Relations* (New York, 1955), the source for everything here ascribed to Professor Quincy Wright.

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in a heap, there then being extruded from it only such exceptional elements as could not by the boldest abuse of artistic license be colored with an international tint, the bulk being then scheduled for transmutation into the substance of a single science—by the stratagem of a new conceptual frame—pending which, International Relations must, even by its sponsors, be held inferior to, say, Economics, whether as the matter for a textbook or as a line of country for research. This is by no means precisely how Professor Quincy Wright has put it. But anyway, if his principle is alone correct, it might appear that what his London confreres have heretofore been furnishing, in fancied fulfillment of the conditions of their employment, must be attested as pathetically malapropos. Yet have they in fact so greatly erred—in conceiving their discipline, so simplemindedly, as merely the indulgence, in a not so desultory manner, of a common curiosity as to how it is "out there," in that mentally projected milieu, that "other world," in which certain mentally pictured personalities do commerce with their kind?

A "common" curiosity? Fairly common, surely. In wartime, we are all of us students of war, a phase of international relationships particularly difficult, when we are in it, to dismiss. Between wars, though possibly with less concern, we are likewise, not a few of us, students of the contrasted phase, wishfully denominated peace, but better described as tension. Others before us have remarked, and pondered, these things; and some of their impressions are ours to share. To engage in such remarking, and pondering, is to study a certain subject; though how methodologically happy is one's approach is a matter of degree. Some go at it with more sagacity, and pertinacity, than the rest.

And some, under academic auspices, more methodically than aforetime, premising the distinction between a foundation-level treatment—the "Structure" subject in Part I—and a less elementary presentation which follows in Part II; where, the nature of the interstate society, as the setting, being assumed as now sufficiently known, the focus shifts to the unfolding of the drama, the motions of the players on the stage. From the World of World Politics it is Over to the Politics of the World.

And all this, confessedly, without the initial synthesizing of even the fewest of constituent disciplines. Nay, even without acknowledged feelings of special frustration in face of the multiformity of facts. And, should this conception be declared unsound, what are we henceforth to think of the mother, entertaining her daughter on the nature of marriage, without herself having made the grade in any, it may be,

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of the divers disciplines, from economics to trigonometry, which bear, in their respective ways, upon her single theme? And what of the anthropologist, financed to make a field study of some recognized cultural group? Is he to warn us that his result must be at best a synthesis, and more probably a miscellany of unblendable notes? Will he admit that there is nothing unitary in what he is charged to explore? Or will he not, on the contrary, approach the life-in-community of his French Canadians, or his Tibetans, as a single reality, to be holistically apprehended if it is duly to be understood? And, once having decided that the ordinary cultural group may indeed so constitute an intelligible unit for study, need we doubt that this could be equally true of what is also in effect, if not literally, a cultural group—the plurality of states, co-existing as they do in a society so distinctively theirs? The habitat, the folklore, the mores, the very givenness of this group: all these are points for reflective investigation, as facets of a single theme.

Nor are the findings of Professor Quincy Wright wholly barren of tacit endorsement for those who in London, with tools of homelier type, have for so long been academically active in terms of so simple a conception of what they will have been brought there to do. His admonition that International Relations is difficult to teach; his implied denial that it need necessarily be catered for as if part of political science; his insistence that every discipline has both a philosophical and a scientific aspect; his perception that the turning-out of well-qualified professionals is less important than the development of citizens and leaders with a broad grasp of International Relations; and, not least, his announcement that the most recent tendency has been to analyze the relations between states by locating them in a multi-dimensional field—all these points are sufficiently in line with the logic of the London effort. A multi-dimensional field: that, for London, is what the social cosmos always was; and it is in terms of such a cosmos, glimpsed, like a panorama, as a whole, that the Structure initiate is there enjoined to think. And this not just provisionally, as pending some fuller development of his power for the use of the tools for some such process of analytical vivisection as should serve finally to open up for observation the inner heart of things. This all-in visualizing of the social given would be like the intuiting, as everybody does it, of the individuality of a friend. Only through an immediate acquaintance with the living person in his living wholeness does the mutual bearing declare itself of his particular traits. Even though mentally dwelling upon one stratum only of his personality at a time, we hold in mind our image of the multi-dimensional essence of his being. He

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exists, for us, in the continuing singular, however inconsequent and unaccountable the succession of his manifestations and his moods.

If this now trite distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by mere description is unreal, or if the Gestalt principle is delusion, then the entire conception of the Structure subject may be discarded as pedagogically inept. But if there is indeed a difference between the synoptic and the synthetic modes of becoming aware; if there is point in savoring someone as a person rather than merely knowing all about him; if there is in fact any advantage, before mapping a bit of country with its minuter ins and outs, in getting of it a bird's-eye view; if there is indeed this suggested distinction between the organic totality of a subject matter and the aggregation of its parts, the juxtaposing of its aspects—then the argument for Structure does at least seem to require consideration. It was in an ancient fable that the blind men, from their experience—one of the tusk, one of the trunk, one of the tail—reasoned to the nature of the elephant per se. For the elephant, read the social cosmos; and, for the blind observers, the tourist, the caricaturist, the purist-jurist, and others nearer home. *Was* the elephant "rather like a rope"? No. He was rather like an elephant. There, in six words, we have the case for Structure.

Meanwhile, the mapping of the ins and outs is not to be avoided, and may involve a variety of techniques. Which ones, in particular, should emerge from a review of the "options" in Part II? Most of these fall squarely within the ambit of the subject itself, positing a more pushing analysis of things there already to be seen. The problem of peace and security, the geographical and strategic aspects, the philosophical and psychological, the interplay of politics at their domestic and international levels, and, by no means the least revelatory, the sociology of international law—each of these heads of inquiry, though the agendum of an option, is also the common business of all. The candidate who gives his mind to some only of these matters should at least be aware of what it is that he has left alone. At least he should know that these opportunities were there. That in itself will be something.

The role, for instance, of the strategic component in the reckonings of a statesman may by some be overstressed, just as was perhaps in another context the role of sex by Freud. But in any case it is pretty continuously present, and its presumptive influence, if only beneath the level of conscious thought, had better be allowed for all the time. The ubiquity, again, of electoral considerations—the public relations aspect, as one might call it—in the calculations of politicians in power:

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a horseman whose prime concern it is to remain in the saddle may have little attention left for the bottles between which, if he is to stay in the competition, his mount must make its way. And there are so many such bottles, so awkwardly placed, in the diplomatic riding track. To grasp the flow of world events one needs an immediate insight into how the several countries come to act, or to miss their cues for acting, as and when they do. The heart of man may doubtless not be knowable, but the state of his mind is, as budding lawyers are advised to assume, a fact; and our guesses at it may be better, or less well, informed. There is, in a given situation, an inherent logic whereto the student, in judging any course of action, should give some conscious thought, whatever the decision-makers themselves will have done. For this requires awareness as well of the intangibles—the institutional elements, morals, law, and organization—as of the more readily quantifiable data, of demography, geography, technology, and the like.

Actually there is little, in the Structure Syllabus, about particular organizational elements in international affairs. What does indeed occur is a reference to the nature, in general, of international institutions, pointing, as it were, to bricks and mortar, and to sites, rather than to the layout of individual buildings, even of so imposing a construction as the United Nations itself. How, in such a society, are such institutions possible? Whose is the pertinent behavior, whose are the relevant thoughts? In Part II, however, with an entire paper allotted to the institutions, there is that much more concession made to such as think to hear in Committee resolutions the heartbeat of mankind. Along with—if not in place of—their predispositional moralizing, these true believers should by this stage have learned to employ a complementary, sociological approach in their valuing of the various goings-on. And, provided the jurists are not suffered altogether to steal the show, this kind of case study of *homo ludens* in his glory can become, in John Austin's pleasant phrase, "pre-eminently pregnant with instruction."[5] The proviso, however, is a big one.

Reviewing recently a volume on the running of great cities,[6] Professor Asa Briggs noted as fundamental a paucity of reference to the work already accomplished by sociologists in this domain. One wonders whether a like complaint might not lie against some who in writings on the *civitas maxima*—greatest "city" of them all—may have presented

[5] Cf. my comment in W. Ivor Jennings, ed., *Modern Theories of Law*, London, 1933, p. 185.

[6] Review of W. A. Robson, *Great Cities of the World*, in *Journal of Sociology*, VI, No. 4 (December 1955).

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a similarly lopsided point of view. With the reception of Structure and the standpoint it seeks to instill, Sociology should perhaps be assured of a growing influence in these matters. And not Sociology only. The problem of co-existence, a hardy perennial with the Structure addicts, would scarcely have appeared to them as offering no issues on which the insights of philosophers could be of decisive avail. It would seem however that UNESCO, in its current project for a multi-disciplinary onslaught on this problem,[7] has reserved no particular place for them. Co-existence, social cooperation, the domesticating of mutual mistrust—the challenge of our epoch. If it is not tomorrow to be all hands to the pumps, it had better today be all heads to the problems of navigation. They are urgent, and their solution is not in sight.

All heads: this means the anthropologists also. What these will know is that social cooperation is encountered in numerous forms, some of them fairly odd-looking in foreign eyes. Whatever field of corporate activity we consider, individual habituation to the relevant milieu is a matter of degree. This is as true where life is real and earnest as it is in the following of games; and we all know how swift and illuminating, at a new turn in a game, its appreciation by a high-power connoisseur—of that particular game—can be. Not least does this hold of the greater games—of war, and war's avoidance. When, in June 1914, Lord Kitchener heard of Serajevo, what he is said to have said is "This means war." And, upon being borne out by the event, he was exceptional in his certainty that the struggle would be long. Genius! said some. But why? Was it anything more than his knowledge of a milieu, the fact of his not being "a stranger in these parts"? In parochial co-existence there is a common sense, a worldly wisdom, for the want of which a man may "miss the bus." And likewise, in the affairs of states, it is *prima facie* the older hand who should at a given moment be the better able to sense what lines are still left open, and what are the risks involved in a choice of this or that. Who, then, would misprise the man of modesty and gumption if, at times, like the psalmist, he were to affect a radical unconcern with "matters which are too high for me"?

It may be that the training for medical practice, or for generalship in the field, is not properly to be termed a "discipline"; but, if so, this is but a verbal point, and International Relations—in the London, as distinct from the Chicago, sense—need not then be a "discipline"

[7] As mentioned, in particular, at the Third Congress of IPSA at Stockholm, August 1955.

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either. Only in the same way as do the doctor's, and the soldier's, does a systematic training for the appreciation of international issues involve a distinctive, arduous, and sustained attuning of the mind.

The nature—as our Syllabus supposes it—of International Relations as an autonomous branch of study may by now have been sufficiently shown. Just as, for one who would make intelligent sense of American affairs, there is need for a familiarity with "the American way of life," so, for following with insight the flow of world events, there is required a connoisseurship of the folkways of the international family. International Relations as an academic subject examines this international way of life.

It is thus not simply history. It is not merely the course of events. It is not just the problems—even the foreign policy problems—of particular countries, or of countries in general, or the comparative study of the problems of some. As, when things go less than well in a domestic setting, the claims of Criminology (as a branch of Sociology) tend to win wider recognition, so, in a period of international malaise, might attention be expected to turn to International Relations (as the quasi-sociology of the quasi-society of states). As Criminology is neither criminal history, nor criminal law, nor current crime, but postulates in its students an interest in these, so does International Relations look to International History and International Law—even to "current events"—as subjects propitiously to be pursued, concurrently, by those for whom International Relations proper is their main concern.

For the make-up, then, of International Relations as Special Subject 12, the reader has but to consult the list of papers prescribed for those with this as their specialization. They include International History and International Law, as obvious underpinners; Social and Political Theory and an "approved" modern language, as underpinners less obviously such; and, as intrinsic to the subject proper, International Relations and International Institutions, along with five of the six remaining "options." The sixth—"a special problem, period or episode in international history" (the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933 being presently specified)—has footings at once in the Relations, the Institutions, the History, and the Law.

For the make-up, on the other hand, of International Relations proper, as the study distinct in itself, and in that special sense independent—albeit dependent enough, in another sense, upon the underpinners—the inquirer should look at the Syllabus for Structure, in Part I; and at those for the two main papers (Relations and Institutions) and for five of the options, in Part II. These five he will recognize

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as constituting intensifications rather than extensions of the studies called for by the subject as such.

Those who would look askance at such a specialism, from doubts of what will in practice be accomplished at it in a brief three years, may rather miss the point. The subject is not there to be finally "learned" when a man is young and "remembered" till he die. Rather is it a habit of thought and inquiry, a propensity for self-education, to be cultivated throughout life, having been formed when the mind was still a sapling. And so, in a sense, it is never too soon to begin. For, while it is well, when seeing Paris for the first time, to have arrived there with a command of French, it is conversely an advantage, when embarking on French, to have been on a visit to Paris. There is nothing so apt to inseminate in a student an avid respect for history and economics, for language and philosophy and law, as his discovery, as a specializer, of what it costs to be deficient in these.

But the earlier the beginning, the more skilled the assistance needed for the opening steps. The teaching of Structure to the fresh-from-school is bound to be a tricky undertaking, for which a special training might with advantage be required. It is not the born researcher who will necessarily find it easy. Nor is it, on the other hand, the "Jack" of all the academic trades. What is wanted is the master of a single trade—the teaching of Structure. And one thing that master will know. However inadequate a young man's vocabulary, his mind, at the start, is not a blank. Nor is it merely naïve, or conventional, or allergic to distinctions. But, good or poor, it is uniquely his. And the teacher, if he is to ring a bell in it, must speak to its condition. Which accordingly he must have it in him to divine. "Put out your tongue," the doctor used to say. "Trot out your presuppositions, your dogmatisms, and your quirks," the academic therapist comes close to saying. His function is not everyone's affair. His like are few, and precious. The Syllabus rather assumes their presence in good supply. Would they be very hard to train? There lies the crux.

But this takes also for granted the social acceptability of the teaching. "A valid science of international relations," writes Professor Quincy Wright, "might cause as much agitation among advocates of some current values, as did the physical sciences of Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes among the advocates of certain values of their period" (p. 508).

Such a "valid science" was, however, as we saw, to be something rather for the future, and having little intrinsically to do with the mere teaching medium that is being considered here. As a science in its own

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right it will have its own system of concepts, its bag of analytical tricks, hardly less esoteric perhaps than those of the physicist for his field of specialized investigation; whereas the Structure subject could never think to set itself up as rigorously and consistently scientific. Its concepts, thought inquiringly employed, are largely those of the ordinary official and of the common herd. Issues may moreover be of concern to man as man, without being the business of science as science; and these the subject does not on principle neglect. It straddles without embarrassment the distinction between the strictly, and the meta-, scientific; it is the *un*-scientific that it would seek to eschew. For its humanistic venturings into the realm of the philosophical it offers no excuses. For none, it feels, are needed. Nor has it, thus far, been vocally reproached on their account.

Probably, however, it is a trifle early to be considering with what quantum of trust, or lack of trust, the Structure subject is regarded. More prevalent than either is a chilling unconcern, interspersed with areas of unawareness of the subject's very conceivability. Yet, even if having heard of it, there might seem to be few who are sympathetically alert to its specific pretensions. A reviewer, for instance, of the Goodwin booklet was resistant to the thought of having students try to see things as they must present themselves "to the experienced statesman's eye."[8] Had there indeed been, as he implied, a proposal for producing "little statesmen," he would doubtless have been right. There is, for a girl, but one way of attaining motherhood. No military manual can give a soldier his baptism of fire. But a good one might prepare him to endure it. The daughter, listen she never so raptly to a mother's conversation, does not so become a little mother. Yet some things, even so, she may begin to see as through a mother's eye. What history teacher would wish to suppress in his pupils an ambition to experience the problems of an earlier age as they will have looked to the men of the time? Only let the men in question have been long enough dead, and that is all right. But why in the name of Thucydides should an exercise so propitious when practiced, in imagination, at the Rubicons of the past become impoverishing, if not impious, if applied at the Yalus of the here and now? It was an admired historian who, in the writer's recollection, applied the adjective "impoverishing" to "the study of the present." Not that International Relations could ever be solely that.

The case, in short, for a less hesitant accommodating of Structure hangs not merely upon the perils, great though they are, of political

[8] Unsigned review of G. L. Goodwin, *The University Teaching of International Relations*, in *Times Educational Supplement*, February 15, 1952.

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illiteracy. It is the case, not just for citizenship, but for education. Its assumption regarding education is, however, that, though not a political grooming, it is indeed a preparation for life. A life, however, in freedom: in vigilance, therefore, and in deliverance from the crafty assaults of the brainwasher and the player upon unexamined doubts.

Whereas in present circumstances the subject might, one fears, all too easily come to suffer at the guileless hands of those with little sense of what their voting was basically about. For what the skeptic would be objecting to might well be little better than a private mental construct of his own. By one—an academic historian who might have been expected to know better—the concept of the structure of international society was, by implication, accounted for as presumably a development of historical determinism. Almost it was as if the Tory underdog were to declare against capital punishment from a feeling that capital had by this time been punished enough.

Hardly less sinister, and just as fallacious, is the doctrine that because a subject is difficult to begin on in one's dotage, or even in middle life, it must be still more difficult to embark upon when one is young. Whoever would think to accept such an argument as against, say, the teaching of the fiddle to the under-tens? Yet, because some man who, not having himself had Structure, finds research in international problems, at the graduate level, too full, for him, of traps, that very teaching which, if given with skill and insight, might, betimes, have forewarned him of the traps may well be written off as evidently at best a vain attempt to lay upon an infant a burden too heavy for a man. Most subjects have their more advanced forms; by the test of these alone, they cannot but seem advanced. Some subjects have also their A.B.C. International Relations is one of these; and its A.B.C. is Structure.

There may thus on the whole be occasion for thankfulness in the very presence of the subject in Part I. How did it get there at all? Someday Clio might be curious to know. Will she be told that that is "classified" information? This looks quite a question. The fact is, of course, that, placed in these pages, this article is perhaps a little out of place. In a journal so named as this one, it is with the politics of a wider world that contributors will ordinarily deal—not with those of the university world. There is presumably no "world" but has its politics, its connoisseurs, its types of "worldly" wisdom. And, were there presently to be established, on the *World Politics* model, a brand-new *University World Politics*, it should have plenty to consider. However, the absence of such a journal is perhaps itself referable to the politics of the uni-

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versity world. Don, shall we say, don't eat don. The following story, however, is scarcely of the non-releasable kind. The truth simply is that, in 1949, when the "new (revised)" regulations, under which the B.Sc. would, in place of "Intermediate" and "Finals," come to consist of Parts I and II, were already in an advanced stage of incubation, International Relations was still only envisaged as a possibility for Part II. Since however it was now being proposed normally to allow, for the candidates' Part II preparation, no more than a twelvemonth—a period which, ample as it might be for dotting the i's of a three years' course in, say, Economics, was manifestly insufficient for a study "from scratch" of anything so exuberant as International Relations—the necessity was conceded of admitting the latter into Part I, in some suitable form. It is a familiar pattern: architectural alterations—displaced person—alternative accommodation—last state of that man not necessarily worse than the first. And credit, if any, where credit is due.

A salutary new departure, let us say, whether a generous inspiration or not. For not only would the specializers henceforth have their subject, however unobtrusively, upon their agenda for their full three years, compared with two under the old order of things; but, for some at least of those with prospective specialisms other than No. 12, the chance would now be open of embracing at an impressionable stage this not obviously unwholesome ancillary[9]—to serve, one might hope, as a factor for the interrelating of their other assignments, and a site for their establishing, in a possible tomorrow, a well-found edifice of pluri-ocular expertise.

One thinks, for example, of the specializers in Government. There has in recent years been a spreading recognition of the interconnectedness of Government alias Public Administration alias Politics alias Political Science, on the one hand, and International Politics alias International Relations, on the other. There are some indeed who would say, for students of either, the inclusion of the other, as an underpinner, was a "must." To this position the London Syllabus does not at present subscribe. Government being in any case obligatory for all and sundry, the question of its differential imposition upon a particular group of candidates could hardly arise. For specializers in Government, on the other hand, The Structure of International Society is there for them to take who choose to. Some do not. Some do. And it is not here in-

[9] A question of interpretation presented by results in a recent summer was whether it was the better candidates who had tended to take Structure, or whether those taking Structure had tended to do well.

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tended to imply that there is necessarily a "correct"[10] solution to the questions involved.

Some do not. And some probably do not even know the point of it. Would we, but for certain pioneers, have seen so soon the point of Economics? Even the layman may feel beholden to those who first put Economics, as a possibility, on the map. The revisionists of 1949 may yet be recognized as having builded better than they knew. Meanwhile it is remarkable with what competence in related fields a man may still join an ignorance, if not of the very possibility, at least of the applications, of Structure. Lately, for example, at a Congress, a British scholar was understood to advise that, in a colloquy on great and small states, terms like "sovereignty" and "independence" should be avoided as unsuited to the position of our day. And what would you propose, inquired a Pakistani dryly, to do with "statehood"? Not for the first time had the well-intentioned de-mythologizer overlooked the relation between the bathwater and the babe.

International understanding, a prerequisite of peace; understanding of matters international, a prerequisite of international understanding; schooling to the business, as the road thereto; and esteem for them who saw to seek the road—such was apparently the logic of those, the leaders of Rotary International District 13 (London), who in 1955 instituted their Golden Anniversary Prize. In notifying their membership of this decision, they said: "The 'Structure' subject . . . is, it is claimed, the beginning of what may presently prove an important new development in the educational field. For it seeks to provide a workable answer to the widely acknowledged need for some corrective to the latter day tendency to over-specialisation and to the 'fragmentation of knowledge,' from which, one would hope, the new generation must, if there by any way of ensuring this, be spared." The Prize would be awarded annually to the candidate who achieved the best performance in the B.Sc., having included among his subjects The Structure of International Society.[11]

The disabilities borne by anyone to whom an early appreciation of the fundamentals of the world-wide social setup has in effect been denied may be likened to those of an urchin sent on errands through busy streets with bandaged eyes. It is as himself having worn such a bandage that the writer feels strongly on the point. He is puzzled by the nonchalance with which the relatively elderly will, in effect, bar discussion of the modes of modern warfare in their bearing upon the upbringing

[10] Cf. UNESCO, *Teaching of Social Sciences: Political Science*, Paris, 1954, pp. 61-66.
[11] *Greater London Radius*, February 23, 1955, p. 361.

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of the young. Could a profounder understanding by these latter of the planetary political process mean nothing to their prospect of averting the ultimate form of such warfare in their day? And, the atom apart, what of the psychological and sociological forms? Why leave the future so defenseless in face of these? *Après nous le déluge*? One does not gladly impute a lack of social responsibility to one's colleagues, especially in universities other than one's own; but the quality is not endemic in the species, and there is nothing in the nature of the academic ladder to guarantee its preponderance in such as reach the top. And the fact rather probably is that those, if any, who in particular universities might have power to put over a reform of their curriculum are relatively eminent, relatively elderly, and relatively few.

All this without reference, so far, to Britain's responsibilities as a pillar of the peace. Any failure on her part in the furnishing of weapons or the raising of men would be learned about with shame. But when, by contrast, it comes to forearming people's minds, by modernizing their intellectual defenses in the light of the new strategies of attack, the fate foreseeable for any such idea is itself a success—for others—in the psychological war.

The army whose commander relies rather upon hunch than good intelligence will not do the best with his troops, brave fellows though they be. A democracy is like an army whose decisions to fight are made on a vote of the rank and file. If, in the 1930's, half a hundred Englishmen had had as true a feeling for how things happen in the game of diplomatics as had half a hundred thousand for what can occur at cricket, public judgment at certain moments might not have fallen down. For, whereas in almost any company there will be knowledgeable comment on the national game, anent the national interest the same cannot equally be said.

What in part saved Britain—and Western freedom with her—in the early 1940's was her possession of two elements of self-defense: for detecting hostile aircraft, a radar system, and for interpreting its intimations, a personnel. So Britain was like an insect, with antennae, and with the instinct for responding to what they said. Today, when the cry is for more technology to exploit the new techniques, less is heard of the need of social diagnostics, for want of which the next generation may nevertheless be at the mercy of the quacks.

There'll always be an England: of this the English will usually declare themselves assured. But deprive a species of its antennae, and see what happens then. It may be best therefore not to pitch too high

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the claims of the London Syllabus to be precluding a repetition of what happened before. The electorate are still rather largely in the position of those lads who in World War I were let out on reconnaissance with only a casual introduction to the compass and the map.

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ECONOMIC GROWTH, COERCION, AND FREEDOM*

By KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR.

THE flood of attention that underdeveloped economies have received in recent years has revived interest in the normative questions of political economy. For the society that stands on the threshold of development apparently can choose among economic systems with different normative properties, each one of which claims enthusiastic followers. One such question concerns the impact of economic organization on freedom. Does a centrally administered economy restrict freedom by achieving its objectives through coercive means? Is the market economy fundamental to free institutions? Difficult though these questions are, normative judgments about economic organization in underdeveloped, as well as in mature, economies depend on answers to them. But because these answers are often concealed in one's value premises, they contribute little more to understanding of social phenomena than to acrimonious debate.

In the hope that we can come to a clearer appreciation of the relationship between economic organization and freedom, we shall examine the coercive impact of economic growth. Coercion provides the focus of our analysis because it is easier to observe than freedom—its presence or absence, in fact, typically being taken as the criterion of freedom. We shall search for manifestations of coercion in the context of a growing economy because in the Western world, with which we are concerned, growth has been the outstanding feature of economic organization. Further, we shall be concerned with a particular stage of growth—the Industrial Revolution—in two different countries, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and shall try to isolate the relevant elements common to both. The reader should be cautioned that the analysis which follows is of an exploratory nature and therefore tentative. He also should be prepared for an interpretation of a familiar social phenomenon, rather than for revelations of previously unknown data. Before we can proceed, however, we must first devote some space to definitional matters.

* I am indebted to Rudolph C. Blitz, Bert G. Hickman, and Leften S. Stavrianos for valuable comments in connection with the preparation of this article.

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I. Coercion and Economic Growth Defined

As a first approximation, coercion may be defined as the act by which one individual (or group) compels another individual (or group) to behave in a way that conflicts with his (or its) preferences or conscience. It is, in other words, a means by which A controls the behavior of B. In this sense, any social organization will depend in some degree upon coercion, for the very purpose of organization is to coordinate and hence make coherent the actions of individuals with diverse and often conflicting preferences.

Economic organization, for example, is necessitated by the fact that the supply of resources is limited relative to the possible uses for them. A system must be evolved for setting up priorities in resource utilization. Positively, it must determine what and how much to produce; negatively, it must decide whose share of the national product will be limited and by how much. The exigencies of scarcity, then, make it incumbent on society to restrain those individuals who have received disproportionately small shares in the distribution of the product.

Similarly, the need for political organization arises because the maintenance of social order is requisite to the satisfaction of certain types of wants. Security cannot be enjoyed by one individual unless he is protected from the actions of other individuals which may jeopardize his position or status. Each individual must be restrained in the interests of protecting the security of all.

Analysis of the coercion resulting from economic growth is complicated by its apparent ubiquity in social organization. It is further complicated by the subjective character of the norms by which one evaluates coercion. Coercion has both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension, the latter being a measure of the impact of the former. A system of urban traffic regulation, for instance, controls the behavior of all pedestrians and motorists—quantitatively, it has coercive effects on everyone. The extent to which the system proves frustrating, however, depends upon the norms which particular individuals use to evaluate it—qualitatively, its coercive effect varies among individuals.

It is quite clear that in microcosm these difficulties are insurmountable. In order to have a valid notion of the coercive impact of social organization on individual behavior, one would have to understand the psyche of the individuals involved. Such knowledge, if not beyond the competence of the psychologist, is certainly beyond that of the economist or the political scientist.

The difficulties of microcosmic analysis, however, by no means rule

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out the possibility of macrocosmic analysis. We can perhaps point to some factors in society which create the presumption that certain *groups* are subject to coercive pressures, even though we will not know the intensity of these pressures on the various individuals which compose the group. In the event of war, the men in the age group liable to military service must join the armed forces. Given the historical antipathy to military service in the United States, we can presume that this group is coerced, in the sense that most of its members would not choose to join the armed forces in the absence of the sanctions requiring it. Similarly, in analyzing economic growth we shall attempt to identify those groups whose behavior may be presumed to have been forcibly changed by the process.

As a means of facilitating this analysis it will be convenient to distinguish between two types of factors: (1) the objective conditions controlling the environment in which behavior takes place; and (2) the ideology affecting the norms by which man evaluates such behavior. To return to the example cited above, a state of war is an objective condition, while the historical tradition and system of beliefs which shape our attitudes about conscription comprise the ideology. Obviously, these two factors affect one another. A declaration of war alters ideological commitments, raising the sense of moral obligation to society and lowering the importance of private interests, so that the individual is likely to feel less coerced by conscription in time of war than in time of peace. Nonetheless, the distinction is sufficiently clear to assert *a priori* that the coercion manifested in social organization becomes more intense the more the objective behavioral situation in which individuals find themselves is offensive to their ideological preconceptions about behavior.

Since coercion can manifest itself in different ways, it will also be convenient to distinguish between *explicit* and *implicit* coercion. Coercion is explicit where specific and easily identifiable organs of society compel people to behave in some particular way. The police power of the state often depends upon the use of explicit coercion. On the other hand, coercion is implicit when the structure of, and the values symbolized by, social institutions restrain the behavior of individuals. Insofar as a price system controls the behavior of individuals, it exerts implicit coercion. When an individual must remain outside the market for a commodity he wants, but which he is unable to buy for lack of income, he is being coerced by the whole economic organization rather than by a particular element within it. Explicit coercion is personalized, where implicit coercion is impersonalized. In the former case, the co-

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erced can confront, and indeed is usually confronted by, the wielder of coercion; in the latter case, he is not so keenly aware of the specific source of the restraints on his behavior.

It is true that the conceptual distinction being drawn here is not always easy to identify in practice because explicit coercion gradually shades off into implicit coercion. For every person who conforms to traffic regulations for fear of being arrested by an officer of the law, there are undoubtedly many others who simply conform to the abstract notion of the law and, in fact, their compliance may be so complete that one could hardly call them coerced. We are, then, dealing with a continuum, one pole of which is explicit coercion while the other is implicit coercion.

Economic growth is what we have previously referred to as an objective condition. It may be defined as the increase over time of the per capita output of goods and services.[1] Such an increase in output may be brought about by the following means: (1) the employment of previously unemployed resources by a given economic organization in a given state of technology; (2) reorganizing a given quantity of resources in a given state of technology, i.e., moving workers from less valued to more valued employment; or (3) raising the technical efficiency of a given labor force in a given economic organization through investment. Of these alternatives the third is the most significant source of growth. Unemployment, whether open or hidden, cannot serve as a continuously full reservoir out of which output increases can always be drawn.[2] Nor is it likely that an autonomous reallocation of labor will be an important means of increasing per capita output. Investment, on the other hand, increases the productivity of a given labor force and hence raises the output capacity of an economic organization.

The amount of investment that an economy can make depends upon

[1] There are, however, difficulties with the concept of growth. As an indicator of "welfare," it is by no means unambiguous. Insofar as growth has repercussions on the distribution of income, the well-known problems raised by the impossibility of making interpersonal comparisons of utility plague the analyst. Moreover, even if one is only concerned with the measurement of aggregate income, irrespective of its influence on "welfare," it is not always possible to tell when an "aggregate" increases, given a change in the composition of output and a change in price ratios. Here, however, we are concerned with economic growth as a process rather than as a measure of "economic welfare" or material wealth.

[2] Hidden unemployment refers to a situation in which resources are organized so inefficiently that the marginal product of labor in some occupations is zero, or less than zero. Thus it is possible to withdraw labor from these occupations without diminishing total output. Employing this reserve of labor in new occupations will be costless in the same sense that the employment of unemployed workers is costless. This situation is alleged to be not uncommon in underdeveloped agricultural economies.

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the size of the gap that it can maintain between net national product and the output of consumers' goods and services. This in turn depends upon the absolute size of the net national product. Here we can distinguish between two different cases in terms of the objective conditions with which society might be faced. In one, the net national product may be so large that the economy has difficulty in maintaining sufficient investment opportunities to offset the savings that the community is capable of making at full employment. In this case, economic growth could be a source of embarrassment to the economy by increasing its capacity to save and hence perpetuating an underemployment situation. In the other, the case more important for this paper, the net national product may be so small that the community may attempt to consume the greater part of it. Economic growth, then, might require that consumption be restrained in the interests of preserving the investment surplus.

Not only will investment under certain conditions depend upon a policy of forced savings, but it also will necessitate a reorganization of labor. Whether investment expands existing capacity, adapts new commodities into an economy, or introduces new methods of producing old commodities, the labor force will have to adjust to the disposition of capital. Adjustment may require either that workers move from one industry to another or that they move from one employment to another in the same industry. In any event, the changes in the structure of the economy occasioned by the investment process cannot take place without a simultaneous rational direction of labor. Now there is no reason to assume that such adjustments will be made voluntarily. Only if the ideological beliefs of society are such that it places a high value on mobility and industrial discipline will they appear to be voluntary. Otherwise, workers will be compelled through one means or another to fit the employment pattern required by investment.

These twin requirements of investment—the maintenance of the gap between net national product and the output of consumers' goods and services and the maintenance of labor mobility and discipline—provide a convenient point of departure for an examination of the relationship between economic growth and coercion. These are objective conditions which will prevail wherever and whenever economic growth takes place. We shall examine some of the economic and non-economic factors, first in Great Britain and then in the Soviet Union, which facilitated the meeting of these twin requirements during the Industrial Revolution. We shall then assess their coercive impact in terms of the ideologies prevailing in the two countries.

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II. The Industrial Revolution in Great Britain

THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS

In the years from 1760 to 1840 Great Britain developed the characteristics of industrial society: the factory system and wage labor; high urban population concentrations; a systematic internal transportation network; capital intensive methods of production. So profound were these developments that the period traditionally is called the Industrial Revolution. In only little more than two generations the feudal and mercantilistic organization of economic activity was replaced by self-regulating markets. A new way of life arose which was both cause and effect of the industrial age. Great Britain in 1840 was significantly different from Great Britain in 1760.

The story of the Industrial Revolution is so familiar that it hardly needs to be repeated here in any detail. In the eighteenth century, the increased demand for goods arising from the expansion of world markets revealed a series of bottlenecks which restricted the productive capacity of the British economy. These bottlenecks stimulated people, close enough to the production processes to be aware of their technological inadequacies, to experiment with new methods of production. Entrepreneurship flourished and, in consequence, as the eighteenth century unfolded, one bottleneck after another was broken. The internal transportation system, which early in the century was almost inoperative, was improved by the construction of canals and turnpikes. The open field system was destroyed by the enclosures in the last half of the century. The disaster facing the iron industry because of the disappearance of the forest was averted by the perfection of the coking process. In the textile industry a series of mechanical inventions made the factory system a more economical form of organization than the domestic system, and, when Watt perfected the steam engine, it became possible for the factory to be located in urban areas. Watt's steam engine also facilitated the drainage of the coal mines, giving an impetus to the production of coal.[3]

By the turn of the nineteenth century the British economy was rapidly approaching the railway age. The shackles of mercantilism had

[3] See, for example, T. S. Ashton, *The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830*, London, 1948, pp. 58-93; Barbara and J. L. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry*, London, 1926, pp. 66-189; Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd ed., trans. by Marjorie Vernon, London, 1926, pp. 193-346; Witt Bowden, *Industrial Society in England Towards the End of the Eighteenth Century*, New York, 1925, pp. 70-135; Arnold Toynbee, *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the 18th Century in England*, London, 1908, pp. 7-34, 64-73.

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been perceptibly loosened and, if there were still abundant traces of the older forms of economic organization, the future nonetheless lay with industrial capitalism. The metamorphosis and expansion of the textile industry and the increasing utilization of steam by British firms created a greater market for the products of the metallurgical industry, the development of which eventually made possible the construction of railways.

There can be little disagreement that these were the salient "real" features of the Industrial Revolution. One can argue about the quantitative significance of the factory system vis-à-vis the domestic system in the textile industry in 1800, but one can hardly question the statement that the textile industry had adapted itself to factory production before the opening of the railway age. Much less clear, indeed quite ambiguous, was the behavior of the prices and income which translated the "real" events of the Industrial Revolution into the "money" values of the market. We know *a priori*, as suggested in the previous section, that an accelerated rate of capital formation, such as occurred in England after 1760, required that society not consume all of the increment to currently produced income. Accordingly, we may suspect that the Industrial Revolution required a widening of income inequality in order to establish a marginal propensity to save appropriate to the prevailing rate of investment. Unfortunately, attempts to confirm such a hypothesis are inevitably frustrated by the paucity of reliable empirical data.

One could cite authorities who believe that the distribution of income became more unequal during the Industrial Revolution, but their evidence is no more convincing than the inferences which can be drawn from the nature of the objective environment out of which industrial capitalism emerged.[4] The entrepreneurs who pioneered the new indus-

[4] Professor Earl Hamilton, for example, believes "that a considerable lag of wages behind prices, hitherto an unnoticed factor, facilitated the Industrial Revolution, during the critical period" ("Prices, Wages, and the Industrial Revolution," *Studies in Economics and Industrial Relations*, Philadelphia, 1941, p. 100). Although Professor Kuznets is reluctant to commit himself because of the inadequacy of the empirical evidence, he says, "I would place the early phase in which income inequality might have been widening from about 1780 to 1850 in England" ("Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review*, XLV, March 1955, p. 19). As one might expect, John Maynard Keynes felt no compunctions about asserting his position: "The capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part of the cake theirs and were theoretically free to consume it, on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed very little of it in practice. The duty of 'saving' became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake the object of true religion" (*The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, New York, 1920, p. 20). On the other hand, Mantoux was quite unwilling to generalize on the basis of the available evidence. "But, in our opinion, it would be rash to attempt to draw a general price curve on the basis of such approximate figures, as it could only

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trial techniques did not have ready access to a supply of capital. In the middle of the eighteenth century, investment in industrial enterprise, with its commitments to fixed assets, had not yet become common. Merchant capitalists invested in shipping and commercial enterprise and in the construction of turnpikes and canals. The less intrepid placed their savings in the "funds." Moreover, the center of industrial development in Yorkshire and Lancashire was far removed from the financial and banking centers in London. Country bankers were accustomed to lending funds to mercantile enterprise where the rate of turnover assured a fairly high degree of liquidity and they often were unwilling to finance the investment projects of the budding industrialists. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that on balance capital flowed from industry to banking rather than from banking to industry during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.[5] Furthermore, the joint-stock company was not yet the common form of organization in industrial enterprise. It was not possible, then, to reach the saving public by selling shares.

Confronted by these difficulties so typical of the capital supply in underdeveloped economies, entrepreneurs could most expeditiously finance industrial growth through retained earnings, a process facilitated by the rise of prices relative to wages—in other words, by a widening of the inequality of income.

Where there has been a widening of the inequality of income, one would expect to observe that the political and social institutions containing the economy in some way favor the groups whose relative income has risen. Income shares represent claims on the national product and the distribution of income is the outcome of the struggle of various groups for these claims. This struggle, however, is governed according to the behavioral precepts established by the existing social order.

In the England of the Industrial Revolution, political and social institutions quite evidently restrained the behavior of some groups more than others. In the last half of the eighteenth century, political power inhered in an aristocratic oligarchy. Men whose wealth and prestige were based on the ownership of land presided over the momentous changes which eventually deprived land of its power. And if in the

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be done at the expense of scientific honesty; and *a fortiori* an attempt to make any mathematical comparison between the movement of prices and wages could only result in mystification" (Mantoux, *op.cit.*, p. 439).

[5] Cf. T. Ashton, *Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution*, London, 1924, pp. 226-31; George Unwin, Introduction to G. W. Daniels, *The Early English Cotton Industry*, London, 1920, pp. xxix-xxxi.

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nineteenth century the aristocratic monopoly of political power was broken by the Reform Bill of 1832, the privileges of political life were only extended to a precious few, the members of the upper middle class. The latter, having acquired these privileges, were more than willing to ally themselves with their old adversaries in holding the fort against the repeated assaults of the Chartists in the late 1830's and 1840's. Throughout the Industrial Revolution, then, the unenfranchised, the working classes, had no opportunity to influence directly through government the rules of conduct that established the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate behavior. The wage-earner, more than other economic interest groups, was forced to abide by the verdict of the market. He could not influence the distribution of income through political means.

The political weakness of the worker was further reflected in the weakness of the trade union, which never really became an effective organization for bargaining over wage-rates during the Industrial Revolution. In the eighteenth century, the friendly societies occasionally broke out in rashes of union activity, but these attempts to manipulate wages were aborted by the common law and statutory prohibitions against combinations in restraint of trade. And even if the legal framework of eighteenth-century Britain had been more favorable to trade union growth, it is doubtful whether the industrialization process had gone far enough to create the bricks and mortar of a strong union movement, that is, a large working class rationally aware of the potential benefits of organized action.

While the trade unions had not yet been born, the medieval guilds had almost become moribund. Many of their regulatory functions had been taken over by the state in accordance with mercantilist prescription during the commercial revolution. Further, the growth of the domestic system of production had increased the proportion of workers who performed their tasks outside the jurisdiction of the guild. Even so, it is doubtful whether the guilds, rooted as they were in the parochial world of local markets, were organizations capable of representing the interests of the expanding proletariat.

The atrophy of the guilds and the delayed growth of the trade unions were symptomatic of the hiatus, so successfully exploited by industrial capitalism, between the old world of corporate responsibility and the new world of individual responsibility. By the end of the century the whole complex of corporate laws and institutions, of which the guild was but one part, had become obsolete. The Elizabethan Poor Law and the Statute of Artificers, for example, were perhaps appropriate for the

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relatively changeless world of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but were unequal to the task of achieving their intended objectives when the world began to be characterized by a rapidly growing population and a rapid expansion of industrial production. But the void created by the obsolescence of these institutions was not immediately filled by the growth of new institutions through which the worker could protect himself from the social costs of self-regulating markets.

As the tempo of the Industrial Revolution picked up during the nineteenth century, the ranks of the proletariat increased. Although ostensibly aided by the repeal of the Combination Acts of 1824, the trade unions still were not able to achieve permanent organization. Not only was the government willing to persecute union members when successful organizational action seemed imminent, but the instability of income in industrial capitalism inhibited the building-up of the financial strength of the unions. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, a period with which we are not concerned here, that the union movement established a firm foundation in Great Britain, and then, it is important to note, primarily among the skilled workers.

The absence of political democracy and of an independent union movement compelled the worker to accept the verdict of the market with respect to the distribution of income. Industrial capitalism thus developed amidst institutions which prevented the investment surplus from being dissipated in additional consumption.

The same institutional structure also made possible the molding of a labor force that would respond to the allocation demands of investment. At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution the labor force, far from having acquired the mobility essential for a viable industrial economy, was habituated to the relatively static pattern of mercantilistic-feudalist society. There was no system of nation-wide labor markets which rationally directed the services of labor among alternative occupations. Nor was there an acceptance, or even a realization, of the need for industrial discipline. One does not swallow Engels' version of the life of the English peasant prior to the Industrial Revolution in recognizing the new rhythm of life it imposed on the worker.[6] If the hours of labor were not longer with the advent of the factory, they were more regular and disciplined. Accordingly, it is not self-evident that a laboring population accustomed to one way of life voluntarily embraced another way of life whose disciplinary demands were symbolized by the factory.

[6] Frederick Engels, *The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844*, trans. by Florence K. Wischnewetzky, London, 1892, pp. 3-4.

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In the eighteenth century, the enclosure acts passed by Parliament at the behest of the wealthier landed interests struck a damaging blow at the foundations of rural life. However beneficial the enclosures were in increasing the productivity of British agriculture, they nonetheless dispossessed many peasants who could not establish a legal claim to the commons, or, if they could, were not able to afford the expense of enclosing the land allotted to them. A class policy formulated and acted upon through existing political institutions had the effect of pushing peasants off the land and creating a potential proletariat susceptible to the wage offers emanating from industrial development.[7]

While the enclosure movement had almost run its course by the nineteenth century, population continued to expand in the industrial centers. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the workers, although attracted by the higher and steadier wages that could be earned in factory employment than in domestic industry, had not yet become acclimated to industrial existence. The proverbial turbulence of the period, at least, suggests that significant numbers of workers resented the restraints imposed upon them by the unaccustomed discipline of the factory. No doubt, there is an element of truth in the notion that posterity has received a distorted view of the Industrial Revolution because of the excessive preoccupation of historians, political philosophers, economists, and others who have chronicled this epoch of British development with the plight of the handloom weavers and their ilk, those groups who remained outside the factory and perhaps for this reason suffered the most from the rise of the factory.[8] If, however, rebellion started among these marginal workers, it touched off a sympathetic response in the factory operatives. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the massive proportions of the unrest of the age. Luddism, the abortive march of the "Blanketeers" in 1817, the Peterloo massacres two years later, the revolt of the agricultural workers in 1830, the meteoric rise and precipitous decline of the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union, Owenite socialism, the Ten Hours Movement, and Chartism—the concrete manifestations of the rebellious adolescence of the growing

[7] Cf. Ashton, *The Industrial Revolution*, pp. 25-26; Barbara and J. L. Hammond, *The Village Labourer, 1760-1832*, London, 1911, pp. 43-96; W. Hasbach, *A History of the English Agricultural Labourer*, trans. by Ruth Kenyon, London, 1920, pp. 103-47; Arthur H. Johnson, *The Disappearance of the Small Landowner*, Oxford, 1909, pp. 83-106; Gilbert Slater, *The English Peasantry and the Enclosure of Common Fields*, London, 1907, pp. 91-116.

[8] This point of view is presented most persuasively by T. S. Ashton in "The Standard of Life of the Workers in England, 1790-1830," *Capitalism and the Historians*, ed. by F. A. Hayek, Chicago, 1954, pp. 127-59.

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industrial labor force—cannot all be attributed to the sweated labor of the still remaining domestic workers.

These mass movements, which seemed all the more menacing to the upper classes because of the inability of local law enforcement agencies to mobilize quickly and effectively the means for controlling the mob, were met firmly by Parliament. The Luddites were subdued after the breaking of machines had been made a capital offense. In 1819 the passage of the Six Acts narrowly circumscribed civil liberties by increasing the power of the magistrates to deal with subversion. Nor did the government scruple in transporting workers to Australia when it considered that the occasion warranted such punishment. The number of individuals who suffered the immediate consequences of these coercive measures was small, but it is reasonable to infer that large numbers of people felt their burden indirectly simply in knowing that the government would deal harshly with anyone who stepped outside the bounds of legitimate behavior. If many people did not transgress these bounds, they also did not participate in the setting of them. The repressive policies of government, as dramatized in action taken against a minority, were a parameter to which the majority adapted as best it could.

After 1832 the middle classes, whose restiveness had been placated by the Reform Bill, made their unique contribution to the institutions by which labor was made amenable to the allocative requirements of industrial capitalism. The Poor Law was radically revised. The Speenhamland system of grants-in-aid of wages, established by the Berkshire magistrates in 1795, was jettisoned by Parliament in 1834 and replaced by the union workhouse, that curious amalgam of Utilitarian and Malthusian dogma which memorialized the principle of less eligibility. The deterrent effect of the workhouse by no means solved the problem of poverty—the level of income was still too low and the fluctuations of income too violent to allow such a simple solution—but, as a symbol of the triumph of the canons of individual responsibility over those of corporate responsibility, it strengthened the disciplinary impact of unemployment. The bargaining position of the worker vis-à-vis the employer, always weak because of the distribution of both material and non-material assets in favor of the latter, was further weakened by the uncertainty of job tenure and the imminence of the workhouse. A job acquired such importance that the worker could not always afford to bargain over the terms of employment; he had then to adjust to the demands of the employer.

In summary, the objective conditions governing the course of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain clearly had a coercive effect on

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society. The absence of political democracy and the weakness of trade unions allowed the entrepreneurial minority to effect the structural economic changes essential to industrial development without being inhibited by the behavior of the laboring majority. The industrial labor force was coerced into being—explicitly coerced by the enclosure commissioners, for example, and implicitly coerced by the technological developments which altered the employment opportunities as between town and country. As the industrial labor force expanded in the nineteenth century, workers continued to be coerced—explicitly coerced by the police power of the state when their actions were thought to be a threat to the political order, and implicitly coerced by the dramatic instability of industrial capitalism. The labor force was thus disciplined to the requirements imposed upon it by an accelerated rate of capital accumulation as well as prevented from placing too onerous demands on the national product.

Before considering the ideological influences, it is relevant to observe that as the Industrial Revolution developed beyond a certain critical stage—perhaps the fourth decade of the nineteenth century—elements in the objective environment started to lower perceptibly the coercive potential of economic growth. The national product had risen enough to allow the real income of many workers to increase without reducing the investment surplus. At some point between the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and the middle of the century, real wages increased. Commodity prices fell relative to money wages as competition spread the benefits of cost-reducing investment. The tariff reforms prior to the abolition of the Corn Laws also exerted a downward influence on prices. Moreover, the terms of trade favored England during a greater part of the period.[9] At the end of the Industrial Revolution, many workers had raised their standards of consumption and some had increased their level of savings as well. Economic growth contained within itself the means of ameliorating its coercive impact.

Furthermore, while it destroyed many handicrafts, the Industrial Revolution proliferated the number of skilled and semi-skilled industrial occupations on which the economy depended. There were, then, employment opportunities created that tended to increase the degree of upward social mobility, at least within the broad aggregate we have called the working classes. Rather than increasing the homogeneity of the class structure, as Marx would have had us believe, the Industrial Revolution increased its heterogeneity. Some workers thereby acquired

[9] Cf. W. W. Rostow, *British Economy of the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1948, pp. 17-19.

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a special stake in the system. Finally, the labor force became further removed from the mercantilist world, the further the nineteenth century advanced. A new generation of workers whose links with that world were weak and who were more accustomed than their fathers to the ways of the industrial world formed the core of the labor force. Being more completely a part of one way of life, the workers were more likely to become habituated to the values it represented.

THE IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

However evident the signs of coercion in the Great Britain of the Industrial Revolution, the appropriate means for assessing them are not so evident. We have already suggested that subjective reactions to the incidence of coercion vary; one man may voice bitter resentment against restraint, while another acquiesces without overt opposition. Yet the former, having expressed his antagonism, may suffer less than the latter, who represses his frustration. Notwithstanding the obvious relevance of these psychological responses, they lie outside the scope of this article. Admittedly, the subsequent analysis will suffer from the defects that frequently plague aggregative analysis—although it may reveal the forest, the trees will still be obscure. We shall presume to evaluate class reactions, but not individual reactions.

During the Industrial Revolution a rich offering of ideology stood ready at hand for the interested person, whether entrepreneur or worker. The publication of *The Wealth of Nations* by Adam Smith launched political economy on what turned out to be one of the more illuminating voyages in the history of economic thought. Closely paralleling classical political economy, and often relying on it for its substantive arguments, Utilitarianism, somewhat immodestly, took the whole social universe for its oyster and purported to explain its mysteries by means of the utility calculus. For those who were disturbed by the disrupting effect of these ideologies on existing institutions there was the conservative philosophy of Edmund Burke, which sanctified tradition and condoned change only when necessary for the preservation of conventional society, or the critical protestations of the early British socialists, who viewed industrial capitalism as the disinheritor of the workers. And standing athwart the Industrial Revolution was the French Revolution, which propagated democratic and republican principles and placed before society the claims of man to those inalienable rights which, as fashioned by the French *philosophes* out of the raw material left by John Locke, eventually became the inspirer of revolt.

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Out of these diverse ideologies one could with little difficulty formulate a mental picture of the world which would rationalize and mitigate the coercive effect of industrial development. One could accept the market of the classical political economist as the appropriate means of structuring society to achieve Utilitarian ends. The prescriptions of mercantilism and the traditions of the aristocracy could be attacked in the name of society, rather than in the name of a narrow interest group within society.

The relevant question here, however, is: were the people whose behavior had to be controlled—coerced, as we have argued—in order to make way for the process of industrial growth likely to have appreciated the subtleties of classical political economy or Utilitarianism? The answer to the question, it seems safe to assert, is no. Workers who experienced the annoying problems involved in the displacement of a traditional by an industrial existence—learning a new job, finding a new home, making new friends, in short, establishing a new way of life—could hardly espouse an ideology which, in concentrating on long-run considerations, minimized the importance of these problems. Entrepreneurial groups, on the other hand, and those who identified their interests with them, established their place in society by choosing to function outside the traditional order. It would indeed have been remarkable if they were hostile to the ideology their behavior inspired.

We do not intend to deny that classical political economy and Utilitarianism *could* influence the subjective screen through which the worker perceived the world of reality. Undoubtedly, many workers became more libertarian and individualistic than they would have in the absence of such philosophy, but, we should insist, this influence was not evident until after the Industrial Revolution. In other words, there very likely was a lagged reaction of popular ideology to the changes in the institutions composing the objective environment. Workers do not readily comprehend political and social theory in its pristine state. Rather it has to be translated into the slogans and aphorisms which can provide the text for pamphleteers, editorial writers, trade unionists, religious leaders, do-gooders, and others who try to influence public opinion.

There certainly was no dearth of advocates of the new order during the Industrial Revolution—one only has to recall the panegyrics of Macaulay or the unctuous praise of Dr. Ure[10]—but it is questionable how far their message penetrated into the social fabric. Prior to the

[10] See Andrew Ure, *The Philosophy of Manufactures*, London, 1835.

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middle of the nineteenth century, industrialization had not yet transformed the media of communication. There were, therefore, mechanical problems which confronted anyone who wanted to disseminate news or propaganda on a wide scale. The journalist most successful in overcoming these problems was William Cobbett, but his *Political Register* was particularly insensitive to the virtues of the new industrial age.

Throughout the Industrial Revolution the working classes, it seems to us, must have held a traditional ideology, however crude, which stressed the corporate nature of society and its complex system of obligations and rights. Indeed, it is likely that by destroying the objective basis of the corporate society the Industrial Revolution made people explicitly conscious of a particular kind of social relationship which in a former age had been taken for granted. No doubt, there was a fringe, possibly a sizable fringe, of workers who because of their skills were able to establish a meaningful relationship with their fellow men in terms of the individualism of industrial capitalism. These men did not lose their sense of belonging in the cash nexus of the market. But many more workers were cut asunder from their social moorings during the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain.

If the worker did not positively embrace the ideology which rationalized the goals of entrepreneurial action, neither did he fully appreciate those ideologies that viewed the rise of industrial capitalism as an excrescence on the social organism. But where the former drew its inspiration from an abstract social structure in which the self-regarding actions of private individuals served the social interest, the latter stressed the social rights that man should have by virtue of his membership in society. Insofar as ideology as such reached the working classes, it seems apparent that Tom Paine or the early British socialists had greater appeal for the worker than did David Ricardo or Nassau W. Senior. It even seems likely that the conservative tradition had more to offer him than classical political economy. Since it stressed the corporate responsibility of society for the individual, it carried forward the canons of traditional justice, with which the worker was familiar, into the unfamiliar world of self-regulating markets.

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was nothing in the ideological influences surrounding the Industrial Revolution that propagated norms among the working classes capable of sublimating the coercive impact of economic growth. Never articulate intellectually, but as conscious as any class of the need for a meaningful relationship with and in society, workers could make sense of arguments couched in terms of rights and social justice, where they could hardly appreciate

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the properties of the system of classical political economy. The unrest that beset England during the first half of the nineteenth century indicated that the objective environment from which the Industrial Revolution emerged did not satisfy working-class standards of justice. If in the years following 1850 the coercion associated with economic growth became less severe, it was not only because of a greater acceptance of laissez-faire. It was also because national income had become large enough to make further growth possible at the same time that the working classes reestablished themselves in society through political action and the organization of trade unions.

III. The Industrial Revolution in Soviet Russia

The objective conditions

Although Russia entered a period of relatively rapid economic development toward the end of the nineteenth century, the impetus given to growth was subsequently aborted by recurring war, revolution, and counterrevolution in the twentieth century. Since Soviet economic policy for the first ten years after 1917 aimed primarily at consolidating Soviet control and restoring production to prewar levels, it seems appropriate to date Russia's Industrial Revolution from the opening of the plan era in 1928, when the Communist Party and the government consciously attempted to accelerate the rate of economic growth and gain the industrial status which England and the West had achieved through "spontaneous" means.

Industrial development was, and still is, an obsession of Soviet leaders. This is hardly surprising. Their ideological commitment to Marxism implied a belief in the conscious development of the forces of production so that man could be released from the chains of economic necessity and realize the freedom of communism. Unless they were extremely naïve, or anticipated that in Soviet Russia the wants of individuals would somehow be depressed to a level commensurate with available resources, the Russian Communists could not conclude otherwise than that the productive capacity of the economy would have to expand many times in order to make possible the achievement of their goal. Moreover, it was clear that economically Russia was years behind the Western world. The mature capitalist economies of Germany, Great Britain, and the United States did not allow the Communist conscience to ignore the road to industrialization. If the Soviet leaders wanted to establish a Marxist society on this earth, they had to surpass the pro-

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duction records of those countries which had already undergone an Industrial Revolution.

Yet the consciousness of the goal of economic growth only served to underline the fact that the Russian economy was not ready for capitalistic means of development. For one thing, the supply of entrepreneurship was limited. Not having experienced the full impact of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the commercial revolution, Russian society had not had its traditional life disrupted enough to prepare the way for an entrepreneurial and industrially oriented class. The technology of the more advanced West, where and when it appeared, had been imposed and, rather than stimulating an indigenous growth of entrepreneurship, it seemed to heighten the schizoid characteristics of the middle classes, those groups from which one might expect to recruit entrepreneurs. The historical conflict in Russia between Westernizers and Slavophils pitted the industrial technology of European capitalism against the messianic mission of the Russian Slav. At the risk of becoming somewhat metaphysical, one might observe that too often this conflict was embodied within the individual Russian, who in his search for the basic premises of his existence had to resolve the conflict, a process which diverted his creative energies from the mundane and practical problems of industry.

If Russia lacked an entrepreneurial class, it also lacked a skilled labor force capable of mastering the jobs spawned by complex industrial technology. The Russian population was a peasant one and only recently released from the trammels of serfdom. Feudal, agrarian, and traditional in outlook, it was easily exploited, even after 1861, and indeed in a rather perverse way these qualities of the peasant facilitated what industrial development Russia achieved prior to the revolution. The growth of the iron and steel industry, for example, was financed by foreign capital, the interest on which was paid out of the export surplus on current account in Russia's international balance of payments. The Russian peasant produced this export surplus in the form of grain which was marketed in countries with higher per capita grain consumption than the producing country.[11] But the immobilities of Russian agrarian life which made the peasant exploitable also raised barriers against industrial development. Prerevolutionary Russian society was structured neither to stimulate coherent movement from one em-

[11] A. Baykov, "The Economic Development of Russia," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, IV (December 1954), pp. 137-49.

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ployment to another nor to induce the predominantly peasant population to acquire new industrial skills.

Anxious to create a strong industrial order and conscious of the inadequacies of traditional Russian society, the Soviet leaders at length constructed an economic order which placed the burden and responsibility for directing economic activity on central governmental authority. Small wonder, then, that in trying to overcome these inadequacies, the Bolshevik leaders systematized and formalized the role of coercion in economic growth. To attempt to accelerate the rate of economic growth in a predominantly agrarian economy necessarily meant rapid change in patterns of behavior, so rapid in fact that they could be effected only through the use of explicit coercion.

The collectivization movement in 1929-1931 is a case in point. Industrial development depends upon increases in agricultural productivity which expand output of food products and agricultural raw materials as well as release workers for industrial development. By sponsoring the collectivization of individual farms, the government created larger land units which presumably were better adapted to the application of agricultural capital than the smaller farms of the peasants. At the same time redundant agricultural workers were directed to industrial employment according to priorities established by plan. Quite obviously, the peasants who turned their property over to a collective farm and subsequently joined the industrial labor force were explicitly coerced by identifiable institutions of government—the planning authority and the complex economic administration which could impose sanctions against those who would not comply with its aims. The teleological nature of these aims imparted to the economic program a purposiveness which would not brook opposition. The ultimate destination of the peasant, to which any problems of transition had to be subordinated, was industry; accordingly, he was coerced off the farm and into the factory.

In contrast, the enclosure movement in England, which had long-run results not dissimilar to the collectivization drive in the Soviet Union, was instigated for limited objectives. Its purpose was the division of the common land into units that could be fenced or hedged so that individual proprietors could husband their crops or raise livestock without regard to the traditional practices of the community. The peasants who were dispossessed as a result of action taken by an enclosure commission were certainly subjected to explicit coercion, but once having been separated from the land, they were left to fend for themselves. If they did not continue to be explicitly coerced by a gov-

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ernmental authority which required an industrial labor force to achieve its avowed objectives, the peasants were nonetheless implicitly coerced by the developing Industrial Revolution, which gradually destroyed the employment opportunities in domestic manufacturing, compelling them to take employment in the expanding industrial centers.

The collectivization movement in Soviet Russia was an overly dramatic manifestation of the structural changes typical of an Industrial Revolution. While these changes took place, industrial unemployment, which had been endemic in the Soviet economy from 1921, disappeared. The central planning of economic activity ensured full employment, but at the cost of the means by which capitalism traditionally had disciplined labor—unemployment. As long as there were more jobs than men to fill them, individual workers could move from plant to plant or from city to city in search of better working and housing conditions. "Drifting labor," which was so characteristic of the Soviet economy during the first two five-year plans, confounded the productivity estimates of the planning authority and stimulated an inflationary rise of the price level.

In order to combat the problems raised by an undisciplined labor force, the Soviet government in a series of decrees and regulations in the 1930's increased the authority of plant managers and trade union officials to deal with delinquent workers. Medical disability and retirement pensions were made dependent on job tenure, while workers who disobeyed employment regulations were threatened with criminal prosecution. By the end of the decade the freedom of the worker to terminate employment, established in the labor code of 1922, had been very severely circumscribed.

No one can contend that the labor force in the Soviet Union voluntarily conformed to the disciplinary requirements of industrial development. The evidence of explicit coercion is too palpable to contravene. On the other hand, it is relatively easy to understate the significance of coercion in the British Industrial Revolution because it did not manifest itself as obviously as it did in the Soviet Union. Unemployment, for example, even though it appears only periodically, disciplines workers by affecting their expectations with respect to job tenure. Its impact is more subtle than an administrative order by a public authority, but perhaps no less severe. We have designated unemployment as a kind of implicit coercion, but this should not obscure the fact that its existence makes it possible for private employers to enforce the rules governing the conduct of workers. Under industrial capitalism, the disci-

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pline function was decentralized, each firm being able to exact obedience from its own labor force.

Not only did the central governmental authority in the Soviet Union have a crucial role to perform in the discipline and control of the labor force, but also in the generation of an investment surplus. It therefore contrived to do two things: (1) motivate the labor force to increase total output; and (2) prevent the labor force from consuming all increments to output. After 1931 Soviet wage and tax policy converged on these objectives with the result that the distribution of income became more unequal. Basic wage rates were changed in order to increase the income differentials between skilled and unskilled labor, piecework became the standard basis of wage payment, and the Stakhanovite movement was given public sanction. The distributive effect of these measures was reinforced by a tax structure which relied on the turnover tax for the major part of its revenues. An indirect tax, it strengthened the incentives built into the wage structure, while serving double duty as an anti-inflationary tax and as a means for forcing out of society the savings required by the investment program.

Once again, the use of explicit coercion is more evident in the case of the Soviet Union than in the case of Great Britain. In the former, the wage-price relationship was consciously manipulated by the government in order to achieve a specific purpose. In the latter, the wage-price relationship changed as a result of the actions taken by many persons, governmental officials as well as private entrepreneurs, for different and often conflicting purposes. Yet in both Great Britain and the Soviet Union the distribution of income became more unequal in response to the requirements of economic growth. In one economy, however, the responsibility for the distributive change was diffused in society; in the other, it was focused on government.

We have argued thus far that in the Soviet Union, relative to the Great Britain of the Industrial Revolution, the consciousness of a purpose on the part of the responsible leaders of the state led to a greater and more persistent use of explicit coercion. It also led to the imposition of a greater quantum of coercion. Because they were aware of the greater industrial strength of the Western world, the Soviet leaders tried to achieve in years what Great Britain achieved in decades. But accelerating the Industrial Revolution placed such heavy demands on the Soviet labor force and national product that the scope of voluntary choice was sharply limited.

This much is obvious. Perhaps less obvious is the fact that the Soviet Union had before it the example of the technology of industrially de-

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veloped Western economies, the adaptation of which in Russia made the indivisibilities of economic growth larger than they otherwise would have been. Russia consciously imitated the industrial technology of American capitalism; it chose capital intensive means of development in the face of a capital shortage typical of underdeveloped economies. By neo-classical criteria this was not rational. The relatively scarce factor of production was not economized, and it would have been possible to reach a higher level of satisfaction with given resources if labor intensive means of development had been used. Light industry, handicraft trades, and agriculture should have been given priority rather than hydroelectric capacity, steel, coal, and rail transport. But the Russian leaders were not interested in reaching the peak of the hill on the economic terrain where they happened to be located; they were anxious to climb the mountain that they knew existed by virtue of the development of Western capitalism.[12] They therefore undertook an investment program in the five-year plans which committed resources to particular uses for a relatively long period of time before the resulting productivity increases became available. The step-like growth of productive capacity which resulted from these investment indivisibilities necessarily meant that the labor force had to be more abruptly allocated and the level of consumption more rigorously controlled than if investment alternatives capable of expanding capacity more smoothly had been chosen.

The British economy during the Industrial Revolution was not confronted by a wide range of technological choices. Since it had to pioneer industrial development, the state of knowledge and the skills then prevailing tended to prevent investment indivisibilities from becoming

[12] The experience of the Soviet Union with capital development has prompted Maurice Dobb to make some critical remarks about neo-classical notions of economic welfare. "The notion that successful development from one economic situation, with its given combination of resources and configuration of demand, to another might be a more crucial test of the contribution made by an economic system to human welfare than the attainment of perfect equilibrium in any given situation seldom commanded attention. It was as though one were to concentrate on the perfection of instruments whereby the summit of any mountain could be precisely located rather than ascertaining which was the highest mountain in the neighbourhood and which was the quickest way to the top" (*Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 3). More recently, Kenneth Boulding has made the same criticism of welfare economics with a strikingly similar figure of speech. "The preoccupation of welfare economics with the definition of a single optimum may well have done a disservice insofar as it has diverted attention from the critical problems of a developmental dynamics. The problem may well be not how to get close to the top of a molehill, but how to climb *down* the molehill in order to start up the mountain" ("Welfare Economics," in *A Survey of Contemporary Economics*, Vol. II, ed. by Bernard F. Haley, Homewood, Ill., 1952, p. 27).

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too large relative to the national income. Productivity in the textile industry, which had moved into the factory before the opening of the steel and railroad age, increased quickly as a result of investment. By the time Britain essayed heavier industrial development toward the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the output of textiles had already greatly expanded. Consequently, the subsequent growth of the steel, engineering, and railroad industries did not jeopardize the consumption standards of the population.

The Soviet leaders were able to give priority to capital intensive development because of their control of the political environment. A small minority composed of planners and Communist Party members conceived and instituted the five-year plans which, among other things, were state documents specifying the behavioral obligations of the labor force in a program of accelerated capital development. If the many whose behavior was altered by the implementation of the plans had had independent political influence, they might have been able to make their preferences felt during the formulation of the plans. But, in fact, the Communist Party and the government, by the time of the plan era, had acquired monolithic control over the political environment, so that the planners were insulated from the demands of the people. Not only was there no effective opposition to the Communist Party, but the unions as independent organizations of working men atrophied and became appendages of the government, concerned primarily with the enforcement of the production objectives of the five-year plans.[13]

If the growth of the Soviet economy was aided by the totalitarian political environment in which it was embodied, the growth of the British economy during the Industrial Revolution, as we have seen, was also aided by a non-democratic environment. No more than the worker in the Soviet Union did the British worker have an effective voice in the management of the political community. Nor did he belong to a trade union which could articulate his grievances and attempt to redress them. In both Soviet Russia and Great Britain the absence of democratic institutions left the behavior of the worker open to control through coercive means. But because the Soviet Union was dedicated to the achievement of *the* goal of industrial development, the manifestations of coercion were more explicit than in Great Britain, where the coercion tended to be implicit in the organization of markets which evolved in response to a more complex set of goals. This is not to argue that the British government did not use explicit coercion dur-

[13] Isaac Deutscher, *Soviet Trade Unions*, London, 1950, pp. 75-120.

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ing the Industrial Revolution or that in the Soviet Union there was no evidence of coercion implicit in the structure of the economy. As suggested earlier, the line between explicit and implicit coercion is sometimes hard to draw, since they both lie on a continuum. In terms of such a continuum, the Soviet economy lies closer to the explicit pole and farther away from the implicit pole than did the British economy.

There remains for consideration the ideological factor which influences subjective reactions to the incidence of coercion. To this we now turn.

THE IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

By the opening of the planning era in the Soviet Union, ideology had become a matter for prescription. The Communist Party established the canons of orthodoxy, thereby proscribing ideological aberrations and guaranteeing the monotony of the intellectual milieu. Unlike Great Britain, where the Industrial Revolution developed amidst a profusion of conflicting systems of thought, Soviet Russia based its Industrial Revolution on a single all-embracing interpretation of Marxism. Non-Marxian ideologies and non-Stalinist Marxism could not be espoused outside the narrow limits of one's private conscience.

Without doubt, the teleology of the Marxian system appealed to many segments of the Russian intelligentsia, who generally despaired of the possibilities of a meaningful existence in the effete society of prerevolutionary Russia. For them, the proletariat, whose strength was predicated on the inexorable movement of the historical process, represented an identification and purpose which made the future appear bright. As this future unfolded in the Soviet state, some of the Marxian intelligentsia became disillusioned with the ideological transformations in Marxism which, by subordinating "spontaneous" to "conscious" behavior, destroyed much of its humanitarianism. But many others became immersed in the professional, technical, educational, and managerial tasks which the new order called for and accepted the Soviet variant of Marxism as the first principles of the good life. In other words, the Soviet "middle class" acquired a vested interest in the new society and the ideology which rationalized it.

But what about the worker or peasant? Is it likely that Marxism-Leninism, even with official sanction, achieved a greater penetration into the popular mind than did the ideologies accompanying the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain? Without hesitation, one can answer negatively with respect to the peasant. Focused as it is on the industrial proletariat, Marxism could not have offered much solace to

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the peasant, who at long last obtained, during the revolution, the land that he always thought had belonged to him, only to see it snatched away in the collectivization movement. Marxism, whatever guise it dons, takes a singularly uncompromising view of the peasant, who, with his overdeveloped sense of private property, is cast in the role of a Philistine.

It is not equally clear, however, that workers find Marxism unpalatable. Although they cannot be expected to understand the subtleties of Marxian ideology any more than they understand the subtleties of other ideologies, workers can perhaps perceive values in the system which affect their subjective view of the world. After all, if Marxism has any message, it is that the working classes shall inherit the earth. It therefore seems to put itself on the side of the many against the few. One should not assume that, because Marx's predictions have not always been borne out by the experience of Western capitalism, workers will turn a deaf ear to the blandishment of the Marxist.

In the Soviet Union, where Marxism has no ideological competitors, it is difficult to see what other ideology could influence the subjective norms of the workers. To be sure, Marxism has been superimposed on a traditional Russian view of social relationships, just as classical political economy and Utilitarianism were superimposed on traditional English views. But it is perhaps not too far-fetched to assert that Marxism is less offensive to traditional attitudes than Utilitarianism—the collectivism of the former, for example, is not as far removed from the corporate and communal spirit of tradition as is the individualism of the latter. At any rate, it seems apparent that Marxism can be reduced to slogans which are marketable among workers, particularly, as is the case in Soviet Russia, when these slogans hold the field uncontested.

Assuming that Marxism, however crudely, permeates the mind of the Soviet worker, what effect is it likely to have on his view of the economic order? We cannot really pretend to answer the question definitively. We can only suggest a possible answer and relate it to the problem at hand: economic growth and coercion. The fundamental propositions of Marxism are that the institutional arrangements of society are transitory and that changes in the mode of production cause society to pass through a series of historical stages culminating in communism. The system is progressive, in the sense that each stage in the historical process is assumed to be an improvement on the previous stage. Marx's analysis of the laws of motion of capitalism therefore purports to guide man's progression to socialism. In crude propagandis-

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tic terms, Marxism proclaims that tomorrow will be better *for the proletariat*. Certainly it is not unreasonable to suppose that in the Soviet Union this theme and variations on it provide a rationalization of the deferred gratification required of workers in the growth of the socialist order.

Moreover, if Marxian ideology tends to subordinate the present to the future, Soviet treatment of the younger generation makes the future attractive. Relative to the Great Britain of the Industrial Revolution, Soviet society is particularly solicitous of the welfare of children. Where the British worker was hard put to find evidence of the better world that awaited his children, the Soviet worker can point, for example, to communal medical services and a greatly expanded educational system which promises better health and education for his children. Just as the fabled capitalist abstained from present consumption to build up his patrimony, so the Soviet worker, conscious of the better prospects for his children, may believe that the cost of building a communistic society is the limitations placed on his freedom of action today.

This brief discussion of the bearing of Soviet ideology on the coercive impact of economic growth is obviously inconclusive. Its purpose, however, is to suggest that in evaluating such a problem one cannot apply the ideological premises of one society to another society possessing different ideological premises. It is perhaps true that in the Soviet Union the greatest hope for minimizing the coercive forces engendered by economic growth inheres in economic growth itself. Nonetheless, ideology may play some small part in assuaging the coercive impact of growth until such time as the objective conditions permit an easing of the pressure.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Statements about the freedom of economic organization are typically made on the basis of its structural characteristics. It is alleged that this economy is free because it is organized around a market mechanism, while that economy is unfree because it is administered by central governmental authority. Such statements are vague and misleading. A mechanism of social control, economic organization is viable to the extent to which it can induce people to behave in ways that are consistent with the objectives of society. The very conditions which bring the economizing process into being impose limits on man's freedom of action; in some degree he will be constrained, or coerced, by the niggardliness of nature and his own insatiable appetite for material goods.

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In what degree he will be so constrained depends in part upon the stage of growth the economic system, regardless of its structure, has attained. As for the structure of economic organization, it affects the way social constraints manifest themselves. One system may rely more on explicit coercion and less on implicit coercion than another. Finally—and this is the most ineluctable difficulty in the way of passing political judgment on economic organization—the norms by which people evaluate the impact of the economic process vary with the prevailing ideology.

We have been led to these conclusions by an examination of the objective forces of economic growth which dominated the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain and in the Soviet Union. In spite of the disparity in the economic institutions of these two countries, one can discern impacts on behavior which are not dissimilar. In stressing these similarities we are not attempting to attribute all of the purges and repressions that have been characteristic of much of the development of Soviet civilization to the ironclad necessity of economic growth during the Industrial Revolution. Obviously, the purge and repression are the hallmark of a system of state which has never legitimatized political opposition. This aspect of the Soviet Union, however, lies beyond the scope of this article.

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PARIS FROM EDC TO WEU*

By NATHAN LEITES and CHRISTIAN DE LA MALÈNE

ON July 28, 1949, the French parliament ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; a week before, it had given its assent to the treaty establishing the Council of Europe. On May 9, 1950, M. Robert Schuman proposed the creation of a European coal and steel community.

None of these arrangements for the defense of the free world and the unification of Europe altered France's status as one of the "big three" of the West: her sovereignty was not going to be substantially reduced by the institutions then created or planned. And West Germany, while participating in the European organizations, would remain outside the Atlantic alliance, and was, for the time being, neither sovereign nor armed.

On June 25, 1950, South Korea was invaded; the following September, all Atlantic powers, except France, accepted Germany's entrance into NATO. France did not veto, as such, the rearmament of Germany that was implied by her joining NATO, but the French government presented an international framework that would reduce the dangers of German rearmament. The first suggestion was that limited German contingents simply be added to the already existing armed forces of the West. Then Paris conceived the idea of linking the rearmament of Germany to the creation of an integrated Europe limited to six member states: Germany, Italy, France, and the Benelux nations; the political positions of Britain and the Scandinavian countries precluded their joining any such arrangement. To some French parliamentarians, this linking of German rearmament and European integration was important chiefly as a device for reducing the potential dangers of a rearmed Germany; to others, it was even more important as a means of achieving European unification. These French proposals set into motion the train of events that led to the signing of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community on May 27, 1952.

It took the French parliament more than two years to decide whether to ratify the treaty. During this period, problems of foreign policy in general and the question of EDC in particular played an important role, at least outwardly, in French political life; conflicts in the sphere

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of external affairs especially seemed to become peculiarly intense. It soon grew clear that the Assembly could come to no quick agreement on EDC. Whenever the question of a decision on EDC was raised in parliament, the date of the final act was either postponed (often on the ground that "supplementary protocols" had first to be created or that "preliminary conditions" had to be satisfied), or, if a vote was taken at all (for instance, after an interpellation debate, as in November 1953, or on the occasion of the investiture of a new government, as in January 1953), it was on a text sufficiently ambiguous as not to entail either major repercussions or irrevocable commitments.

However, in the summer of 1954, further delay became difficult both in view of France's international situation and because the new government of Mendès-France had resolved to settle some major pending problems of French foreign policy. Parliament was called upon, more insistently than before, to decide how the defense of the free world was to be organized on the Continent, and what kind of Europe was to be created. The time had passed when the National Assembly could content itself with issuing vague pronouncements, as it had done in October 1950, February 1952, and November 1953, and as the Council of the Republic had done in October 1953. In the summer of 1954, the French parliament entered the period of binding decisions that was to stretch from August 30, 1954, when EDC was rejected, to March 27, 1955, when the ratification of the Western European Union was completed.

It is with this period that the present article is concerned; the attempt is to contribute insight into some of the motivations of the non-Communist French parliamentarians. (None of what follows is intended to apply to the Communists; their attitudes were not investigated in this study.) The analysis does not pretend to be complete. Attention is given to feelings and calculations with respect to only two of the important foreign policy considerations manifest at the time—the integrity of France, and its position in the free world—and to the parliamentary mechanics involved in the voting on WEU. Reasons of space make it necessary to put aside other matters of foreign policy, and of economics and domestic politics, that were perhaps of no less importance. To a significant extent, no doubt, the ideas and sentiments that will be discussed played the role of means unconsciously chosen, or screens deliberately used, to conceal the factors that were really motivating French parliamentarians. But it would be incorrect either to minimize the significance of the ostensible motives, or to deny them a substantial force of their own.

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In view of the relatively greater weight given to foreign as against domestic policy in this article, it may be useful to indicate briefly the interplay of the two factors in the minds of the members of the parliament. The formation of the Mendès-France government in June 1954 indicated a change of policy on Indochina. In European matters, however, the government was intended to include representatives of both the partisans and the enemies of EDC. Yet the MRP and the Moderates —the two bodies in the Assembly that included the most fervent *cédistes*—were, on the whole, hostile to the government.[1] The Socialists, who had changed from opposition to Laniel to support of Mendès-France, were evenly divided on the question of EDC, and the governmental representation of the *Républicains sociaux* (ex-RPF), who were hostile to EDC, was increased.

This fragile equilibrium was upset in August 1954 when the government's proposals at the Brussels Conference became known. And when EDC was rejected ten days later, many of the supporters of EDC held the government responsible for killing it. Hostility to Mendès-France's European policy then became a major attitude of all those who opposed the government, whatever may have been the factors on which the opposition was really based.

By October 1954, many former supporters of EDC had become reconciled to the London Agreements, which seemed to them to be the least of the possible evils under the circumstances. But not all of those who came to this view proceeded to support Mendès-France. Their hostility toward him, which had led them to oppose his assumption of power in June, made them persist in opposing his foreign policy. In addition, they wanted the responsibility for consenting to the rearmament of Germany to rest with Mendès-France, and they therefore took care to vote against WEU.

Thus, when the Paris Agreements on the makeup of WEU were voted on in December, the genuine opponents of the measure—i.e., those who were against *any* German rearmament—were joined by many ex-*cédistes*, who voted against WEU for the domestic political reasons suggested above. Conversely, many deputies who disapproved of the new institution voted for it because they wanted to ensure the survival of Mendès-France. After the fall of Mendès-France, on the other hand, the Paris Agreements were defended before the Council

[1] The term "Moderates" will be used throughout to designate the *Indépendants*, the *Indépendants Paysans*, the *Paysans*, and the ARS. For convenience, and in accordance with the political slang of the period, the term "*cédiste*" will be used to refer to an advocate of EDC, and "anti-*cédiste*" will refer to an opponent.

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of the Republic by various leaders who had previously opposed them. The majority of the MRP and the Moderates now voted in favor of the agreements, while most of the *Républicains sociaux*, freed of their concern for the survival of Mendès-France, rejected them.

Two factors contributed to the increasing role of domestic concerns during the period when WEU was under consideration. First, in the transition from EDC to WEU, the question of German rearmament was divorced from the issue of an integrated Europe, thus tending to make a vote for WEU appear as support of German rearmament pure and simple, which no member of parliament could have viewed as politically advantageous to himself. Secondly, it was very widely taken for granted that the French parliament would not repeat its earlier refusal, that it would not reject WEU as it had rejected EDC in August 1954. Thus, since ratification of the Paris Agreements seemed to be a foregone conclusion, individual members of parliament could permit themselves to be guided more exclusively by what they conceived to be their personal or group interests.

Several of the interpretations advanced below are based not only on the facts adduced in their support but also on more general hypotheses about contemporary French politics whose nature will be indicated in the appropriate places.

It has not proved practicable to state with great specificity who, precisely, were the carriers of the broad trends of feeling and opinion that are analyzed here. Every parliamentary group was more or less divided on the issues; the precise distribution of positions on each matter within each group, apart from being insufficiently known, is hardly deserving of detailed exposition in an article such as the present one. Generally, when the "frequency" of pro-EDC sentiment is referred to, the statement, unless otherwise indicated, applies to incidence of such sentiment among all groups except the ex-Gaullists; frequency of anti-EDC sentiment refers to all groups with the exception of the MRP. (The Communists are always excepted.) Finally, unless stated otherwise, the attitudes discussed were publicly expressed in parliament.

I. The Integrity of France

Some of the hostility toward EDC manifested by French parliamentarians was related to the belief that, under it, France's armed forces would cease to be French. This concern was particularly serious, given existing apprehensions about the nation's capacity for survival and current suspicions about the presence in France of a powerful group

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striving for a united Europe. Those who predicted that EDC would deprive France of an indispensable part of her substance, her army, usually also argued that this would work to Germany's advantage: the strongest member of the new community would dominate it, they feared; France would peacefully and smoothly fall under German control. In contrast, according to the dominant view, WEU would not really infringe upon France's sovereignty.

Similarly, it was widely felt that EDC would greatly reinforce the tendencies toward reduction or loss of France's control over her overseas domain (no such harmful prospect was ascribed to WEU). It was argued that France, in joining EDC, would appear much weakened, and would give the impression that she preferred her European to her world-wide alliances. For both these reasons she would be less able to continue her present role overseas.

Such prospects seemed all the more dangerous to the many parliamentarians of almost all shades of opinion who saw in "the French Union" the only hope of recovering France's past and progressively diminishing greatness. From this point of view at least, WEU appeared harmless by contrast.

"DENATIONAL" AND "TRANSNATIONAL" INSTITUTIONS

According to the general opinion in Paris, one of the important factors behind the rejection of EDC was the repugnance of many deputies toward what was felt to be the excessive importance of the "supranational" aspect of the treaty.[2]

WEU was not objected to on this score,[3] despite the fact that the WEU Council of Ministers had "powers of decision" in several major military matters over which France had no veto. One may well ask, then, how it was possible to affirm that French sovereignty would not be touched under WEU. The reason for the greater attractiveness of WEU was that, unlike EDC, it did not involve denationalization, particularly of the French army. Despite the fact that, under it, decisions binding on France could be taken against her will, the army nevertheless continued to exist as a national entity, and France's voice could be heard through its representative on the WEU Council of Ministers. WEU, then, could be called a "transnational" institution,

[2] Cf. Mendès-France, October 7, p. 4569. Page references are to the *Journal Officiel* of the National Assembly. Unless otherwise indicated, the debates referred to or quoted from took place in 1954.

[3] Cf. de Pierrebourg, October 7, p. 4579; Vallon, October 12, p. 4671; Léon-Noël, December 21, p. 6705.

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but it was not one that denationalized the military forces of its participants.

We can thus say that EDC was rejected largely because of the denationalization that it involved. WEU, involving only "transnational" arrangements, was more palatable to the French parliament.

The extent and political spread of opposition to any form of denationalization are clear from the similarity of reactions of men as different in age, intelligence, and political tradition as Herriot and Mendès-France.

This is how M. Herriot evaluated the provision of the EDC treaty (paragraph 2, Article 20) that required members of the Commissariat to submerge all national interest in favor of "the supranational character of their function": "This clause is both monstrous and ridiculous (Applause on the Extreme Right, numerous benches of the Left and some benches of the Right). What patriotic Frenchman would agree to represent his country in this fashion? (Applause on the same benches) . . . I wonder whether there is any chance of finding men willing to renounce their national origin. . . . This appears to me so monstrous that I cannot accept the idea. But what if one were not to find them? The commissioners would then have to be abstract beings, supermen or robots . . ." (p. 4465).[4]

The day before, on August 29, Mendès-France, too, had discussed Article 20 of the EDC treaty: "At least in the beginning every commissioner will think of his own country (Very good, very good! on numerous benches). He will not be able to do otherwise than to think of his own country. He will necessarily let himself be guided by preoccupations arising out of the situation of his own country" (p. 4427). Denationalization, in other words, was above all unfeasible. It was also dangerous, although, he protested, morally defensible: "I happen to have participated in international institutions as a representative of my country . . . , in the International Monetary Fund and in the International Bank. . . . I should like to make a confession which is perhaps to the honor of Frenchmen. I have in fact seen Frenchmen who rose above the national interest to attach themselves to that of the community which they were directing. But I must say that I have rarely seen representatives of certain other countries act in the same fashion (Applause on the Left, on the Extreme Right and on certain benches of the Right)" (pp. 4427, 4428).

[4] The following are the meanings of the terms used in the *Journal Officiel*: Extreme Right—*Républicains sociaux*; Right—*Modérés*; Center—MRP and *Indépendants d'Outre-Mer*; Left—Radicals, UDSR, Socialists; Extreme Left—Communists.

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There is nothing peculiarly French in this reaction to the suggestion of a supernational institution. There are, however, several reasons why the French are more intensely averse than other nations to any attempt at denationalization.

Paris is the only major Western capital in which some people actually believe in the possibility that their nation may cease to exist, and where locutions such as "the agony of France" and "the death of France" are neither simple hyperbolas nor attempts by intellectuals to stun their contemporaries, as has sometimes been suggested.

This sentiment was reflected in the words of M. Herriot, on August 30, in which he rejected one of the major pro-EDC arguments during the final phase of the battle over EDC, namely, the contention that the treaty was capable of improvement: "I am giving you my innermost thoughts on the threshold [*sic*] of my life. . . . I shall condense in this conviction all the efforts I have been able to make: for us the European Community is the end of France. . . . For us it is not a question of detail . . . of the change of commas . . . of added phrases. For us it is a question of the life and death of France" (p. 4467). And he quoted the statement of Clemenceau, made in a situation identical with his own ("shortly before his death"): "Don't forget, Frenchmen, that even a great nation may disappear" (p. 4468).

Clearly, in view of such sentiments, the reactions to a proposal involving denationalization, such as the EDC, were bound to be particularly unfavorable. It was not an atmosphere propitious to the statement by Mendès-France, on August 29, that he wished with all his heart that men might come to "shed their national personality" in order to let themselves be guided exclusively by "international preoccupations" (p. 4428)—a statement which he has never repeated.

But there were still other factors that militated against French readiness to accept denationalization. There seemed to be, in influential Paris circles, a certain apprehension of collective death (not necessarily or consciously related to the prospect of another war). In addition, there was also a belief that an occult and powerful group was *aiming* at the disappearance of France. Jean Monnet (whom General de Gaulle in his press conference of November 12, 1953, called "the inspirer" without identifying him) was believed to have placed members of that group in crucial positions, where they could work toward the disappearance of the Continental nations, in favor of a united Europe. "Technocrats," impatient with obsolete and inefficient national traditions and barriers, were thought to have combined their efforts with those of political leaders who wanted to recapture medieval unity.

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True enough, the general belief in the central role of Jean Monnet in Paris politics seemed to decline as the treaty weakened. But the association between the provisions of EDC and the enormous objectives attributed to him had been established not only for the ex-Gaullists, but also in the eyes of numerous Moderates and Radicals, some influential Socialists, and even a few MRP. They suspected that, to the small group essentially responsible for EDC, denationalization was not a painful sacrifice serving such definite national goals as the control of Soviet expansionism or German militarism, but a clever utilization of these problems in order to involve France in a setup that would lead to its disappearance as a nation in favor of a larger community.

This belief caused a much stronger reaction against EDC than was warranted by the degree of denationalization actually involved in it. Many of its enemies saw in the treaty not a restriction of freedom for the entire body of France—which they might have been willing to accept—but, rather, the amputation of one of the body's precious organs, its ailing army. This feeling, though not often publicly expressed, was reflected by M. Lapie (Socialist) on August 29, when he spoke of ". . . the acute danger which touches the hearts of all of us, the danger that the French Army might disappear, the Army which, through all changes of regime, we know to be the permanent artery of the fatherland" (p. 4416). It was again voiced by M. Bardoux (*Modéré*), recalling on December 21 that an "integrated Europe" would have been "a Europe of castrated states" (p. 6695).[5]

A final factor in the opposition to the treaty was a widespread conviction that under EDC the armed forces would not retain their denationalized character for long, but would acquire the national coloration of their strongest national element, Germany. The lack of barriers within EDC would be to the advantage of the strongest; and France, being weak, therefore had to insist on the maintenance of certain barriers in order to avoid falling under German control. In discussions on the London Agreements, the *cédiste* Paul Reynaud remarked that under WEU the German "Great General Staff" would reappear and

[5] The treaty might have appeared less unacceptable to many if, without changing the true content of a single article, it had called for an "association of European armies," among them, the French army. On the other hand, the fact that such rephrasing would have meant the inclusion of the German army as well would have cost the treaty a number of votes (e.g., from the Socialists), which might have offset the gains on the "right" side of the Assembly. In this context it may be interesting to recall a statement by Mendès-France on December 23: "Between the EDC and the Paris Agreements . . . there are immense differences of a political, technical, psychological kind. . . . But on the strictly military plane the differences are . . . insignificant" (p. 6814).

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"after a few years" would "establish control over the government of its country" (October 7, p. 4775). Similarly, many anti-*cédistes* thought it inevitable that, within a few years, the German components of EDC would quietly gain control over the entire EDC community and thus also over the former French army.

While the larger part of the French political class may have been little affected by the above-mentioned myth of the possible "death of France," its members were, of course, fully aware of the steady decline in the country's power, and rejected the thought of adding to earlier losses by an act of voluntary "abandonment"—a word that carries significant connotations for contemporary Frenchmen. In the words of M. Lacoste (Socialist): "We know perfectly well that the modest position of France in the world does not allow her to entertain vast ambitions. But all the more must she cling to the position she occupies. She must not descend further; she must maintain herself on her present level against all inimical factors" (quoted by *Le Monde*, September 29, 1954).

As we said before, one of the major objections to EDC was the degree of denationalization that it involved, while WEU was acceptable to the French parliament as involving only "transnational" arrangements. In October, Mendès-France's most solid and least conditional support for WEU came from the ex-Gaullists, who had formed the spearhead of the fight against denationalization by EDC. Without fear of shocking them, he could say about WEU that "It is not, as one might have *feared* . . . an association . . . without any element of supranationality" (October 7, p. 4570; italics added). For the "supranational" elements involved were merely transnational. The existence of the French army having been safeguarded, one could accept certain limitations on its freedom of movement as a painful but inevitable sacrifice for the sake of definite national goals. Even M. Soustelle, who was going to vote against the Paris Agreements, admitted that "The agreements . . . do not drown our army or our foreign policy in a kind of nation-less magma. They leave us the core of a national sovereignty, the use of which has already been so profoundly limited" (December 21, p. 6696).

We have tried to show that some of the aversion to EDC was connected with the belief that it would deprive France's armed forces of their French character—a fear that was intensified by misgivings about the nation's capacity for survival, and by suspicions that an influential political group was striving for a united Europe. Those who held this view were inclined to believe that EDC would work to the advantage

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of its strongest member, and that France would rapidly fall under the control of Germany. By contrast, WEU appeared to have a much more limited impact on the nation's future and to present no serious threat to France's sovereignty.

THE AREA OF THE "SUPERNATIONAL"

Under WEU France was required not only to assign a smaller part of her armed forces to supernational control; she was also called upon to relinquish less of her control over her entire military establishment than would have been the case under EDC. Under the latter, the French army would have continued to exist only outside European France. At Brussels, Mendès-France tried to render possible a French army on the French mainland by "the limitation of the principle of integration to the covering forces." The London Agreements permitted the presence in European France of units of the French army outside WEU, under the article which allows a member state to ". . . dispose, apart from forces put under NATO (via WEU), of so-called national forces. These would be composed, on the one hand, of forces stationed overseas, and, on the other hand, of reserve divisions stationed on the Continent, but ultimately destined for overseas needs" (Mendès-France, October 7, p. 4570). And nothing in the Paris Agreements seemed to limit French sovereignty as to the strength or numbers of such "so-called national forces."

The reduction in the area of the supernational in WEU, as compared with EDC, no doubt played a major role in making enemies of EDC assent to the new arrangement. On the other hand, this very reduction also contributed to the anti-WEU feeling of those who had looked to EDC as a means of "building Europe."

THE DOMAIN OF FRANCE: BREAKUP VERSUS INDIVISIBILITY

According to the belief of its enemies, and to the mild distress of many of its proponents, EDC would have endangered what is usually (and not quite correctly) called *l'Union Française*, i.e., the cohesion between metropolitan France and her overseas connections. If the overseas bonds of Great Britain did not permit London even to consider the possibility of entering EDC, how could Paris act otherwise without risking a reduction of its domain to a Continental "hexagon" of insignificant size?

WEU, on the other hand, was acceptable to enemies of EDC because, in the words of M. Vallon, ". . . the London Agreements . . . do not threaten . . . the cohesion of the French Union" (October 12, p. 4671).

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And, according to M. de Pierrebourg, ". . . the unity of our French Republic which stretches from Lille to Brazzaville has not been broken" (October 7, p. 4579). Thus the earlier concern for the preservation of what had been the French Empire was virtually absent from the debates of December and March.

The argument of the anti-EDC faction was that the curtailment of her sovereignty would fatally weaken the already gravely threatened position of European France in her overseas domain. With the sovereignty of metropolitan France thus reduced and that of overseas France remaining unaffected, the predominance of the former over the latter could hardly have been maintained. In the words of the *rapporteur* of the EDC treaty for the Overseas Territories Commission of the Assembly, M. Apithy (*Indépendant d'Outre-Mer*): "We are led to ask ourselves how large an abandonment of sovereignty can be tolerated by a state which pretends to govern a large number of diverse people dispersed in extra-European areas. . . . How could an undeveloped but sovereign domain remain in the dependence of another area which is highly developed but which would have lost its sovereignty?" (August 29, pp. 4420f.).

More particularly, such a large-scale abandonment of sovereignty by metropolitan France would, it was believed, be regarded outside France as an abandonment also of France's overseas domain in favor of European "integration." In the words of Jean-Paul Palewski (*Républicain social*): "The ratification of EDC would, to an incredible degree, weaken the bonds which unite the citizens of the French Union with the motherland, by which they would feel in some fashion abandoned" (August 28, p. 4404). And here one must again remember the sinister connotations that the word "abandon" has for most contemporary Frenchmen.

The law of retaliation would then operate against France: having abandoned, she would, in turn, be abandoned. On August 29, M. Apithy quoted an MRP Counsel of the French Union, M. Vignes, as predicting that ". . . the integration of metropolitan France alone into a European community would lead to separatism in the overseas territories, a separatism encouraged by the secession of the metropolis."

Clearly, the strong, traditional French tendency toward centralization, toward a state "one and indivisible," would make for very unfavorable reactions to any single act that might destroy unity and start such a fatal chain of "abandonments." If dismemberment is regarded as a useful means of rendering a dangerous neighbor less powerful, one must, for that very reason, avoid it for oneself.

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The ideas which we have just sketched were direct expressions of strong feelings, unlikely to be affected by subtle revisions of treaty texts. This in part explains the limited role in the conflict over EDC that was played by various articles of the Additional Protocols to the EDC treaty, signed on March 24, 1953, and designed to reduce the separation which, it was feared, the treaty might create between the French contingents in EDC and those outside metropolitan France. What is more, the complexity of these dispositions discouraged parliamentarians at large and even disoriented the small circle of initiates; one anti-EDC deputy exclaimed in desperation: "What a treaty! Nobody is able to understand it! (Laughter and applause on the Extreme Right and on the Left, *mouvements divers*)" (August 29, p. 4446).

The damage that EDC might inflict on France's extra-European positions appeared all the more catastrophic because the French Union was regarded in many parliamentary circles as the only basis for a possible reconquest of France's greatness. It had become almost a cliché that France herself, without her "extensions," was "nothing," but that French Eurafrica could be much. Overseas France had been able to some extent to right the situation compromised by the metropolitan collapse in the spring of 1940. Now again, the only possibility for remedying the consequences of France's decline over the previous ten years seemed to lie in a transfer of French energy toward the "extensions" of France's body. And EDC threatened to cut these potential power centers off from metropolitan France.

To be sure, when Mendès-France affirmed on August 29 that "the French Union . . . remains our principal force and our principal hope" (p. 4432), he was merely expressing a hope, not speaking of results already obtained or of precise plans for a near future. And if, on the one hand, possibilities of future developments overseas often seemed grandiose, they were, on the other hand, frequently regarded as illusory in view of metropolitan France's lack of resources and energy, and because of native resistance and foreign interference. This pessimistic feeling has, of course, grown stronger since the fall of 1954. Moreover, a hope such as that expressed by Mendès-France tended to be forgotten by parliament when it was absorbed, as it generally was, in domestic affairs. Although a remote territory like Haute-Volta may, legally, be just as much part of the French Republic as any metropolitan *département*, it is nevertheless difficult for metropolitan Frenchmen to feel about possible achievements down there in the way in which they would react, for instance, to economic dynamism within the country itself.

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But whenever the possibility of using the French Union as a last recourse against the unfavorable tendencies of the century has been threatened, Frenchmen have rallied to defend what they regard as a last chance to recover greatness. This was revealed by an incident which occurred in the debate on the London Agreements. Criticizing these agreements, M. Simonnet (MRP) stressed the new treaty's "discriminations" against France in favor of Great Britain. And he concluded on a note of resignation: compared with that of England, the situation of European France was, he implied, so unfavorable—exposed as she was to the divergent threats and demands of Moscow, Bonn, London, and Washington—that there was no choice: "We can accept or refuse this situation. I should like to say right away that I am at the moment in favor of acceptance" (October 8, p. 4639). His purely European perspective had led him to be discouraged. At that moment, Mendès-France, by widening the horizon and reminding the deputies of the existence of overseas France, produced the most favorable reaction of the day. M. Simonnet had recalled that Great Britain would be a full member of the Council of Ministers of WEU, but that the jurisdiction of that body was purely Continental and did not extend to the British Isles. This Mendès-France admitted, but he added: "I am asking you, my dear colleagues, not to forget that . . . the French overseas territories are equally excluded from that authority" (p. 4647).

By recalling overseas France to parliamentary consciousness, in the context of a problem which seemed insoluble on a purely European basis, Mendès-France restored the belief in Franco-British equality which is so important to the French political class. To the delight of the Assembly, he continued with an allusion to an overseas France as the rich and safe center of French power in the second half of the century: "We shall be just as free as is Britain in her insular territory to proceed with the production of arms of all kinds, for example, in North Africa. Let me say on this occasion that I believe we should locate in North Africa certain installations which we have probably been wrong in concentrating in the metropolis" (*ibid.*).

But side by side with this vision of French Africa as a powerful extension of France, there existed in the minds of parliamentarians another view of overseas France, that of a burdensome ward which, like Indochina, might reduce, and perhaps exhaust, the strength of the metropolis. M. Soustelle, employing the same argument that the ex-Gaullists had used against EDC, predicted that, in WEU, Germany "has every chance of becoming predominant," and reasoned as follows: "As Germany does not possess overseas territories, and consequently

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is not beset by problems similar to those with which we will have to contend . . . for years in Africa, she will be free to concentrate all her forces on Europe" (December 23, p. 6819).

One or the other of these contradictory beliefs came to the fore according to shifts in events or arguments; but they were rarely fitted into a coherent whole.

In summary, we may say that its opponents saw in EDC an institution that would deprive France of her army and merge her into a Continental organism, thus endangering her chances of retaining any degree of control over her former empire. The more limited arrangements of WEU, on the other hand, appeared as a far lesser threat to France's hold on her overseas territories and thus to her chances of recovering through them her past greatness.

II. The Position of France in the Free World

In the eyes of its enemies, EDC threatened not only to impair France's integrity, but also to reduce her status within the concert of the free world's powers. Many believed that to accept the loss of national integrity was to place France in a position of inferiority with regard to the other "big" powers of the West, Britain and America. Specifically, EDC would constitute a glaring denial of Franco-British equality; and Paris feels strongly about maintaining at least the appearance of that equality. It was widely felt, on the other hand, that British membership in WEU safeguarded this essential aspiration; that it prevented Germany's rearmament from becoming the occasion for France to "reverse" her alliance with America and England in favor of a Continental one; and that it reduced the chances of German hegemony in the new institution.

This feeling was strong so long as the British "concession" in entering WEU was news. But, after a short time, many of those who had at first been greatly reassured by it became once more apprehensive that France might fall under the domination of her stronger allies (Germany, Britain, America), and this fear contributed to the strong tendency to reject WEU as EDC had been rejected.

France: one of the "grands"

It was widely believed that under EDC France would lose her position as one of the Big Three by renouncing her sovereignty, while Britain and America were determined to keep theirs intact. Numerous Moderates and Radicals, and some Socialists, felt that those two powers

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did not even consider making the kind of sacrifices that they expected of France. In the words of General Aumeran (*Modéré*): "We are still a nation . . . with rights equal to those of America and Great Britain. . . . The ratification of EDC would put us on the level of two defeated and three tiny countries" (August 29, p. 4437). As M. Marcellin (*Modéré*) put it: "Why is it so necessary today for France to preserve her sovereignty? . . . First of all, because the United States and Great Britain intend to preserve their full autonomy. . . . Our position would be quite different if our British and American friends would agree to abandonments of sovereignty. . . . The day they do that, we could accept similar sacrifices for France" (October 12, p. 4672).

Indicative, to many Frenchmen, of the state of inferiority in relation to London and Washington into which France would put herself by entering EDC was the manner in which the Anglo-Americans were pressing France to accept EDC, without being embarrassed by their own refusal to do likewise. Men as different as the Socialist M. Moch and the ex-Gaullist M. Triboulet expressed similar feelings on this subject. The former spoke of "friends eager to remain outside of EDC but pressing us to enter into it" (August 28, p. 4380), while the latter commented: "That the five nations which together with us have signed the EDC treaty invite us, even with much bitterness, as in Brussels, to adopt their attitude . . . is perfectly admissible. But it is very unseemly for the United States and Great Britain to call upon us to fuse with five nations on the European Continent and thus to lose our equality with the other two great powers" (August 28, p. 4397).

But behind the impropriety of the moment, M. Triboulet discerned a desire on the part of America and England to see France's international position reduced, "an impatience, as it were, to deal from now on with world strategy in an Anglo-Saxon *tête-à-tête*" (*ibid.*).

Another fear that was frequently voiced was that the creation of EDC would be followed by the replacement of the French representative in the NATO Standing Group by one of EDC. And membership in the Standing Group is cherished by French politicians as an institutional safeguard of France's eminence, against the time when, as many of them hope, her real strength will once more equal her official rank.[6]

If entering EDC meant a reduction in France's status vis-à-vis the

[6] From this position it is not far to the idea of using changes in institutions as a means for offsetting unfavorable developments in the relationship of real forces. Thus, at one point, M. Palewski accepted the entrance of Germany into NATO only on condition of a reform of that organization ". . . which would in particular tend to give the Standing Group—and we must remain one of its three members—a function of real strategic and political leadership" (October 12, p. 4670).

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great powers, there were some who felt that it would render her inferior even to the many small powers that were absolutely unwilling to abandon any portion of their sovereignty. On August 30, the day that EDC was rejected, M. Herriot said: "There is no doubt that a large number of sovereign states remain in Europe . . . Britain . . . the United States . . . the Soviet Union, China, Switzerland, Norway, Spain, Turkey, Greece, and others yet" (p. 4464).

FRANCO-BRITISH EQUALITY

Even stronger than the desire to remain one of the "great" powers was the French demand for equality between Paris and London. In order to understand the exact nature of this demand, it may be useful to examine the French attitude toward equality with the other powers.

In the relationship with Moscow, the word "equality" is not really applicable. For not only does the power of the Soviet Union dwarf that of France, but Moscow, in recent years, has not been France's partner in international arrangements.

With regard to Bonn, the demand for "non-discrimination" has emanated from the German side. To heed it might be for the French a matter of necessity, but hardly one of positive national interest.

In the case of Washington, the demand for equality within the Atlantic alliance has often been tempered by French awareness of the great discrepancy between American and French power, and by the feeling that America may not need the French alliance quite so much as the French need the American connection, despite frequent affirmations to the contrary. Pro-Atlantic parliamentarians, for example, tended to accept without discussion the American nationality of SACEUR. And even though General de Gaulle in his press conference of February 25, 1953, had rejected EDC above all as reinforcing France's submission to SACEUR and its American chief, this was but a minor theme in the Gaullist deputies' campaign against EDC. Certain ex-*cédistes* criticized the London Agreements for increasing the powers of SACEUR. In the words of M. Teitgen: "General Gruenther . . . would receive full powers to settle all problems of integration [of WEU forces]. . . . Do you really believe that France, Germany . . . Benelux, and Britain could really abandon to General Gruenther . . . a problem of that importance?" (October 8, p. 4636). But M. Teitgen was primarily expressing the apprehension of ex-*cédistes* that General Gruenther might not share their own desire for a maximum national "integration" in WEU.

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Another matter, which aroused still greater opposition, was the stipulation in the Paris Agreements by which American military aid to member states of WEU would be given directly to each beneficiary. Under EDC, Washington's contribution would have gone to the organization as a whole. French parliamentarians were practically unanimous in demanding the application of the EDC formula to WEU. And one of the factors behind this demand was the belief that, if the practice favored by Washington were to be adopted, each member state of WEU would continue to occupy an inferior status in its isolated and competitive dealings with America. In the words of the *enfant terrible*, M. Vallon: "By preserving her full freedom to bestow military aid on one nation or another, according to her whim, America will be able to exercise an untrammeled tyranny over Europe. That is too much!" (October 12, p. 4671). M. Vallon was working himself up to abstain from voting (out of good feelings for Mendès-France, he explained), and he was therefore making a rather feeble attempt to dramatize the inequality involved in the proposal. Actually, the considerable parliamentary displeasure which the arrangement provoked was directed at others of its aspects.

In the first place, it seemed to obstruct the creation of "Europe." Above all, however, many parliamentarians feared that, if America were free to distribute her aid among the members of WEU, she would favor Germany as promising the greatest military effort.[7] This fear of a possible Washington-Bonn axis weighed more heavily in the minds of deputies than the concern about French inequality in relation to America, an inequality which, to a certain extent, appeared inevitable and could be tolerated if Washington followed an acceptable policy.[8]

But if the French felt that they could never compete with America's vastly superior power, her genius for "productivity," and her enormous human and material resources, their feelings about Britain were quite different. Her resources were considered comparable to those of France, and yet they had permitted Great Britain to attain qualitative superiority. She was consolidating her position as a semi-giant, at the very moment that Paris was asking itself at what level of mediocrity the decline of French power would be arrested. French politicians thus regarded London with a mixture of guilt, admiration, envy, and uncertainty about their own ability to emulate the British achievement.

[7] Cf. Paul Reynaud, October 7, p. 4576.

[8] When the London Agreements were debated, M. Palewski was alone in asking that Washington make an approach to equality with London and Paris by assuming military obligations similar to those offered by Sir Anthony Eden at the London Conference.

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They were reluctant to agree to any arrangement that implied an official admission of French inferiority, and this reluctance was shared by a great many parliamentarians: from those who simply denied French deficiencies to those who recognized them and sought solutions in major reforms.[9]

This was a major reason for the great significance that Paris attached to British entrance into WEU. With Britain willing to submit to some of the same discipline and constraints, it was now possible for France to abandon her own sovereignty and yet to maintain the feeling of essential equality between Paris and London. It is in this sense that one should interpret Mendès-France's comments on the British offer: "It is not too much to say that the British government . . . has agreed to a real renunciation of sovereignty. This is a manifestation of discipline . . . which gladdens all Frenchmen" (October 7, p. 4571).

Another important reason why Paris welcomed British membership in WEU was that it reduced, or even removed, the aura of a "reversal of alliances" that had attached to EDC. For EDC had threatened to separate France from Britain and the United States by the very fact that it would have tightened France's bonds with Germany while leaving her relations with the Western powers essentially unchanged.

But the argument most often adduced in favor of British participation in any arrangement involving German rearmament was that Britain's presence alone could prevent a German hegemony in such a framework. Only with Great Britain would it be possible to establish an "equilibrium" that would protect France against being chronically overruled in the new institution.[10]

Those were the various aspects of Britain's inclusion in a European defense organization which, combined, led many parliamentarians to the conviction expressed by M. Loustaunau-Lacau (*Modéré*): "Rather no Europe at all than a Europe without Britain! But if Britain is politically and militarily present in Europe, who would not be a European?" (October 8, p. 4633).

[9] The desire to avoid a position of manifest inferiority to Britain was evident also in the October debates on the London Agreements, which were criticized by the ex-*cédistes* for "discriminating in favor of Britain."

[10] Practically no mention was made in parliamentary discussions of the clause by which Britain could withdraw her forces from the Continent (a) if, for instance, she obtained the agreement of Benelux, or (b) if the British government were to declare that "an acute overseas emergency" existed. (The latter provision recalls Agreement No. 6 of the Additional Protocols to the EDC treaty of March 24, 1953, which gave France similar freedom "in case of a grave crisis in a non-European territory in regard to which a member state of EDC assumes defense responsibilities.")

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IS FRANCE CONDEMNED TO SUBJECTION?

And yet, less than three months later, Mendès-France noted the disappearance of these agreeable feelings: "In October the British decision [to adhere to WEU] . . . was viewed by everybody as an immense success, as an unprecedented event giving us valid grounds for rejoicing. . . . The organic presence of Great Britain on the Continent appeared to all of us as a new fact of colossal importance. When I heard the Paris Agreements being disparaged these last days . . . I regretted that no attention was being paid anymore to this essential achievement [of the British presence] for which French governments had fought for so many years without being able to obtain it" (December 27, p. 6885).

Behind this development, which was decisive for the difficulties that WEU encountered in December, one perceives a human tendency that has been particularly evident in French politics and has contributed to the uniquely high mortality of French governments. It is the rapid decline in satisfaction once an advantage has been definitely established —the instability of desire after consummation.

As the pleasure in a given situation wanes, misgivings about its unfavorable aspects tend to rise. In the October debates on the London Agreements, the fear of German domination, which had contributed so powerfully to the rejection of EDC, had been sharply reduced by Britain's great "concession" in entering WEU. But by December, the saving event of October not only had lost much of its reassurance value, but even appeared in an unfavorable light. Ex-*cédistes* maintained that WEU would put Paris under the political domination of London as well as in military subjection to Bonn; in other words, they were applying to the new agreements a stigma similar to that which the enemies of EDC had attached to the treaty of 1952.[11]

The forecast of German military preponderance was not always coupled with that of British political control. At times, the specter was one of a Washington-Bonn axis strengthened by increased powers for SACEUR, on the one hand, and by the direct distribution of American military aid, on the other.[12] Another prediction was that France would fall under tripartite control: "In WEU the army will be German, the arms-controller British, and the general charged with the integration of the military establishments American" (Teitgen, December 22, p.

[11] Cf. Paul Reynaud, December 22, p. 6760; Alfred Coste-Floret, December 22, p. 6770; Felix Gaillard, December 29, p. 6935.
[12] Cf. Soustelle, December 21, p. 6697.

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6752). (M. Teitgen, a fervent ex-*cédiste*, was to be a member of the government which, in March of 1955, insisted on the final ratification of WEU.)

But the predominant fear associated with EDC—the one that the transition to WEU had been designed to alleviate—returned in its pristine form once the October euphoria had passed. It was the suspicion that, whatever the institution, it would lead to German hegemony. Thus M. Palewski (who also was to support WEU the following March) spoke about it in December in much the way he had talked about EDC earlier: "From the first day of WEU there will be a German general staff, and a German representation in NATO, SHAPE and SACEUR. . . . These will exercise a very important influence. The role of the Germans in the interim EDC committee shows the extent to which they know how to impose their point of view on all our allies" (December 22, p. 6758). On December 29, he maintained that in WEU ". . . we must resign ourselves to seeing Germany occupy the first place on the Continent in the near future. . . . She will impose on us her own solutions in the Saar and as to the development of Africa" (p. 6937).

In this view—which was shared well beyond the limited circle of those who expressed it clearly—France would lose not only her military independence, but also the capacity for preserving her political independence in time of peace.[13] Whatever the particular policy under discussion, the prospect of French servitude always appeared plausible.

The preceding review of Paris opinion on the probable consequences of EDC and WEU for France's position in the free world leads us to the following conclusions: EDC, so its enemies feared, would destroy France's status as one of the "Big Three" of the West, and would consign France to a position of definite inferiority with regard to Britain in particular. When Britain agreed to enter WEU, her offer was at first regarded as removing this danger, assuring the continuity of France's Anglo-American connection, and reducing the likelihood that a rearmed Germany would dominate the Continent. But, after a short while, this sense of relief was at least in part superseded by renewed apprehensions that WEU, too, might cause France to become subject to her stronger allies.

[13] This seems implied when M. Delbos foresaw (or pretended to foresee) as the immediate consequence of the rejection of the Paris treaty—apparently without any Soviet ultimatum or aggression—the reduction of France to satellite status (cf. December 27, p. 6876).

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III. Some Aspects of Parliamentary Mechanics in the Passage of WEU

Attitudes focusing around the integrity of France, and the place of France among the powers, were by no means the only ones that bore on the defeat of EDC and the eventual passage of WEU. Other relevant foreign policy attitudes, too involved and, indeed, significant to be fairly dealt with in a summary fashion, concerned the German military danger, the defense of the free world against the Soviet Union, the possibility of negotiation with the East, and the international consequences of twice refusing a European solution. But even these foreign policy considerations do not fully explain the Assembly's behavior toward the successor to EDC; we must also look, albeit briefly, at the parliamentary mechanics involved in the passage of WEU.

Conceptions of Parliamentary Freedom

On October 12, the Assembly passed a resolution approving the London Agreements without qualifications. On December 24, the Assembly rejected the Paris Agreements which gave legal form to the principles indicated at London. By this reversal, 113 deputies—21 Socialists, 26 Radicals and UDSR, four MRP, two *Indépendants d'Outre-Mer*, 26 *Modérés*, 32 *Républicains sociaux*, and two members not belonging to any group—in effect refused to honor what, outside of France, had generally been viewed as an obligation assumed by the vote of October.

This reversal occurred without explicit consideration—during the debates of December 21-23—of the inconsistency of behavior characterized by the two votes. Nor did this question play more than a quite secondary role in the debates of December 27-29 which preceded the final acceptance of WEU on December 30. In fact, the widespread approval of the London Agreements indicated in the vote of October 12 had been largely forgotten by December. When M. Bourgès-Maunoury brought the matter up, he pointed out a rather shocking situation: "Mesdames, Messieurs . . . I should like to examine two groups of dates with you. On the one hand there was February 19, 1952, and October 12, 1954. On these days the National Assembly approved a well-defined foreign policy. . . . On the earlier date M. Edgar Faure obtained 328 votes . . . in favor of a detailed project of a European defense community. On the later date M. Mendès-France obtained 350 votes in favor of the contours of WEU. . . . But we must also envisage two other dates, those of rejections. On August 30, 1954, EDC got only 264 votes, and on December 24, WEU but 259. . . . Thus

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the Assembly approved the sketches of two projects conceived by France, and then changed its mind on the final results" (December 27, p. 6878).

How easy it is to forget one's recent parliamentary past may be seen from an instance in which an influential deputy seems to have lost sight in December of the actions in which he himself had engaged in October. When the London Agreements were being discussed, Gaston Palewski had proposed a resolution indicating a set of conditions which the future treaty should satisfy. But he had also at the end of the debate voted in favor of the resolution of M. Aubry according to which ". . . the National Assembly, informed . . . of the result of the London Conference, extends its confidence to the government. . . ." (October 8, p. 4644).

That this resolution implied an unconditional approval of the London Agreements had been underlined by Mendès-France: "If you vote this resolution, you will be approving what the government has done during the last weeks, and you will be expressing your confidence in the government, which you will be asking to continue the same policy and to carry it to its conclusion, that is, up to the point of submitting to you for ratification the treaties which will have been worked out with our allies and partners" (October 8, p. 4654). Mendès-France rejected Palewski's resolution, declaring that ". . . while it contains a number of indications which are not far from the thoughts of the government, it also includes several points with which the government does not agree" (*ibid.*). Yet Palewski voted for the resolution that was acceptable to the government.

But when he recalled the October debate on December 27, it was only his own personal resolution of October which Palewski remembered. Seeking to justify the rejection of WEU by himself and numerous *Républicains sociaux*, whose change of mind had contributed to the surprise of December 24 and was still endangering the Paris Agreements when he spoke, Palewski declared: "M. le Président du Conseil: In October it fell to me to announce the near-unanimous vote of my group in your favor. But I could repeat today my entire speech of that date, for with one exception you have failed to satisfy any of the conditions which I then posed" (p. 6888). In this fashion, the primacy of his personal position in the mind of a deputy may mask the incoherence of his votes; the persistence of unsatisfied desires may obscure the compromises concluded.

The deputies who rejected the Paris Agreements after accepting those of London, and did not attempt to justify the change, expressed by

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their silence not only embarrassment or failure of memory, but also a basic refusal to be bound by their own past actions. This is a point that calls for some elaboration.

In October, those who were about to approve the London Agreements would, on the whole, have refused to grant that such approval involved a moral obligation or a political necessity to ratify the treaty that was later expected to emerge from the London Conference. They would have argued that it was impossible to approve in advance a treaty that had not yet been drawn up.

In October, many parliamentarians believed that the general principles embodied in the London Agreements were no more important for their final decision than the as yet unformulated details of the WEU treaty. M. Soustelle put it this way: "It is not a ratification debate which opens today in our Assembly. We have before us today not the text of a treaty to be approved or modified [*sic*] . . . but rather certain extremely important general orientations. To these, however, the future may add not less important modifications" (October 8, p. 4623).

This view—and this is the significant point—stood in clear contrast to the prevailing interpretation of the situation in the other Western capitals, where it was believed that the London Agreements were sufficiently rich in content to enable the French parliament to express a binding yes or no that would hold for a later treaty embodying the same principles.

In fact, there were those even in Paris who felt that the final decision of parliament at a later vote of ratification would be determined by the principles agreed upon in London. General Aumeran, for example, recalled the approval of the principles of EDC in 1952 and added: "When the full text of the Paris Treaty had become known, opposition steadily mounted until EDC was rejected on August 30. Would it not have been better to reject the very principle at the outset? For it was, finally, this principle which was refused" (October 7, p. 4581).

It would be an exaggeration to say that the October insistence on the difference between approval of principle and treaty expressed only a desire to preserve the precious freedom of changing direction. A certain number of deputies believed—partly, of course, because they were not yet up against the question of ratification—that the advantages and the disadvantages of WEU were about equally balanced, and that they therefore needed to know all the details of the forthcoming treaty before they could arrive at a decision.

But, when the Paris Agreements were concluded, it was difficult not to see that they added very little to those of London. In fact, in the

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words of Mendès-France on December 23, they were fashioned "in strict application of the conclusions of the London Conference." Appealing to the 350 deputies who had voted in favor of these conclusions, Mendès-France went on: "I am still waiting for even a single one of these deputies to say at the rostrum: Since October 8 the government has not fulfilled the mandate with which it had been entrusted. I shall enumerate the concessions which it has, wrongly, made. I shall indicate the points on which it has not honored the obligations into which it entered" (p. 6811).

Mendès-France was left waiting. The virtual silence of the 113 deputies who changed their minds in December about the reasons for this change not only implied that they saw no essential difference between the London and Paris Agreements, but also showed that they were not prepared to justify their new stand by citing a change in the world situation. It was only M. Soustelle (December 21, p. 6696) who alluded to changes in international politics as rendering WEU less desirable than it would have been in October.

Of course, the silence of the deputies who changed their minds also enabled them to avoid a flat denial of the binding character of the October vote. Such a denial was in fact made explicitly only by two somewhat eccentric deputies. The old Radical, M. de Moro-Giafferri, said: "When we approved your policy after your journey to London, M. le Président du Conseil, . . . we wanted to encourage you with all our heart, but we did not want to bind ourselves" (December 27, p. 6874). And the rank-and-file MRP, Auguste Billiémaz, after having confessed that ". . . this is one of the first occasions on which I dare to speak. . . . I am in all respects an average deputy. . . . When I speak, for once, I do think that I merit a little bit of attention on the part of my colleagues . . . ," declared on December 29: "I have up to now voted against the Paris Agreements, and I shall continue doing so, though I did vote in favor of the London Agreements. But the vote in favor of the London Agreements is out of date. It was, at least as far as I am concerned, more about the Président du Conseil than about the substance of the problem" (p. 6924). This statement illustrates the crucial role played by feelings and calculations concerning the survival of a government even in votes dealing with highly important questions, and manifestly unrelated to domestic political considerations.

Past actions could be viewed as creating a moral obligation only if they happened to support a course of action determined by other considerations. M. Garet, speaking in the name of the *Indépendants* on December 27, as the Assembly was being asked by the government to

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undo its rejection of WEU three days earlier, said that the final decision should "depend on the answer to two questions": (1) If WEU were definitely rejected, would another negotiation with the allies be feasible? (2) Could a unilateral rearmament of Germany be avoided? "If your answer is yes, then it would become possible to reaffirm our hostile vote of the other night. But if your answer were to be no, . . . then the situation would be different. In that case nobody could doubt that your appeal, M. le Président du Conseil, to the 350 deputies who voted in your favor after London and before Paris should be heard. This conclusion could, to my mind, be avoided only if it were possible to maintain that the content of the Paris Agreements is such that the 350 deputies in question, or some among them, could pretend to have been freed from the obligations toward you which they had, at least implicitly, assumed" (pp. 6873-74). In other words, only in a situation that allows no alternative need one recall a moral obligation that reinforces the only possible course of action. Only if it were politically harmful to reject the Paris Agreements should one recall the earlier moral commitment not to reject them. Nobody protested against this view.

It is not surprising that, in such an atmosphere, the appeal to the 350 deputies who had voted for the London Agreements on October 12 was not a significant element in the parliamentary situation in December. It was mainly used by Mendès-France as an emergency device, and then not until the small hours of December 24, when the danger to WEU suddenly became visible. He said then: "If the government has remained faithful to the policy approved by 350 deputies on October 8, these deputies must in their turn remain faithful to the contract concluded between us" (p. 6840).

It seems clear at this point that the stress put on "contracts" between the government and the Assembly—which is particularly characteristic of Mendès-France, but is also generally important in French politics—is intended to combat (but may in fact tend to reinforce) the strong urge to be unfaithful to anything which is felt as an obligation.

LET GEORGE DO IT

WEU was rejected on December 24 by 280 votes against 259 (with 88 deputies choosing various forms of abstention) chiefly because, as late as a few hours before the vote, ratification seemed to most to be a foregone conclusion. Not since March 7, 1952, when Pinay became Premier partly because it was so widely believed that he would not, had a decision been brought about as a result of self-defeating predictions. The generally accepted hypothesis was that WEU would be ap-

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proved. On the basis of this hypothesis, enough deputies voted against it so that the hypothesis was upset.

As early as December 20, at the very beginning of the debate on the Paris Agreements, M. Isorni (*Modéré*) spoke of "those who are convinced that the Agreements must be ratified" but "who count on the vote of a majority . . . which they refuse to join." He expressed the utopian wish that "everybody should vote as if his own vote were decisive" (p. 6652). Two days later, M. Le Bail (Socialist) made a reference to ". . . those deputies who calculate that there will be a sufficient number to vote . . . in favor of German rearmament, so that they need not themselves incur this disagreeable responsibility" (December 22, p. 6754). His statement was greeted with "applause on numerous benches of the Center, of the Right and of the Extreme Right" as well as with exclamations of "Very good!" on the part of MM. Billotte (*Modéré*) and Daniel Mayer (Socialist). Shortly afterwards, Paul Reynaud proceeded to illustrate Le Bail's point by justifying the impending abstention of a number of ex-*cédistes* among the *Modérés* in the following words: "Those who have brought France to the present impasse affirm that there is now no other solution than that proposed today. We answer them that, if this be so, our will to safeguard Western solidarity will prevent us from voting against the Agreements. And once they will have been adopted by the majority . . . (December 22, p. 6761).

After the vote of December 24, M. de Bénouville (*Républicain social*), one of the deputies whose change of position of December 30 made the final passage of WEU possible, admitted that he had abstained on December 24 in the belief that it would not matter: "Though I abstained last Friday in order to indicate my disagreement with the government . . . I cannot now overlook the fact that the very existence of the Atlantic alliance is at stake. In these circumstances . . . I cannot refuse the Atlantic alliance my vote" (December 29, p. 6880).

A certain attitude of Mendès-France himself helped the hypothesis to defeat itself. In his speech of the evening before the vote, he mentioned a then widely shared prediction: "If tomorrow, by misfortune, the Assembly were to divide itself into three roughly equal parts, and if thus its decision [in favor of WEU] were to come about only by virtue of a considerable number of abstentions . . . , then [here he added a very unusual challenge] it would almost be better for us to say no" (p. 6822). In a parliament in which the unceasing struggle for mere survival absorbs such a large part of each government's energy after its first weeks or months of grace, the fact that Mendès-France

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insisted on the luxury of a large majority could only reinforce the belief that he himself—a parliamentary forecaster of some repute—was sure of ratification.

Just before the beginning of the WEU debate, the MRP had, despite its opposition to the government, abstained from the December 20 vote on Indochina; it had done so grudgingly only because it did not want to see Mendès-France overthrown in time to avoid the responsibility for the passage of the Paris Agreements which were soon to be debated. But, despite this MRP "sacrifice," Mendès-France won an impressive victory on the Indochina vote; to the surprise of most forecasters, it transpired that he did not even need the MRP vote in order to survive. This mishap determined many MRP members (who were in any case smarting under their reputation for parliamentary clumsiness) not to expose themselves again to such ridicule. Mendès-France's statement that he preferred the rejection of WEU to its ratification by a small vote reinforced this MRP determination. Mendès-France morally condemns abstention and says that he prefers a negative vote to it, they said. All right, we will give him our negative votes, all the more as he is surely asking for them because he is, rightly, certain that they will not impede ratification.

The intense aversion of many deputies to needless self-sacrifice, as well as a disinclination to go along with what they believed to be the attempt of other parties and factions to impose on them burdens which the latter should themselves carry, fostered adoption of the reassuring prediction of passage that allowed them to reduce their own inner conflict by enabling them to consider self-sacrifice unnecessary. Thus, anti-WEU Socialists counted on the determination of factions represented in the government (which they were not) to save it by securing ratification, and MRP deputies relied in their turn on the Socialists' voting discipline to ensure passage.

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THE DAVIES MISSION AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1937-1941

By RICHARD H. ULLMAN

IN the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., resting on the open shelves along with other books from the President's personal collection, is a copy of Joseph E. Davies' *Mission to Moscow*. As was his custom, FDR wrote a short comment in the book after reading it. Inside the front cover, under the glowing dedication to him by the author, the President scratched four words: "This book will last."

Succinctly, this comment sums up Davies' influence on Administration policy toward the Soviet Union. Davies, Ambassador to Moscow during 1937 and 1938, published his book in early December 1941, almost at the very time of the Japanese blow at Pearl Harbor. His influence on United States-Soviet relations had been strongest six months before, when Hitler's armies began to roll into Russia. For it was Davies, virtually alone among the President's advisers in those doubtful June days, who counseled a policy of all-out aid to the retreating Soviets.

The risks involved were gigantic. To send aid to Russia meant to divert it from the United Kingdom at a time when British needs were equally critical. Almost no one thought the Soviet forces had any chance of stopping the German attack. Of the envoys who clambered onto the special train that would take them to the relative safety of Kuibyshev several hundred miles east of Moscow, the American Ambassador, Laurence A. Steinhardt, was among the most pessimistic. Steinhardt told the United Press correspondent, Henry Shapiro, who was also on the train, that he predicted a Russian collapse within a month.[1]

If this estimate was anywhere near accurate, effective aid could never arrive in time. Vital supplies, desperately needed in Britain, would be wasted. Most of official Washington echoed the pessimism from the field, and the responsible press was unanimous in insisting, with men like Stimson, Knox, Ickes, and Admiral Stark,[2] that "This is no time

[1] Interview with Henry Shapiro, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., January 25, 1955.

[2] William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, New York, 1953, pp. 537-39.

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to debate aid to Russia; this is a time to aid America and the cause of freedom by throwing every weight into the scales on the Western front."[3]

But the decision to aid the Soviets was taken. The President was willing to gamble that the Russian forces would hold out until the onset of winter, when they would have a breathing spell in which to bolster their strength with American weapons. According to Langer and Gleason, it was almost certainly Davies' prediction that the Soviets could last out that caused Roosevelt to take the Russian risk.[4] The former Ambassador, then serving as Hull's Special Assistant for War Emergency Problems and Policies, ". . . was everywhere in those days urging that this country improve the opportunity offered by Russia's willingness to destroy the Nazis. Mr. Davies' confidence in Russia's staying power carried undoubted weight in forming this Government's opinion."[5]

Davies himself recalls today that "Immediately after the attack, I was in constant touch with the White House, with Harry Hopkins and the President."[6] At the same time, when "high officials of the Army expressed the opinion that it was only a matter of weeks before Russia would be conquered, I expressed the contrary opinion, and due to my recent tenure as Ambassador to Russia, I was well-informed as to the strength and power of Russia from a military point of view. It aroused considerable comment when I expressed confidence that the Russian Army would hold Hitler and his allies, and would surprise and startle the world by their defense."[7] Davies agrees with Langer's estimation of his influence in persuading Roosevelt to send help, remarking that ". . . I should be credited with some service in connection with making our country aware of the military potential of the Red Army, in spite of the great body of opinion to the contrary held by our military and other observers."[8]

How did Davies, a lawyer-businessman new to diplomacy, arrive at an estimation of Soviet strength which clashed so sharply with that made by his fellow ambassadors in Moscow? Davies, indeed, was "right" about the Russians. And results count. But this article will argue that it was only by a curious turn of circumstance that he was right, and that he never really understood the country to which he was assigned. It will also compare Davies' conceptions of the USSR with

[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, July 1, 1941.
[4] Langer and Gleason, *op.cit.*, p. 540.
[5] Forest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, *How War Came*, New York, 1942, p. 251.
[6] Letter to the author from Joseph E. Davies, Washington, D.C., March 3, 1955.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*

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those held by his leading professional colleagues from other countries and by subordinate professionals on his own staff. His was the least realistic of these varying views of Soviet behavior, yet his conclusions were the most acceptable to those who made American policy.

I

In a gesture typically his own, President Roosevelt signed Davies' ambassadorial commission on November 16, 1936, the third anniversary of the agreement of recognition between the United States and the Soviet Union. By this time, the relations which had begun so hopefully in 1933 had declined to a state of mere formality. American disappointment at the Russian failure to meet the debt obligations of the initial agreement, or to restrain the activities of the Comintern within the United States, had generated a mutual bitterness that at times approached veiled hostility. Two and a half years in Moscow had changed the first American Ambassador, William C. Bullitt, from a staunch advocate of United States-Soviet friendship to an implacable foe of the Kremlin regime.[9] Reflecting on these disappointments, Secretary of State Hull wrote in his *Memoirs*: "We were now back almost to where we had started. We had official relations with Moscow, but they rested on no bedrock of friendship and cooperation."[10] The truth of Hull's statement was mirrored in the routine nature of diplomatic events during the interim period between Bullitt's departure in June 1936 and the arrival of Davies the following January.

Loy W. Henderson was then Chargé. The most important item of negotiation that summer of 1936 was a one-year renewal of the trade treaty signed a year before, in which the USSR again promised to buy at least $30 millions' worth of goods from the United States in exchange for most-favored-nation treatment.[11] Otherwise, the embassy's time was spent in trying to parry the thrusts of the Soviet petty bureaucracy, which continually threw up unnecessary and irritating barriers against all Western diplomats.

In the sphere of Russian domestic developments, however, the period was far from routine. The threat of a European war increased and the

[9] For an extremely able survey of United States-Soviet relations during the years immediately before and after recognition, see Robert P. Browder, *The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy*, Princeton, N.J., 1953.

[10] Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, New York, 1948, p. 306.

[11] The texts of the notes exchanged are printed in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1952, pp. 340-42. (Cited hereafter as *Soviet Union, 1933-1939*.)

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race to strengthen the USSR continued. On August 11, the Russian conscription age was lowered from twenty-one to nineteen years. Western military attachés learned that the move was part of a four-year plan to raise the size of the Red Army from 1,300,000 to approximately two million men.[12] But the most significant development in internal politics was the opening, in late August, of the Zinoviev-Kamenev treason trial. This was the first public purge trial to take place since the late 1920's, when Stalin was trying to consolidate his position, and Henderson reported that he and his colleagues were "puzzled and astonished" by the manner in which the defendants heaped denouncements upon themselves—making a death sentence certain.[13] The embassy learned that "hundreds of active or former Party members are being arrested and discontented whispers in Party circles have been effectively hushed."[14] On September 1, the announcement came that all sixteen of the men convicted in public trial had been executed within twenty-four hours of the passing of sentence. Henderson cabled that "a wave of fear . . . is said to be sweeping over the country."[15]

It was in this atmosphere that Davies' mission began. A more unlikely candidate for diplomatic appointment would have been hard to find. While Bullitt had had long and varied experience in international affairs (if not in diplomacy) before becoming an ambassador, Davies had absolutely none. Born in Watertown, Wis., educated at the University of Wisconsin and its Law School, Davies never fully lost the air of a small-town Middle Western attorney. But he had quickly grown wealthy as a businessman and corporation lawyer. More important, he was a staunch party-line Democrat of the Wisconsin Progressive strain, and had been named Western manager of Wilson's successful 1912 campaign. In appreciation of his services, Wilson made him Commissioner of Corporations in 1913 and chairman of the Federal Trade Commission in 1915, a post he retained for two years. The President also offered him the choice of becoming Ambassador to Russia or Italy, or Governor-General of the Philippines, but he turned these offers down to run unsuccessfully for the Senate in 1918.

In the early years of the Wilson Administration Davies met Franklin Roosevelt, who was then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and a warm friendship developed between the two men. Together with other younger progressives in the Democratic Party, they belonged to an

[12] Henderson to Hull, August 18, 1936, *ibid.*, pp. 299-300.
[13] Henderson to Hull, August 27, 1936, *ibid.*, p. 300.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 301.
[15] Henderson to Hull, September 1, 1936, *ibid.*, p. 303.

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organization called the "Common Counsel Club," which met twice a month over lunch for political discussion. Nearly three decades later, Davies wrote that "All of us saw in this tall, handsome young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the future great progressive liberal whom we were all 'for' in connection with some future election to the presidency."[16]

During most of the twenty years following the Common Counsel days, Davies stayed out of public office and devoted himself to business and law. But he found time to be a good Democrat: he was chairman of the 1936 campaign of Franklin Roosevelt and backed up his efforts with a contribution of $10,000.[17] Less than two weeks after election day, his Russian appointment was made public, though he and Roosevelt had talked of it during the previous August.[18]

The new Ambassador took with him to Moscow two important attitudes. One was a concern for the welfare of the working man, though it was of a gradualist nature. "I am a firm believer in evolution as against revolution," he explained in a prefatory note to *Mission to Moscow*. "I think our system is doing the best job for the common man and doing it more slowly but more surely because it seeks advance through evolution rather than revolution."[19] Another was a distaste for the wiles of conventional diplomacy, as he understood it. Describing his presentation to Soviet President Kalinin on January 25, 1937, he wrote: "I stated I was not a professional diplomat and was accustomed to work directly. To this Mr. Kalinin replied that their government was a government based on popular support and that their leaders all believed in directness and forthright discussion. I then stated that my government was particularly fortunate in that we were isolated and far removed from any possible threats of other nations and that consequently we were accustomed to direct diplomacy, whereas general European diplomacy was perhaps influenced by the necessities of national fears or national ambitions."[20]

Davies' mission cannot be discussed in terms of major diplomatic issues, for none existed. In the days before his departure on January 4, the new Ambassador had been briefed by Under Secretary Sumner

[16] Joseph E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, New York, 1941, p. xi. (This and subsequent references are to the 12th printing.)

[17] *New York Times*, January 16, 1937.

[18] Davies, *op.cit.*, p. xi.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

[20] Davies to Hull, January 25, 1937, *ibid.*, pp. 26-27. *Mission to Moscow* contains many official despatches not included in *Soviet Union, 1933-1939*.

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Welles and the President on the policies he should follow in Moscow.[21] First, the still-unsettled Soviet debt to the United States was to be regarded as a dead issue. Davies was to make clear that both the President and the Secretary of State were deeply disappointed by the Russian failure to meet the recognition obligations, but he was to take the position that a settlement was of far greater importance to the USSR than to the United States (because of the American economic doors it would open to Russia), and that therefore any move to renew negotiations would be up to the Kremlin. Neither were there any hopes for improvement in the Comintern situation. The Soviet government continued to deny all responsibility for the actions of the Comintern, through the American Communist Party, in the United States. About the only specific assignments that Davies received were to negotiate the annual renewal of the trade treaty and to size up the position of the Soviet Union as a power in a European war. Both Roosevelt and Welles emphasized that Davies' impression of Russia's military, economic, and political strength was the most important aspect of his mission.

The new Ambassador's powers of observation were put to an exacting test only a few days after his arrival, when the second of the great treason trials took place. On trial were thirteen minor figures and four prominent political leaders,[22] the core of the so-called "reserve center" of the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center" whose leaders had been condemned in the previous trial. Davies attended the seven days of sessions with Second Secretary of Embassy George F. Kennan, who served as translator. Both Davies and Kennan submitted reports to the State Department evaluating the trial. A comparison of the two documents reveals an important difference between the two men.[23]

Davies saw the entire proceedings in the light of his own legal experience. What struck him most forcibly was that a long trial was held

[21] Diary entries, December 15, 1936, and January 2, 1937, in Davies, *op.cit.*, pp. 4 and 6.

[22] The four were Pyatakov, former Assistant Commissar for Heavy Industry; Sokolnikov, Commissar for Timber; Serebryokov, Assistant Commissar for Communications; and *Pravda* editor Karl Radek.

[23] There is no special significance in the fact that Kennan's memorandum was despatched to the Department. It is common diplomatic practice for a Chief of Mission to transmit information from or opinions of subordinates in their original form as memoranda, thus identifying the source and also saving the tedious labor of redrafting the material into standard despatch form to be signed by the Ambassador. It is highly unusual, however, for both the Ambassador and a subordinate to submit reports on the same event, unless the Chief of Mission wants to call the attention of the Department to conflicting views. Also it is an interesting commentary on the two reports that Kennan's was selected over Davies' for inclusion in *Soviet Union, 1933-1939* (pp. 362-69), whereas Davies' is available only in *Mission to Moscow* (pp. 32-46).

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despite the fact that the men under indictment had all confessed. Such confessions were amazing to him. But the weight of testimony convinced him that the state had a legitimate case. "Viewed objectively," he wrote to Secretary Hull, ". . . and based upon my experience in the trial of cases and the application of the tests of credibility which past experience had afforded me, I arrived at the reluctant conclusion that the state had established its case, at least to the extent of proving the existence of a widespread conspiracy and plot among the political leaders against the Soviet government, and which under their statutes established the crimes set forth in the indictment. . . . Assuming, however, that basically human nature is much the same everywhere, I am still impressed with the many evidences of credibility which were obtained in the testimony."[24]

A few homey comparisons helped the Ambassador to categorize the trial in his mind. Vyshinsky, the Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Union (Davies called him the Attorney General), reminded him of his old friend Homer Cummings, the US Attorney General. Davies described the Russian as "calm, dispassionate, intellectual, and able and wise. He conducted the treason trial in a manner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer."[25]

Kennan, however, was not of the same opinion. "It requires no very extensive acquaintance with the background and the proceedings of the trial to appreciate that the great mass of evidence produced in the court room was neither entirely true nor entirely false," he wrote. To him, it was clear that both prosecutor and defendants were not speaking in terms of actual crimes, but in dialectical equivalents which in the Communist mind stood for other actions. "It seems almost certain, for example, that the phrase 'terrorism,' which was used so frequently throughout the proceedings, was understood by all the participants in the spectacle to mean simply illegal opposition activity."[26] For Kennan, there was no evidence to prove that many of the men whom Davies termed "cutthroats" ever had had any real connection with specific acts of sabotage.

It is not surprising to discover that Kennan, the Foreign Service career man and area specialist, was more capable than Davies in analyzing Soviet conditions. But Davies' report does more than illustrate this rather obvious point; it also suggests the inadequacy of the conceptions he brought into what was for him the wholly new realm of interna-

[24] Davies to Hull, February 17, 1937, in Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 43.
[25] Letter to Stephen Early, February 10, 1937, *ibid.*, p. 67.
[26] Kennan memorandum, February 13, 1937, in *Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 363-64.

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tional affairs, especially his disposition to measure all new phenomena by the standards of his own country and his own limited experience. Where Kennan, convinced that too much evidence of importance had been held back, hesitated to draw firm conclusions from the trial, Davies judged the proceedings as he would have judged a murder trial with full confessions in Wisconsin. Although the embassy's analyses of the preceding Zinoviev-Kamenev trial were open to his inspection, and might have persuaded him that all was not what it seemed, he was ready to accept the Russian verdict as an open and shut case.

The trial also brought out another of Davies' characteristics: a tendency toward excessive legalism. To him the most impressive thing about the sessions was their difference from common-law procedure.[27] This legalism was demonstrated throughout his mission. Indeed, one might say that Davies' primary conception of the role of ambassador was that of counsel for his country and its citizens in a foreign nation. This attitude accounts for his intercession in many routine cases of detention of Americans by the lower levels of the Soviet bureaucracy—matters ordinarily left to the embassy staff.

Davies' legalistic approach to such diplomatic problems as he encountered is illustrated by his handling of the negotiation of the annual trade treaty during the summer of 1937. Washington was willing to renew its usual grant of most-favored-nation status to the USSR and, in addition, to remove a special discriminatory tariff on Soviet coal. In exchange, the State Department asked that Moscow increase its guaranteed American purchases from $30 million to $40 million, actually no more than the Russians had purchased the previous year.[28] The Soviets agreed, but insisted on throwing one more clause into the bargain: Moscow would also extend most-favored-nation treatment to the United States.[29]

Here was the rub. Because of the Soviet government's monopoly of trade, most-favored-nation treatment from it meant nothing. Davies realized this, but since the clause itself contained nothing detrimental to the United States, he saw no reason for refusing the letter of the Soviet proposal even if it had no substance.[30] As Secretary Hull pointed out, it was for precisely this reason that the Department turned it down: "The Department is strongly opposed to the inclusion in the present agreement of a pledge which has no real value, but which would give

[27] Davies to Hull, February 17, 1937, in Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 46.
[28] Hull to Davies, July 1, 1937, in *Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 409-11.
[29] Davies to Hull, July 6, 1937, *ibid.*, p. 413.
[30] *Ibid.*

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Political model - of US.

the appearance of a concession to the United States on the part of the Soviet Government and which might therefore be utilized in the future by the Soviet Government as an argument for reducing those of its undertakings which constitute the real *quid pro quo*."[31]

The reasoning behind Davies' advice to the Department that the United States allow the paper concession is only partially clear. His main motive, however, seems to have been to protect the Soviet minor bureaucracy from the risk of being visited with Stalin's wrath—a humanitarian aim but not a recognized objective of American foreign policy. He felt that in the very tense situation that existed because of the purges, these officials were "seriously and honestly concerned with . . . the prevention of an appearance on the face of the treaty that there was a discrimination between the treatment accorded to the Soviet Union and other nations."[32]

Even when Davies was told by the Department to refuse the Soviet offer adamantly, he did so only with the greatest reluctance. "It appeared to me to be a question of *amour-propre*," he wrote in a memorandum following a conference with Russian trade officials on July 15, "and, as a matter of fact, it was difficult for me to make an effort to maintain that there was serious justification for such discrimination, particularly in view of the fact that the treaty was to obtain for only one year."[33]

Davies' tendency to see Russian events and institutions in the American image prevented him—as, in all fairness, it did others—from really comprehending the dictatorial nature of the regime and its extreme centralization of power. In a report describing the "Bukharin Mass Treason Trial" of March 1938—involving Grinko, People's Commissar for Finance; Rosengoltz, Commissar for Foreign Trade; Krestinsky, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs; and numerous other second-level officials—Davies wrote: "To appreciate its significance, it was as though Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Secretary of Commerce Jones, Undersecretary of State Welles, Ambassador Bullitt, Ambassador Kennedy, and Secretary to the President Early, in this country, confessed to conspiracy with Germany to co-operate in an invasion of the United States."[34] A statement of this kind reveals a basic misconception of the role that these second-level bureaucrats played in the Russian policy-making process. Krestinsky, for instance, was little more than

[31] Hull to Davies, July 8, 1937, *ibid.*, p. 414.
[32] Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 665.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 277.

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Litvinov's water-boy, and Litvinov himself was charged only with the execution, and not the formulation, of foreign policy.[35]

This lack of understanding extended to other of the most fundamental processes of totalitarian control. The Pioneer organization, which prepares selected adolescents for membership in the elitist Komsomol, Davies found "analogous to the Boy or Girl Scout movement in the United States."[36] In another instance, soon after his arrival in Moscow, the Ambassador attended the closing sessions of the Soviet Constitutional Convention. He described in detail how delegates from the various provinces voted for new articles, holding up a red card to indicate assent as the hierarchy read off each clause; and he found this process "moving."[37] An interesting contrast is the reaction of Charles E. Bohlen, then Second Secretary of Embassy, to the opening session of the Supreme Soviet, which was set up by the new constitution: "Judged by the accepted connotation of the word 'democracy' and by the usual procedure of legislative bodies, the entire proceedings in the sessions of the Supreme Soviet were a farce. Nevertheless, I received the impression that many of the deputies themselves, having no standards of comparison, felt that they were taking an active and responsible part in the government of the Soviet Union."[38] Loy Henderson, in a note sent to the State Department along with Bohlen's memorandum, expressed his complete approval of the younger man's observations.[39]

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Davies, despite a few disconcerting experiences like the discovery of a microphone hidden in the wall behind his desk[40] and the continuing purges, was living in a world where ideal was real. The revolutionary communism that made Bullitt an embittered cynic was only a passing phenomenon for his successor. In his final report to the State Department at the conclusion of his mission on June 6, 1938, Davies wrote: "Dictatorship over the proletariat is not the objective or end this system professes to seek, as is the case with fascist ideology. The fact of dictatorship is apologized for here. It is justified on the ground that it is a realistic expedient, resorted to

[35] See Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, p. 282.

[36] Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 634. Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to Moscow, noted that these youth organizations "serve the purpose of creating a reliable new generation." Despatch of November 18, 1938, in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1949 and continuing, Series D., III, p. 612. (Cited hereafter as *German Documents.*)

[37] Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

[38] Bohlen memorandum, February 2, 1938, in *Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, p. 510.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 509n.

[40] Davies to Hull, August 10, 1937, *ibid.*, pp. 445-46.

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only to protect the masses of the people, until they can themselves rule under a system where ideologically the individual and not the state shall be supreme. Moreover, there is no doubt of the present sincerity of this regime in its desire to maintain Peace."[41]

One of the most important factors supporting Davies' attitude toward the Soviet Union was the guile of the Kremlin officials with whom he became acquainted. They used two techniques in dealing with him. One was to compliment him on his objectivity and refer to his excellent powers of observation;[42] the other was to praise FDR.[43] Each time they did so, the Ambassador passed their words on to the President, and then recorded them in his diary. For example, a letter from Davies to Roosevelt on January 18, 1939 (when Davies was Ambassador to Belgium), read: "The leaders of the Soviet government have stated to me that there is only one government in the world that they trust and that is the United States government under your leadership."[44]

Davies' farewell call on President Kalinin and Premier Molotov illustrates clearly how successfully the Russians used flattery on the Ambassador. In a letter to his daughter, he wrote that the two men had told him "that they had been much impressed with the serious manner in which the Ambassador had taken his work and particularly by his studious application to industrial and social conditions in the Soviet Union and the objectivity and honesty with which he sought the facts. . . . As a matter of fact, I was quite flabbergasted by the extent of their knowledge of what I had done . . . and also by the intimate knowledge that they had of my work when I was Commissioner of Corporations and Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission under President Wilson. Moreover, I was, of course, very much gratified to hear these things said, because these men are a strong and able group, and I personally give them credit for honesty and sincerity of purpose and an idealism that is based on an effort to serve humanity."[45]

The climax of Davies' mission came during this farewell call. With no advance notice, Stalin strode into the room and sat down. As the dazzled Ambassador subsequently noted, the occasion was the first time Stalin had received a foreigner in years. Here, too, the briefing officers had done a thorough job; Stalin also was familiar with Davies' work as Commissioner of Corporations and chairman of the FTC. "It was really an intellectual feast," the Ambassador wrote to his daughter.[46]

[41] Davies to Hull, June 6, 1938, *ibid.*, p. 555.
[42] See, for example, Davies, *op.cit.*, pp. 27 and 365.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 67 and 263. [44] *Ibid.*, p. 433.
[45] Letter to daughter, June 8, 1938, *ibid.*, pp. 355-56. [46] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

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The three men—Stalin, Davies, and Molotov—talked for nearly two hours. Certain minor areas of United States-Soviet relations were discussed, but the significant event of the meeting was Stalin's offer to reopen the debt negotiations. However, he immediately raised the same point the Russians had made time and time again: they sincerely wanted to pay the debt, but payment would open them to claims from twenty-seven other nations. In short, nothing was accomplished. By the time various exploratory offers had been sent back and forth during the next year, the Nazi-Soviet pact had been signed, and after that there was clearly no hope for a settlement.

But the conference with Stalin did have one result: it added to the regard Davies already had for the Soviet leaders. To his daughter he wrote the following description of Stalin: "He greeted me cordially with a smile and with great simplicity, but also with a real dignity. He gives the impression of a strong mind which is composed and wise. His brown eye is exceedingly kindly and gentle. A child would like to sit in his lap and a dog would sidle up to him. It is difficult to associate his personality and this impression of kindness and gentle simplicity with what has occurred here in connection with these purges and shootings of the Red Army generals, and so forth. His friends say, and Ambassador Troyanovsky assures me, that it had to be done to protect themselves against Germany—and that some day the outside world will know 'their side.' "[47]

The talk with Stalin marked the end of Davies' mission to Moscow. So far as the specific points of conflict between the two countries were concerned, no real solutions had been found. The two major problems, the debt and the Comintern, were merely put in cold storage. In his final memorandum of June 6, 1938, Davies correctly predicted that a debt settlement would never be made, owing to the Russian fear of claims from all creditors.[48] His judgment regarding the Comintern was similar. Basing his reasoning on the fact that Comintern activity in the United States had apparently subsided, he wrote: "The question of the Comintern, therefore, in practical effect, has become largely academic so far as any vital interests of the United States are concerned . . . it would be advisable, in my opinion, strictly to maintain our position with reference thereto as a formal matter, but to quietly ignore the question, unless and until it threatens our well being."[49]

The American Ambassador emphasized the importance of continued

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 356-57.
[48] Davies to Hull, June 6, 1938, in *Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, p. 560.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 561.

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diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. "A common ground between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and one that will obtain for a long period of time," he wrote, "lies in the fact that both are sincere advocates of World Peace." Furthermore, he did not think revolutionary communism represented a threat to the United States. "In my opinion, there is no danger from communism here, so far as the United States is concerned. To maintain its existence, this Government has to apply capitalistic principles. Otherwise it will fail and be overthrown. That will not be permitted by the men in power, if they can avoid it."[50]

Though Davies left the Soviet Union on June 10, 1938, to take up the position of Ambassador to Belgium, he remained Moscow's staunchest American friend down through the days of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the war that followed. He had sensed the coming of the pact. In January 1938, he wrote Harry Hopkins that "The Chamberlain policy of throwing Italy, Poland, and Hungary into the arms of Hitler may be completed by so disgusting the Soviets that it will drive Russia into an economic agreement and an ideological truce with Hitler."[51] On February 9 he cabled Washington that a political agreement was also possible, that since Stalin's main objective was to keep Russia out of war, he might well "take Hitler as the best bet for his security."[52]

Davies' distrust of Anglo-French policy led him to think that he was the only diplomat with experience in Moscow who had a real understanding of the Soviet system and was therefore trusted by the Kremlin. In the increasingly precarious state of affairs in the late spring of 1939, he offered to return to Moscow to persuade the Soviet leaders that their best interests lay with the West. "I am convinced," he wired to Hull on April 18, "that the decisive factor in Hitler's determination will be whether or not Russia will support Britain and France wholeheartedly. . . . Neither the French nor the British in my opinion can personally reach the highest authorities there in the negotiations there pending. I am confident that I not only can see proper people otherwise unreachable, but that they have confidence in my judgment and sincerity."[53] With neutrality legislation pending in Congress, Hull refused Davies' offer, writing him in explanation: "From a domestic point of view, such a visit . . . might be misconstrued."[54] In the end, Russia was forced to

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 557.
[51] Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 434.
[52] Unpublished despatch quoted in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, New York, 1952, p. 98.
[53] Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1939, I, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1956, p. 234.
[54] Hull to Davies, April 18, 1939, *ibid.*, p. 236.

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make the pact, Davies felt; and when it came, bringing with it European war, he commented ruefully that "The Russian Bear has taken a handsome revenge for being thrown out of Munich."[55]

II

What were other diplomats in Moscow thinking in the anxious years before the outbreak of war? How did their analyses of the Russian present and future differ from those of Davies?

There were three major hypotheses about the mainsprings of Soviet behavior formulated by observers of the Soviet regime in the late 1930's. The first, defined most clearly by the German Ambassador, but also shared by his colleagues from Britain and France, was that Soviet conduct was shaped by pure power politics. The advertised facts of communism made little difference to these men; the Kremlin, they felt, was motivated primarily by questions of power, not of ideology.

The second point of view was Davies'—that the Russian regime was an experiment in the right direction, that short-term sacrifices were necessitated to achieve long-run gain.

The third hypothesis, and one not often stated during this period, was that shared by most subordinate American Foreign Service officers in Moscow. It was based on a detailed knowledge of Communist theory and practice. The Soviets played from power, these officers admitted, but, more often than not, Moscow's moves could be predicted by an examination of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology.

All three of the envoys representing Britain, France, and Germany were professionals. The English Ambassador was Viscount Chilston, whose tour in Moscow from 1931 to 1938 marked the close of a career that had begun in 1898. Robert Coulondre, a shrewd, ascetic Huguenot, was sent to the USSR from France because the Quai d'Orsay thought that he above all others could wring positive value from the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact of 1935.[56] The German Ambassador was Count Werner Friedrich von der Schulenburg, a cold, skeptical aristocrat who entered his country's service under the Kaiser.[57]

The chief trait that these men had in common, and in respect of which they differed most from Davies, was an understanding of *real-*

[55] Davies to Hull, Brussels, October 12, 1939, in Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 464.

[56] See Coulondre's book, *De Staline à Hitler*, Paris, 1950; and Franklin L. Ford and Carl E. Schorske, "The Voice in the Wilderness: Robert Coulondre," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, Princeton, N.J., 1953, pp. 537-55.

[57] See Carl E. Schorske, "Two German Ambassadors: Dirksen and Schulenburg," *ibid.*, pp. 477-512.

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politik. None felt that there was any significant factor behind Soviet policy other than a desire and respect for power. Certainly, they did not attribute motives of altruism to the Kremlin dictatorship. Schulenburg, in an address to the officers of the German *Wehrmacht* Academy on November 26, 1937, remarked that two convictions were "at the root of all political activity of the Soviet Union." The first was that "Imperial Russia owed her defeat in the World War to the *lack of an adequate war industry*." The second was "born partly of respect, partly of fear . . . of the fearful *strength of the German people*." This second conviction, heightened by the rise of Hitler, "led to the Soviet-French and the Soviet-Czech mutual assistance pacts."[58] Fear of Germany, not a desire to align with the democracies, had inspired this course.

Coulondre, too, though he was convinced that his primary objective must be to convert these pacts into firm anti-German alliances, realized that the essential question for France was not "Will Russia be with us or not?" but "With whom will Russia go?"[59] The French Ambassador had no doubt that if the USSR did not find a suitable ally in France, it would shift to a German connection. Writing a month before Davies left Moscow, the British Chargé, expressing the views of his Ambassador, made the same comment: ". . . there was no good hoping vainly that the Russians might be of some value as a counterpoise to the Germans when the balance of probability seemed to be altogether on the other side. We must not, however, forget that the Russians were Asiatics, more so now than at any period since the time of Peter the Great, and that with the present Byzantine regime in the Kremlin anything might happen."[60]

Looking at the USSR in terms of power politics, these three observers came to different and inevitably more realistic conclusions about political phenomena than Davies reached. For example, where Davies felt that the increasing evidence of Russian nationalism was a sign that the Soviet Union had given up its revolutionary intentions and was attempting to assume a position of responsibility in the community of nations, Schulenburg had greater political insight: "For some time the observer has noted with astonishment that a Soviet patriotism is again being cultivated, which seems to contradict the internationalist aspirations of Communism. There can be no doubt that this revival of nationalist sentiment among the people is only a measure to strengthen

[58] *German Documents*, I, 899.

[59] Ford and Schorske, *op.cit.*, p. 560.

[60] Vereker to Viscount Halifax, May 16, 1938, in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1949, 3rd Series, I, p. 307. (Cited hereafter as *British Documents*.)

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the defensive spirit of the nation and is therefore also part of the rearmament effort of the Soviet Union."[61] Coulondre described the Kremlin's new realism with a typically Gallic image. Litvinov, in the internationalist days of the early 1930's, had been "a soldier marching gaily to the front with a posy in the barrel of his rifle." But in the months preceding Munich, the Foreign Minister gave the impression of "the same soldier just returned from the trenches, brought face to face with a situation which the Soviets had up till now endeavoured to shirk."[62]

The purge trials provide perhaps the best example of the difference between the American Ambassador and his professional colleagues. Davies, as we have noted, took them at face value: "The story which was unfolded in these trials disclosed a record of Fifth Column and subversive activities in Russia under a conspiracy agreement with the German and Japanese governments that were amazing. . . . The purge had cleansed the country and rid it of treason."[63] The three other Ambassadors, however, agreed with Loy Henderson's interpretation: the trials were aimed at the suppression of the Trotskyite opposition.[64] Again it is Schulenburg's views which are most explicitly stated in the available documents. Though he was puzzled about the exact origins and aim of the wave of terror that swept Russia during the middle 1930's, he concluded: "Most observers believe that all older party members, who experienced the prewar era and the period of pure Communism, as well as all who still have any connections with foreign cultures . . . are to be removed or rendered harmless. The purpose would be to see to it that the Soviet citizen is deprived of any chance to make comparisons, so that even the slightest improvement in his almost unbearable situation must appear to him as a huge gift from the 'mighty' Stalin."[65] In short, Schulenburg saw the purges as "in reality directed toward securing Stalin's personal authority."[66] His French colleague, Coulondre, analyzed the terror in the context of the vast Soviet program of industrialization and militarization. In his eyes, the internal upheavals were "a crisis of growth," not toward democracy, of course, but toward increasing absolutism, and, above all, might.[67]

In regard to the result of the purges, too, there existed a marked dif-

[61] *Wehrmacht* Academy address, November 25, 1937, in *German Documents*, I, p. 899.
[62] Report of a conversation with Coulondre, Vereker to Halifax, May 16, 1938, in *British Documents*, I, p. 304.
[63] Davies, *op.cit.*, pp. 276 and 280.
[64] Henderson to Hull, June 13, 1937, in *Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 380-81.
[65] *Wehrmacht* Academy address, November 25, 1937, in *German Documents*, I, pp. 899-900.
[66] Despatch of November 18, 1938, *ibid.*, IV, p. 612.
[67] Ford and Schorske, *op.cit.*, pp. 559-60.

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ference of opinion between the American Ambassador and those of England, France, and Germany. Writing in the *American Magazine*, Davies stated that, in addition to cleansing and purifying the Soviet state, "The purges also gave the average soldier a greater sense of security, and the conviction that his fate was now in the hands of more trustworthy officers than 'the Trotskyite traitors who met the fate they deserved.' "[68] The other three Ambassadors knew how seriously the Red Army leadership had been crippled;[69] Davies must have been aware of the magnitude of its losses also. Members of the staff of the British embassy concurred in the belief that the purges "had thrown the General Staff and Higher Command into such appalling chaos and disorganization for the time being that one could not possibly tell what might or might not happen in the event of a major operation."[70] Schulenburg agreed with this estimation. In a general despatch in November 1938, commenting on the Kremlin's failure to oppose his country's seizure of Czechoslovakia, the German Ambassador noted "the removal of most of the higher command, their replacement by insufficiently trained younger men, and the reintroduction of political commissars have brought about a not inconsiderable weakening of the striking power of the Red Army."[71] He observed that the infection of the purges had spread beyond the army, however: "The results of this personnel policy are mistrust, fear of responsibility, and general insecurity, which show themselves in imperfect work in every sphere."[72]

It is interesting to note what these other Ambassadors thought of their American colleague. At least in their published despatches, neither Viscount Chilston nor Schulenburg mentioned him by name at all. But in one instance, the German remarked that the chief characteristic of a blindly pro-Soviet attitude on the part of foreigners in Moscow was that they "considered as true and proven the accusations made at the last Moscow trial."[73] Coulondre, however, had nothing but praise for Davies in his *De Staline à Hitler*, published in 1950: ". . . he is one of those big Americans who do everything they attempt well and in

[68] Joseph E. Davies, "How Russia Blasted Hitler's Spy Machine," *American Magazine*, CXXXIII, No. 6 (December 1941), p. 112.

[69] The British embassy, for instance, estimated that "about 65 per cent. of general officers had been liquidated." May 16, 1938, in *British Documents*, I, p. 306.

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] November 18, 1938, in *German Documents*, IV, p. 613.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 612. The extent of Russian losses in the first two years after the German attack showed that these appraisals were essentially accurate. See also Khruschev's remarks on this subject in his speech on Stalin delivered during the Twentieth Party Congress, in *New York Times*, June 5, 1956.

[73] Despatch of May 30, 1938, in *German Documents*, II, p. 363.

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a princely manner. . . . J. E. Davies came to Moscow to plead the cause of understanding and peace, and like a good lawyer, he pleaded it with talent. He did me the honor of granting me his confidence, and I in turn shared with him some of my 'tricks of diplomacy' (*technicité diplomatique*). It is not without emotion that I speak of our collaboration. J. E. Davies was, I believe, the only foreign diplomat who, during my mission, was received by Stalin. He was, in any case, without doubt the only one of my colleagues who did not let himself be hurt by the crisis of growth of the U.S.S.R. In looking at Russia, he took a broad view. . . . I am forced to admit that he estimated Soviet power at its just value."[74] This is high praise, but its importance should not be overrated. It is the only time that Coulondre mentions Davies in his book, and it comes in a section in which the Frenchman lavishes compliments on the Moscow envoys of all the major powers. Yet, of the diplomats in the Russian capital, no two worked harder for a rapprochement between the USSR and the West, and both fully appreciated the dangers of Nazism. In the course of their assignments, they became good friends.[75]

We have seen some of the differences between the way Davies and his colleagues viewed the Soviet system. A third line of approach—through an analysis of Communist theory and ideology—was taken by subordinate officers of the American Foreign Service. Examples of Kennan's and Bohlen's analysis of the trials and the sessions of the Supreme Soviet have been cited. On February 18, 1938, Loy Henderson set about a more general task, an examination of the entire range of Russian foreign policy. "It will be recalled," he began, "that one of the fundamental tenets of Bolshevik theory in regard to the relations of the Soviet State with the outside world is the doctrine of the two hostile worlds—one capitalist and the other socialist—which was written into the preamble of the first constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in 1923. . . . This concept, in varying degrees, may be said to be the governing principle of Soviet foreign policy in regard to its relations with European countries."[76] Using this concept, Henderson goes on to explain the reasons for the Kremlin's adherence to the League of Nations and then its growing disenchantment with any sort of cooperation with the bourgeois democracies. This theory of capitalist encirclement, this image of the enemy in which accommodation is regarded as a negative virtue, partially explained the paradoxes of Soviet policy when other explana-

[74] Coulondre, *op.cit.*, pp. 112-13; my translation.
[75] Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 327.
[76] Henderson to Hull, in *Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, p. 515.

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tions seemed strained or illogical. The American officers who employed these tools of analysis were the first of the Russian experts now common in the diplomatic service. But in the days before World War II, the British Foreign Office, for example, did not even receive Soviet publications.

Experts or none, the approach advocated by men like Davies was the one followed by the United States in Russian matters. This approach was summed up years later by Hull in his *Memoirs*: "As long as I was in the State Department . . . I was never to relinquish efforts to promote two-way friendly relations with Russia. I did not abandon my original idea that Russia and the United States . . . had no conflicting national aims, and that the two countries, working together in harmony with other countries opposed to war, could have been a beneficial influence on the world."[77] While these aspects of United States policy in the critical years preceding World War II coincided with Davies' recommendations, it is extremely difficult to determine how much of the coincidence was due to chance or necessity, and how much to the efforts of the Ambassador. Certainly, the career men in the State Department were skeptical of his views. But the President and his closest advisers were themselves chary of the professional diplomats,[78] and there is little question that major foreign policy was made by the President, not by the Department of State.

Davies' influence in persuading the President to send aid to the Soviets was apparently very great during the crucial period of the German attack on Russia. Considering the fact that policy was controlled primarily by the non-professionals, it is safe to assume that his influence did not grow overnight. Langer and Gleason support this hypothesis: "Although it is difficult to document matters of this kind, it seems that the President, who had begun his first term by putting through recognition of the Soviet Government, continued to be influenced by men like Assistant Secretary of State Messersmith and Ambassador Davies."[79]

It is one of history's fortunate quirks that the one time when it was important for Davies to be right—on the question of whether or not the Soviet armies could survive the German advance—he was right. Indeed, with the exception of Colonel Philip Faymonville, the American Military Attaché in Moscow from 1934 to 1939, Davies stood virtually

[77] Hull, *op.cit.*, p. 306.

[78] For an account of Roosevelt's acute distrust of the career Foreign Service, see the introduction to Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*. Also valuable are the memoirs or collected papers of Hull, Hopkins, Ickes, Morgenthau (*Collier's*, October 11, 1947), Raymond Moley, Claude G. Bowers and, of course, Davies.

[79] Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, p. 126.

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alone in his faith in the Red Army. Most of his fellow diplomats in Moscow at the time of the German attack believed that Russian leadership had been fatally weakened by the purges.

Why was Davies right, even though he did not really understand the Soviet state? Part of the answer is perhaps to be found in the surface impression of enormous power that a totalitarian monolith gives to a casual observer. Similarly, in democratic states, where power's presence is dispersed, the inexpert eye may be deceived by the superficial appearance of weakness. Davies thought the Soviet Union was stronger than his Moscow colleagues believed it to be partly because he did not understand its weaknesses as fully as they did. With more realistic theories to guide them, they were better able to discern the disabilities in the Soviet system which the regime sought to conceal. But the shroud of secrecy was too heavy, with the result that they overestimated Russia's weaknesses, while Davies merely overlooked them. Thus Davies was right but for the wrong reasons, whereas his fellow diplomats were wrong but for the right reasons.

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Review Articles

IN PRAISE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

By CHARLES E. LINDBLOM

Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Government Decision-making in a Democracy*, Technical Report No. 32, prepared for the Office of Naval Research, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, Department of Economics, May 31, 1956, 347 pp. (mimeographed; Armed Services Technical Information Agency, Knott Building, Dayton, Ohio).

Arnold Rogow, *The Labour Government and British Industry, 1945-1951*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1956, 196 pp. $3.00.

IS anyone's esteem for political science better suppressed than a political scientist's? Ordinary modesty is admirable, but his is professionally destructive. For, not only hiding his light under a bushel, he follows the more nihilistic course of blowing it out. Granted that many political scientists neither deprecate their discipline nor permit a low regard for it to stultify their work, I have been repeatedly assured by members of the profession that no social science is more retarded and none less promising for systematic theory. Thus they hide—even from their own eyes—their discipline's accomplishments. This I shall try to show, offering two books as evidence. There is other evidence, too. When even politically ignorant undergraduates complain that the major in political science is thin, no imaginable poverty of the field explains enough. Such a phenomenon proves concealment, either deliberate or unintended.

To be sure, political scientists seem no less happy in their work than other social scientists. They do not apologize for the books they write, or even concede intellectual superiority to their cousins in the other social sciences. I find their lack of esteem for political science displayed in two other ways: (1) As Rogow will show, they often undervalue the richness of their professional insights, concepts, and empirical generalizations, neglecting to employ them in analytical work to which they are relevant. (2) As Downs will show, they have failed to recognize, applaud, and make explicit the systematic theory that is implicit in their work.

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I

Consider the second first. Attitudes toward explicit theory differ in the profession; some do not wish to pursue it, others do. For the latter, the prospects are thought discouraging in all fields—from political parties to budgeting, and not excluding international relations. This in a discipline long ago distinguished by the skillful even if only half-explicit model-building of Hobbes and then Rousseau! Judging by their common practice of applying the term "political theory" to what in other disciplines would be called the history of doctrine, it would appear that to many political scientists political theory has only a past—no present, no future.

The contrast with my own discipline is pertinent. Where economists have made the most of a seriously defective theoretical system, political scientists have permitted a kind of perfectionism to inhibit ambitious, explicit system-building. In talking with political scientists I am often struck by their dissatisfaction with theoretical proposals that do not promise a rough fit to the phenomena to be explained, while economists have happily elaborated, to take one example, a theory of the firm that is still a caricature of the phenomena described. The difference between the two disciplines is noteworthy, despite difference of opinion on whether paralytic tendencies in the one are to be preferred to the elegant errors of the other.

Because economists deal with easily measured quantities—with prices, amounts bought and sold, numbers employed, and flows of funds—systematic theory may on this count be easier for them. On the other hand, much of their theoretical refinement has been paid for in relevance. Quite aside from the limited relevance of economic theory attributable to its heroic assumptions, it is irrelevant again to large areas of economic life about which it has nothing very important to say. Consumer economics is an example. A multitude of questions about consumer behavior, comparable to questions asked in political science about voting behavior, are beyond the reach of economic theory for the time being. It is quite possible therefore that explicit political theory, less elegant but more relevant, will turn out to be more serviceable than economic theory, as well as intellectually more satisfying. This is not merely a possibility but an eventuality toward which signs are pointing.

The test of whether political scientists fail to appreciate the implicit theoretical accomplishments of their own discipline hinges on the answer to the question: Do they in fact possess an underlying implicit

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theoretical system? I would argue that a number of works are beginning to show that they do;[1] and I can now point to Downs's splendid book as clinching evidence. The fact that it is not a professional political scientist who has here integrated a large part of political science into an explicit theoretical system doubly bears out my argument that the profession itself has not appreciated its riches.

Downs's formulation is neither full-blown nor unblemished. But it is bold, imaginative, creative, to say the least, and persuasive beyond any expectation with which I approached it. I believe its impact on political science, as well as on economics, will be deeply registered in the next ten years. It is an impressive theory in the classical sense: from relatively few definitions and assumptions, it derives deductively a large integrated body of generalizations which can be tested against generalizations empirically established.

My reason for believing that Downs has uncovered a previously implicit system is that his definitions, assumptions, and propositions are on the whole familiar to political scientists, even if his formulation carries him on to the unfamiliar as well. His major postulate, that of rational individual behavior, is similar to the rationality assumption of economics. From it and certain supplementary definitions and assumptions, he derives a central critical hypothesis. This hypothesis is a reformulation of a proposition often encountered in political science: a political party is an organization for making nominations and contesting elections in order to win control of the governmental machinery.[2] His reformulation turns it into a maximizing hypothesis. Putting the party into a kind of entrepreneurial role, the hypothesis is that the political party seeks to maximize votes cast for it. On these simple foundations, his remarkable achievement is constructed.

[1] Pendleton Herring's *Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940) is an excellent example of a work with substantial theoretical content remaining implicit. Less rich in theory but more explicit in the theory it contains is David Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951). Somewhat more systematically theoretical and more explicit is E. E. Schattschneider's *Party Government* (New York, 1942). Still more deliberate attempts to make explicit and systematic the underlying theory of political science include, among others, Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, New York, 1947; R. A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Chicago, 1956; David Easton, *The Political System*, New York, 1953; H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society*, New Haven, Conn., 1950; Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1952; R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare*, New York, 1953; and A. Ranney and W. Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System*, New York, 1956. I would add the further evidence of underlying theory constituted by A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government*, Chicago, 1908; and W. Edwards, "The Theory of Decision-making," *Psychological Bulletin*, LI, No. 4 (July 1954), pp. 380-417.

[2] For example, Ranney and Kendall, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

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Correspondence between Downs's propositions and the fruits of empirical research he leaves to his readers to appraise. But here are some of his empirically testable propositions, and I think they bear out my thesis with respect to the political scientists—that they "knew it all the time," but, not knowing that they know it, are underplaying the possibilities of explicit and systematic theory.

> Party members have as their chief motivation the desire to obtain the intrinsic rewards of holding office; therefore they formulate policies as means to that end rather than seeking office in order to carry out preconceived policies.
>
> Both parties in a two-party system agree on any issues that a majority of citizens strongly favor.
>
> In a two-party system, party policies are (a) more vague, (b) more similar to those of other parties, and (c) less directly linked to an ideology than in a multi-party system.
>
> In a multi-party system governed by a coalition, the government takes less effective action to solve basic social problems, and its policies are less integrated and consistent, than in a two-party system.
>
> A large percentage of citizens—including voters—do not become informed to any significant degree on the issues involved in elections, even if they believe the outcomes to be important.
>
> The percentage of low-income citizens who abstain in elections is higher than the percentage of high-income citizens who abstain, *ceteris paribus*.[3]

As is generally true of theoretical systems, many of Downs's propositions are not directly testable; but, again, their degree of correspondence with those widely accepted as true among political scientists is impressive. This can be illustrated by any of his analyses: of the circumstances that determine whether a party appeals to a majority or to a group of minorities, of the impact of costs of obtaining information upon voter behavior, of coalition governments, or of the role of party ideology. On the last named, here is his summary of some of the derived propositions:

> Uncertainty restricts each voter's ability to relate every government act to his own view of the good society. Therefore acquaintance with each party's view of the good society—its ideology—helps him make his voting decision without knowing about every policy specifically. Voters thus use ideologies to cut their information costs.
>
> Parties also find ideologies useful in gaining the support of various social groups and in short-cutting decisions about which policy will gain the most votes. A diversity of party ideologies can exist only because uncer-

[3] These propositions are taken verbatim from a summary list of twenty-five testable propositions, pp. 336-41.

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tainty prevents any one from being proven superior; if a superior one does emerge, other parties imitate it and subtler differentiation takes place.

In our model, it is necessary for each party's ideology to bear a consistent relation to its actions and to develop without repudiating the party's former acts. Any other procedure makes rational voting nearly impossible; hence voters impute value to parties with these traits. To win their votes, all parties are forced by competition to be relatively honest and responsible in regard to both policies and ideologies.

Though ideologies are never internally contradictory, they may be only loosely integrated, since they are designed to attract many social groups. Their stability over time has both logical and institutional roots which prevent policies from being altered smoothly to fit changing conditions. Thus ideologies cause lags and discontinuities that may cost a party votes.

In this way conflicts arise between the maintenance of ideological purity and the winning of elections. The former may occasionally take precedence over the latter, but our hypothesis is upheld as long as parties behave most of the time as though election is their primary objective (pp. 127-28).

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that I am not calling attention to the correspondence between Downs's deductions and the propositions of empirical political science to prove that Downs is right, for both the deduced and the empirical propositions may be faulty. My point, to repeat, is that he has demonstrated that a large body of definitions, assumptions, and propositions current in the profession constitute with some adjustment a theoretical system. Q.E.D., the discipline has been and is better off than many of its practitioners have allowed.

Productive as the assumption of rationality is in economic theory, I would not have expected, before reading Downs, that a similar assumption would prove as fruitful in political theory. I was inclined to think that people in the market are more rational than people in the political arena. But Downs has defined rationality in such a way that, although he retains its usefulness for deductive theory, it can encompass both the ignorant voter and the apathetic. Hence his model predicts surprisingly well some of the "irrationalities" in voter behavior that have been described in empirical research.[4]

Moreover, rationality turns out to be a powerful postulate for leadership in the form of the vote-maximizing hypothesis. It may actually be a more useful hypothesis than its comparable application in economics, where it postulates entrepreneurial profit-maximizing. The business firm may embark, it is of course true, on profit maximization as an organizational goal; but it may also pursue in combination with profits,

[4] For example, P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York, 1948; and B. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting*, Chicago, 1954.

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or in place of them, such goals as conservation of assets, growth, diversification, minimization of disturbance of market relationships, or minimization of competitors' profits, assets, growth, or diversification. These various possibilities reduce the fit of a theoretical system postulating profit-maximization even if, as some believe, all these goals can be related eventually to profit-maximization. In contrast, the political party's interest in winning elections is almost single-minded and the vote-maximization assumption more serviceable.[5]

Even aside from entrepreneurial goals such as growth or conservation of assets, the profit-maximization assumption in economics stumbles on alternative time perspectives that entrepreneurs entertain. A firm may plan to maximize profits here and now, gambling that the future will take care of itself; or it may seek to maximize over a decade, over the life-span of its owner, or for an even longer time, especially in the case of corporations. Consequently it is difficult to deduce anything from the assumption of profit-maximization without a supplementary assumption about time perspective. But any one of many alternative assumptions is as good as any other; and propositions are therefore greatly multiplied at the same time that the possibility of applying the appropriate theory to any given empirical situation is reduced.

In contrast, Downs argues rather convincingly that the political party is ordinarily preoccupied with the next election in any cycle to the exclusion of its interest in any subsequent ones. A vote-maximizing assumption therefore requires no supplementary assumption as its counterpart does in economics, and its application is much simpler and more correctly predictive.

As for the scope of Downs's model, by no means are all the major empirically based generalizations of political science placed in it; and it is almost foolish even to mention such a possibility. The judiciary never appears in it, nor do the administrators. It is largely a theory of parties and their relations with voters. On the other hand, he has not begged off with the plea that differences between the American system and others abroad make a general theory of democracy impossible. His is a general theory, encompassing both two-party and multi-party systems, as well as systems differing in the distribution of voting power among groups in the electorate, and otherwise embracing common aspects of differing democratic systems. What he has not included in

[5] For a fine discussion, still largely correct, of the discrepancy between the theory of the firm and the phenomena described by it, see K. W. Rothschild, "Price Theory and Oligopoly," *Economic Journal*, LVII (September 1947), pp. 299-320, reprinted in the American Economic Association's *Readings in Price Theory*, Chicago, 1952.

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the model are still other factors varying from one country to another. In this understandable failing political theory is, again, not necessarily less adequate than economic theory, which, for all the freedom with which it is applied to various economies, remains incapable of explaining, for example, just why or in what specific consequential respects American, French, and British business practices will differ.

How far Downs's model can be extended through further work is best tested by further work. One is tempted to speculate on the potential in political theory compared with that for economic theory, but systematic comparisons of that kind can be made only with clearly specific standards, which are present in neither field and presumably would differ in any case from the one field to the other. But for what it is worth, let me say that I find the model richly suggestive of directions to take for explicit theoretical analysis along several lines.

One is the preconditions or prerequisites for political democracy. By contrast traditional economic theory promises very little on prerequisite conditions for the market system. On another—the justification for, as opposed to preconditions of, political democracy—Downs has himself developed a brief but sharp argument covering a few of the issues. Because it will in a sense claim less for democracy than welfare economics has tried to claim for the market, I would guess that political theory can more quickly establish a satisfactory theoretical justification for democracy than can economic theory for the market.

Still further, on the clarification and appraisal of alternative forms of democracy, the model should be extraordinarily fruitful. Differences in potential development in the two fields of theory may be possible to guess, the comparable field in economic theory being market structure. With considerable precision, economic theory permits explanation and appraisal of alternative forms, but these forms are encompassed in a model whose fit to the real world is poor, as witness the profession's inability to find workable norms for market structures. Rigor is won at the cost of relevance. Here is a specific area in which I would expect, both from Downs's formulations and from empirical generalizations not yet organized into a theoretical system, that political theory with tolerable precision can meet a higher standard of relevance or fit than can economics.

I would not so sanguinely regard the prospects for theoretical advancement along the line that Downs has taken if it were not that the task is, as I have said, less to create theory than to make it explicit. We now have a partly excavated political theory. And what we see are not ruins but the outlines of well-developed structures. Although greater

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prizes have already been uncovered than had been thought to exist, indefinitely more digging remains to be done. Because circulation of Downs's work in its present format is limited, its commercial publication by Harper & Brothers will be fortunate for social science.

II

For the kind of future we can imagine, the whole of no social science will be neatly bound together by theory, and substitutes for theory will be heavily relied upon. It is the political scientist's attitude toward these substitutes that constitutes my other reason for believing that the profession undervalues its own discipline, Rogow serving as a case in point. I begin again by analogy with economics.

Insofar as economics has substantial accomplishments to its credit, they are due somewhat less to theory than is commonly supposed both in the profession, I should guess, and outside. A great strength of economics is a kind of half-formal codification of generalizations, concepts, and questions, all short of theory.

Put an economist to work on the effects of income taxation on business spending, for example. He really knows very little about it, except for the obvious; and his formal theory is of little help. But he will organize his work in a fairly predictable way, working with standard categories. He will distinguish between effects of taxes on incentives to spend, on one hand, and on resources for spending, on the other. He will separately examine each of several different incentive problems: the incentive to invest, the incentive to save, and others. He will distinguish between marginal and average rates of taxation. He will consider the impact of taxes on the individual's absolute share of income as well as on his rank in the distribution of income. And so on. And having broken down his large problem into its analytical components, into each part he will feed the relevant generalizations from a common stock widely accepted in the profession. He will not be a very good economist if this is all he does, but this procedure is a beginning on which he can then build his own contribution. In short, he values and uses his discipline.

Political science is perhaps quite as well equipped as economics for exploiting partially codified concepts, questions, and propositions. If we take, as one of many possible examples, a group of studies like Herring's *Politics of Democracy*; Schattschneider's *Party Government*, Truman's *Governmental Process*, and Ranney's and Kendall's *Democracy and the American Party System*, we find certain concepts, questions,

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and generalizations common to all four. Substantial professional assets are apparent.

Rogow's book suggests, however, that if one puts a political scientist to work on a problem, there is little predicting what he will do with it —whether he will use his professional assets or not. I am not competent to decide whether the book is a representative or an extreme case. In any case, it is an example of a scholar's throwing away accumulated organized knowledge and trying to go it alone, presumably because he does not highly enough value the accumulated achievements of his discipline, certainly not because he is unfamiliar with them.

I turn to the book to illustrate a situation in political science, not to judge Rogow individually. The evidence from this book, from his other writings, and from many hours of discussion with him is that he has an able mind; he is intellectually courageous, imaginative, and vigorous—and I choose those three adjectives with care. Anyone interested in recent British history, economic life, and politics will profit from his study of the Labour government. It displays more than the virtues of accuracy, organization, and style, for it is also thoughtful, sensitive, insightful. I especially applaud Rogow's skillful balance between forest and trees. And, considering that he chooses to throw away the excellent analytical aids of his own discipline, it is a perspicacious piece of analysis.

But he does throw them away. And having thrown them away, he is pushed back onto less satisfactory questions, concepts, and generalizations simply because he cannot do without any at all. From the questions he asks and the answers given, one can work back to his set of implicit norms or expectations for two-party democratic processes. I want to list and discuss some of them to show by contrast what he has wasted. An explicit statement of them is probably sufficient to lead Rogow to deny their validity; yet on them his analysis stands or falls, as I shall try to show.

(1) *A successful political party is an organization for carrying through a predetermined program derived from a highly integrated ideology.*

The significance of this proposition is clear if contrasted with the more common view that a political party is an organization for winning elections and control of government. Now Downs and others show that conflicts sometimes arise between ideological purity and winning elections, and I think it is clear that such a conflict has been serious in the Labour Party. Hence an analysis of the prospects for the Labour Party must come to grips with factors facilitating a loosening

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in ideology sufficient to permit the Labour Party to continue successfully as a political party. Instead we find Rogow alarmed by the ideological impurity of the party and concluding that "the Labour Party must reformulate its basic principles. Nor is there much time to lose" (p. 187). This he regards as one of his major conclusions: if socialism is to be achieved, the Labour Party needs a theory, a more precisely defined socialism.

Perhaps for the Labour Party Rogow prefers ideological purity to winning elections. But if he believes that ideological purity wins elections, he is flying in the face of accumulated knowledge that ought to be taken account of. Perhaps his point is that ideological purity, though it does not win elections, is logically necessary to the achievement of Socialist goals. But then he must explain how the Labour Party, without winning elections, will achieve socialism.

(2) *A practical ideal for democratic politics is that interest groups be cooperative rather than conflicting.*

Because most analysts of political parties would find it hard to explain party organization without reference to conflict among interest groups, I think it unnecessary to labor the contrast between the more common view in political science and Rogow's near-Utopian view of harmonious democracy. What is more difficult to believe is that such a view is often implicit in Rogow's analysis.

He reveals it in a variety of ways, one of which is curious. A serious constraint on the Labour program, he says, is the possibility that further change cannot be peaceful and democratic. Why? Because the Conservatives will fight it. He quotes Laski's well-known thesis on revolutionary resistance to radical social change. But he then goes on to say that resistance is unlikely to take the form of violence. The offended power interests will, however, increasingly enter the political arena to influence public opinion (p. 180). Thus his fears for peaceful and democratic change rest on his expectation that business groups will become increasingly active in politics. The argument has either accidentally been muddled or is, as I suggest, an implicit contrast of peaceful democratic processes with group conflict that throws away the insight of political scientists who see democracy as a process of reconciling conflict.

Rogow's identification of democracy with harmony is even more sharply illustrated in his critical comment on the thesis that a taxpayer is morally entitled to minimize his tax liabilities, so far as the law permits. This unexceptional position he sees as "anachronistic in a society

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where the State, financed by taxation, is undertaking a vast responsibility for welfare and services" (p. 125).

Is a reasonable interpretation of Rogow's views on harmony and democracy simply that he identifies some minimum level of agreement as essential to democracy? If so, he would be on familiar ground. Consider his next implicit proposition, which is to the contrary.

(3) *Major interests are bi-modally distributed in a democracy.*

I must admit I have some difficulty reconciling this proposition with Rogow's norm of harmony in democracy, but his attempt to go it alone understandably involves him in frequent inconsistency. The assumption of a bi-modal distribution is the other side of the coin of class conflict. His picture of such a distribution of interests is revealed in several ways. To begin with, he does not see the two British parties as appealing in slightly different ways to an underlying consensus, despite the overwhelming evidence of empirical and theoretical political science that this is the case. Secondly, he has difficulty imagining an individual with multiple group loyalties. For example, "It is almost axiomatic that any identification of interests between the workers and private enterprise operates against an identification of interests between the workers and socialism, and ultimately, between the workers and the State" (p. 115). Thirdly, he has little conception of role-playing as a determinant of behavior; instead, behavior is determined simply by class origin, as illustrated in his belief, ignoring American experience to the contrary, that the attitudes of industrial leadership are largely a product of class origin and not of career and role.

I concede that there are social classes and that there are serious class conflicts. My point is that Rogow has neglected his discipline's wealth of insight into class and *other* group conflict, its relation to social agreement as a prerequisite to democracy, and its bearing on party strategy.

(4) *A political party is a monolithic interest group.*

Again, the contrast between this postulate and the more common one requires no explanation. The most convincing evidence that it is indeed a reasonable inference from Rogow's work is in his analysis of the failure of the Labour Party to achieve all its objectives, especially its failure to carry nationalization further. Some of the leaders in the Labour Party felt themselves caught in an ideological trap in 1945, and feel so increasingly with each passing year. The party's traditional position on nationalization, hardened in a period in which no alternatives to nationalization were attractive, they thought somewhat inappropriate to a post-Keynesian era. Clearly much of the opposition to nationalization came from within the party, and it seems probable that the grow-

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ing intensity of opposition from outside the party was encouraged, in part deliberately, by the lukewarm nationalizers within the party. This internal struggle Rogow alludes to. But for the most part Rogow's story is one of monolithic opposition outside the party poised against monolithic policy-making inside. Much as he has to say on the motives, character, and tactics of the opposition, his analysis is far from adequate, as will inevitably be the case when internal conflict within a party is largely ignored as a determinant of party policy.

(5) *Power is a homogenous mass fixed in total amount, so that what A gains B loses.*

Power, it would appear from professional writing, is neither homogenous nor fixed in amount. A may gain certain powers over B by putting certain other powers into the hands of C. Analysis requires that who controls whom be specified, as well as the scope of each control. But Rogow's analysis runs in terms of a struggle for possession of a large undefined mass. His is a kind of "lump of power" fallacy. In pursuing the question: "Was there a substantial transfer of power from the middle to the working classes?" (p. 1), he never makes clear whether he means voting power, administrative power, managerial power in industry, or the control of public opinion. His interest shifts from one to another of these categories, which are neither well defined nor carefully related to his overriding question on the transfer of power.

(6) *A party's program, in a time as short as one or two periods of incumbency, may sometimes be expected to achieve a drastic displacement of certain power groups, hence a fundamental alteration of the power structure of the society.*

The proposition is loosely stated because Rogow's concept of power is not well defined. And because there is less crystallization of a common position in the discipline, the contrast between his implicit view and a more common one is not so easily identified as it is for the earlier propositions. However, to indicate his failure to use the analytical aids at his disposal, I return to Rogow's question on the transfer of power: "Was there a substantial transfer of power from the middle to the working classes?"

In the contexts in which the question appears and reappears, Rogow wastes his time and ability investigating the possibility of a transfer of power substantially greater than is consistent either with the implicit models of democracy that are to be found in empirical political science or with the explicit model of Downs. To put it another way, if in a six-year period such a transfer of power as Rogow wishes to investigate actually took place, the transfer would have been marked by

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disturbances to the democratic process which he neither found nor thought worth investigating. Hence he has posed an analytical question that makes sense only if the common models are incorrect.

These are only a few of his working assumptions. Considering the six, as well as others that might have been cited, one can concede the outside possibility that they fit the phenomena they describe better than the more commonly accepted hypotheses with which they contrast. For, lacking both careful statistical verification and theoretical validation, many of the commonly accepted beliefs of political scientists are as shaky as those of economics. But I doubt Rogow's assumptions, just as he will doubt them in their explicit form. If it was Rogow's intention—and here I scrape bottom looking for an alternative interpretation of the book—to undermine a large segment of what can be referred to as the half-codified knowledge of political science and to substitute a new set of propositions for the old, he has been overly subtle. Assuming this was not his intention, I return to my thesis: his work, for all its merit, illustrates the failure of an able political scientist to value his professional assets. To perceive the failure is to appreciate the discipline.

III

Why many political scientists have undervalued and underemployed the theoretical richness of their discipline and its accumulated wealth of concepts, questions, and generalizations I do not know. But that political science is a more fully developed area of organized knowledge than is frequently assumed, I am increasingly convinced, even when I see some of its practitioners turning a blind eye to it. Underplaying it presumably has its roots in the history of the profession, just as overplaying the discipline of economics is also rooted in its tradition.

A last few words about my own field: I believe that political scientists would more accurately value their own discipline if they better understood what little reason economists have for self-satisfaction. As I have said—and with great respect for my profession—economics is only in small part theory and consists largely of informally codified procedures and knowledge, much of which is bookkeeping or even simple arithmetic. Political science is today no less favored. If, then, economists are euphoric where political scientists are not, the reason is that a tradition in recruitment has grown up through which those who will be happy within the limitations of economics are admitted to the brotherhood and others are commonly turned away. In the best training centers, with few exceptions no one can become an economist who does

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not come to value formal economic theory. Moreover, the boundaries of economics have been marked out with careful attention to those tasks to which theory can be applied. Where political scientists represent a wide variety of interests and kinds of skill with ambitions outstripping capacities, economics has come close to defining an economist as one whose professional ambitions are limited to those for which formal economic theory is not seriously frustrating.

Since World War II, however, urgently practical problems of economic development on every continent have rudely thrust economists into tasks far beyond the competence of their theory. The new demands are to be welcomed for their erosive effect on the discipline's boundary lines. But to say something when called upon to speak and to say it in terms not unduly demanding on the policy-maker, economics will now meet a new difficulty. It will be pulled in the direction of very high-grade journalism—toward analysis that, however skillful, is unburdened by the weight of a discipline's terminology, methods, insights, and theory. Looking backward, one wonders if it is not also this—practical problems and a large audience—that has sometimes pulled political scientists away from an appreciation and employment of their profession's assets. To exploit these assets poses obstacles to communication. And even for the analyst himself, theory is first constraining and only afterwards liberating.

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PROGRESS IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS

By TIBOR SCITOVSKY

W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1955, 453 pp. 30 shillings.

THE problem of economic development was among the main preoccupations of the classical economists; and Karl Marx, Max Weber, and their followers continued to be interested in it. The Anglo-Saxon economists and their followers, however, during the century preceding the Second World War, all but forgot about economic development—perhaps because they took it for granted. The growth of most of the advanced economies was impressive enough to be taken for granted; as for the underdeveloped areas, next to nothing was known about their rates of growth, although economists (at least in the advanced countries) seem to have supposed that the magnitude of capital exports to these areas gave them a chance to develop even faster than, and ultimately to catch up with, the more highly developed Western economies. Only England's development received some attention and mild doubts were occasionally raised as to whether her rate of economic growth was as fast as it could and should have been. From the turn of the century onward, blue books and white papers appeared, uneasily comparing British with German and American industrial production, questioning the wisdom of exporting quite so much capital, stressing the need for more aggressive export drives—but next to nothing was done about all this. For one thing, the philosophy of *laisser faire* still ruled supreme; for another, business fluctuations obscured and rendered difficult a true assessment of the situation; for a third, Britain's continued political supremacy may have lulled concern over the deterioration of her relative economic position. The problem of development came to the forefront of economic discussion only with the Second World War, as a result of two important changes. In the West, political power shifted across the Atlantic; in the East, Russia's war record established her both as an important center of political attraction and as a shining example of the success of planned industrialization and development. This is why the retarded development of the Western European economies (relative to the United States economy) became painfully evident and the industrialization

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of backward countries became a matter of urgency and practical politics even in the West.

In England in 1943, an article by the late Dr. Rostas,[1] comparing the industrial productivity of Germany with that of the Allies, drew the attention of the House of Commons and the informed public, not indeed to its main topic, but to the great disparity in industrial productivity between Britain and the United States.[2] This article, together with Rostas' subsequent work, marks the beginning of the Western European preoccupation with productivity and of the current fashion in Europe of productivity drives, teams, centers, councils, agencies, reports, studies, and other such. In the United States, President Truman's Point Four Program focused public attention on disparities and the danger of increasing disparities in productivity and standards of living between developed and undeveloped countries, and on the need to do something about all this. Since then, there has been no lack of interest in the subject. Productivity, growth, and development have become the fashionable subject in economics, in which courses are taught in every college, research is done by every budding economist and financed by every foundation.

All the new work in this old and rediscovered field, however, has not yielded much of a harvest so far. We have extended our empirical knowledge and grown more wary of facile generalization; there have been laudable excursions of historians into economic theory and of theoreticians into history; but we have gained very little in analytical insight. The theoretical work has been of limited scope, most of it concerned with the study of investment, its optimum rate, its effectiveness in raising productivity, the availability (and means of increasing the availability) of resources for investment, and the principles of allocating investible funds among alternative uses and industries. The work on the last-mentioned topic has had the most practical application so far and is responsible for the paradox that American aid to foreign countries, voted by Congress to bolster the spirit of free enterprise abroad, is (or rather was) in most countries administered by American officials according to an investment program more centrally planned and more tightly knit than is the case (according to Western observers) in the Communist countries.

[1] L. Rostas, "Industrial Production, Productivity and Distribution in Britain, Germany and the United States," *Economic Journal*, LIII (April 1943), pp. 39-54.

[2] A similar article published in 1924 by the doyen of American economists, F. W. Taussig, and showing the same disparity between British and American productivity seems to have attracted no attention whatever.

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But the problem of investment, however important, is not the only aspect of the general problem of economic growth; and the neglect of its other aspects, while hardly excusable, is easy to explain in terms of the trend of economic science. For economics as a subject has traveled far since the days of the classical economists. It has become a vaster subject, more nearly a science; and this has led to extreme specialization, both as between different fields and as between theoreticians and empiricists. To count the blessings of specialization is the economist's stock in trade; let us not blame him too much for overlooking its curse. Specialists in each field know more about their own field than the general practitioners of old used to know; but they also know very much less about all the other fields. The theoreticians have greatly increased the rigor and power of economic analysis; but they have lost much of their predecessors' practical judgment, knowledge of the world, and power of observation. The observation of economic behavior has become the preserve of the empiricist; but his work, all too often concerned more with realism than with analytical usefulness, has not been very helpful to the theorist. The latter has retained by and large the empirical assumptions made a hundred years ago by the classical economists, and continues—usually without being aware of it—to explore the theoretical implications of the behavior of old-fashioned *homo oeconomicus* in the typical environment of nineteenth-century English liberalism, consisting of a highly developed and reasonably efficient (and honest) bureaucracy, legal framework, educational system, and transportation and communication network.

Fortunately, all this specialization and the retention of the classical assumptions have not been a serious impediment to the progress of economic theory; but they have handicapped the theory of economic progress. For one thing, economic analysis based on the assumption of rational economic man maximizing his income in a typical capitalist environment can yield only limited insight into the problem of economic growth, because it assumes away half the problem: that of developing the mentality and institutions favorable to the growth of modern industrial society. For another, the gradual extinction of the general practitioner of political economy is also a handicap, because the theory of economic growth neither fits into any existing field of specialization nor can be made into a new special field. After all, economic progress consists in the expansion of the economy as a whole, which depends on the simultaneous development of all its parts and aspects: labor relations, foreign trade, monetary and banking institutions, markets and the distributive system, etc., etc.; and the development of each of these

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is closely intertwined with the development of all the others. This is true, of course, in developed and undeveloped economies alike; but in developed economies most changes are small, and to analyze one small change in one part of the economy while ignoring all the other small changes in the rest of the economy is usually legitimate and leads to negligible errors. By contrast, the theory of economic growth is really a theory of fast growth and big changes; and to analyze one big change while ignoring all the other big changes that occur simultaneously and interconnectedly may well yield seriously misleading results. Hence the greater danger of wearing the specialist's blinkers when dealing with the theory of economic growth.

This fact has been generally recognized, of course, and an attempt has been made to solve the problem in the characteristic modern fashion of forming (and financing the formation of) research teams composed of various specialists and entrusting to them the task of thinking about the problems of development. How effective this method will be only time can tell; to date, the investment that the foundations have made in cooperative research on economic development has yielded very small returns in terms of new ideas, insights, and understanding. Indeed, old-fashioned believers in an individual approach to intellectual speculation in the social sciences will welcome the fact that the first important book on economic growth has come from England, the country where specialization of mental and manual activity alike is lagging, and from the pen of a man unaided by research associates or even research assistants.

Professor Lewis, in his *Theory of Economic Growth*, sets himself the task of taking for granted neither man's psychology nor his environment and thus of dealing with all aspects of development, economic, social, political, and psychological alike. This is a tremendous task which requires, if not the universal man of the Renaissance, at least an all-round social scientist; and Professor Lewis, an alumnus of the London School of Economics, probably comes as near to that as anyone these days. He is ideally fitted for the task in another way also: West Indian by origin and English by training, he has one foot in and one foot out of both camps, giving him intimate knowledge but an outsider's more detached view of both developed and undeveloped countries. Indeed, his book is in the best tradition of the classical economists, wide in sweep, simple in approach, astute in its understanding of human nature and motivation. The author discusses his subject under such broad basic categories as "The Will to Economize," "Economic Institutions," "Knowledge," "Capital," "Population and Resources,"

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and "Government"; and in the process we learn about such disparate subjects as the economic effects of priestly asceticism, the obstacles to development under conditions of slavery, the factors that govern the absorption of immigrants, the causes and effects of imperialism, the advantages of piecemeal over comprehensive centralized planning, and the problem of what to do with the rich in a country whose government draws its main support from the poor. This short list is a random selection of the hundreds of topics discussed or touched upon, most of them illustrated by examples drawn from just about every economy and civilization one can think of, ranging from Spartans to Hottentots and from the twenty-fifth century B.C. (Egypt) to the twentieth A.D. The book is full of shrewd observations about human nature, skepticism about too much planning and too much *laisser faire*, and the bits of insight that make up the wisdom of elder statesmen. It is a true *Principles*, that British counterpart of the American textbook, which aims at giving a God's-eye view of the economy, comprehensive and impartial (though not too impartial), and at teaching students worldly wisdom and common sense rather than analytical technique. (The title of the book is therefore misleading. Containing very little theory, it ought to be called *Principles of Economic Growth*.) All this renders it invaluable both as an adult introduction to the subject for students and intelligent laymen, and as a warning to professional economists that their accustomed habits of thought and implicit assumptions are often inappropriate for dealing with problems of development. Indeed, the book is likely to become required reading for everyone concerned with economic growth.

Required reading, however, is often also dull reading; and this book, despite its excellence, is not altogether an exception to this rule. A solid diet of practical wisdom and shrewd observations, unrelieved by the spice of theoretical speculation and not held together by an analytical argument, is not easy to digest. The virtual absence of analytical argument renders it intelligible to the non-technical reader but that much the less readable for the economist who has an acquired taste for analysis. The student is likely to be overwhelmed by the sheer number and variety of observations and pronouncements; to the mature economist these will be very interesting and rewarding; but since he is bound to know a large proportion of them already, he may be wearied by having to take the familiar with the new. The book should be most useful to the practical economist in underdeveloped countries; but he again may be disappointed at being offered simple home remedies instead of a quick-acting wonder drug to combat backwardness.

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These features of the book are deliberate and no reflection on the author's abilities. He is clearly skeptical of comprehensive central planning for development, both of the Russian variety and of that practiced by American economic missions abroad; and such skepticism—even if it should prove exaggerated—is still a healthy antidote to the currently fashionable, naïve faith in the accuracy and practical usefulness of econometric methods. As to the avoidance of analysis, the author has demonstrated elsewhere his ability to carry on an analytical argument[3] and presumably refrained from doing so in this book in order to render it accessible to a larger audience, to keep it within manageable proportions, and perhaps also to register a protest against the modern (especially the American) economist's addiction to theoretical models, often to the neglect of common sense. Addicts, however, should not have their drug withdrawn suddenly and completely: they may be discouraged from taking the cure. A compromise between too much theory and too much common sense would have been better. This criticism, however, may be nothing more than the slight disappointment of a reader who is hoping for the last word on an interesting subject and finds instead a first book—though a very good first book it is.

[3] Cf. his "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour" (*Manchester School*, XXII, No. 2, May 1954, pp. 139-91), whose inclusion would have greatly enlivened the book but to which there is only a bibliographical reference.

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ON UNIVERSAL HISTORY

By E. HARRIS HARBISON

Geoffrey Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma Press, 1956, 246 pp. $4.00.

THE problem of how to conceive and write "universal history" is increasingly haunting the imaginations and troubling the consciences of historians in the West. We live in one world, but our historiography is still national, or at most regional. We no longer really believe that piling the known historical facts higher and higher will save us, but we still hopefully support antiquarianism and monographic research. Professional historical writing has thus lost all power to influence the man in the street because its thought-frame is parochial, myopic, and so irrelevant to the modern world. It cannot prepare us to understand the world we live in unless it casts off Leopold von Ranke's Europe-centered mentality and becomes truly "universal" in attitude and perspective. Or so it seems to one particularly articulate British historian, Geoffrey Barraclough, in *History in a Changing World*, a volume of essays recently published.

Barraclough's views are important for several reasons. He is Arnold Toynbee's successor in the Stevenson Research Chair of International History at Chatham House—a medievalist succeeding a classicist as editor of *A Survey of International Affairs*. He is typical of a particularly able group of younger British historians who came to maturity during and after the Second World War. And finally, he is a sound historian with a critical and inquiring mind who can say what he wants to say in vigorous English prose. If the results are sometimes baffling and confusing, they are nonetheless worth reading and pondering. To this reviewer the essays illuminate the intellectual and emotional tensions that are characteristic of sensitive European historians today.

With considerable fanfare, Barraclough calls for "a new view of European history," "a new beginning in the writing of history," "not so much new knowledge as a new vision playing on old facts." We are living, he says, in a world "totally different" from Bismarck's and so it will not do merely to tinker with current historical conceptions. They need "radical revision." History "needs writing anew with another set of values in a new world." (Pp. vii, viii, 29, 62, 135, 168, 220.) Continuity is not the most prominent aspect of history. Nineteenth-

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century "historicism" has given us too much continuity and not enough sense of change, creativity, and new departure. The real analogies to our age are the revolutionary ages: the fourth and fifth centuries, the eleventh and twelfth, the Reformation, the French Revolution. If ours is a radically new age, it must have a radically new historiography or historians will lose what remains of their influence and significance.

The new historiography must be everything that "historicism" was not. It must renounce all antiquarian delight in the sheer particularity of events and must search for meaning and relevance at every turn. It must put interpretation and generalization before mere research, without dispensing with the latter. It must restore the relation between the past and the living present. Above all, it must be "universal" in scope because for the first time we live in a world inexorably one.

As nearly as I can make out, "universal history" means two things to Barraclough. In the first place, it means a conception of history purged of all "parochialism" of time and space. This is its Toynbeean meaning, which Barraclough embraces wholeheartedly. "The more universal . . . [a historian's] point of view, the more he strives to free himself from national or regional preoccupations, the nearer he will approach to a conception of the past which is valid for the present" (p. 182). As in Toynbee, this applies to temporal as well as to regional parochialism: Caesar may be more relevant to the world of 1956 than Lloyd George or Stanley Baldwin. In the second place, Barraclough speaks of "universal or general history" as "a search for meaning beyond the immediate facts."[1] In other words, universal history is also generalized history, meaningful and relevant history. The two meanings are obviously related—only ecumenical history can be meaningful in the twentieth century—but the second meaning is as important as the first. Barraclough is as frightened as Toynbee in his last four volumes by a historiography that postulates meaninglessness and loses itself in factual research.

Barraclough sees two broad ways of working toward the goal of writing truly universal history. The first is Toynbee's. This is the way of all-out massive frontal attack on the problem: assume the Olympian attitude from the start toward *all* civilizations, *all* religions; admit no favorites and grant no essential "uniqueness" to any historical phenomenon; if anything, play up the Orient in order to humble the Occident, exaggerate the underdog's virtues in order to cut the top dog down to size. This "synoptic" or "panoramic" view (to use Toynbee's own

[1] Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Larger View of History," *Times Literary Supplement*, January 6, 1956, p. ii.

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terms) has moved some of Toynbee's critics to warmest praise, others to bitterest ridicule. "No book that deals with human affairs," writes Lewis Mumford of the *Study of History*, "has been more free from the blatant parochialisms of our age and our civilization . . . [from] the notion that our age is the climax of human existence and that its ephemeral values are eternal ones."[2] But to Hans Kohn, Toynbee underestimates the originality, creativity, and humanity of Western civilization, and Pieter Geyl sees sinful betrayal in his attitude toward the West.[3] Geyl speaks of Toynbee's "impossibly universalist system" and concludes: "His vast, global knowledge of history has tempted him into what strikes me as a prideful and sinful, an inhuman and at times slightly ridiculous, ostentation of detachment from his own heritage. . . . Often one cannot help suspecting that the detachment is actually spite masquerading as detachment."

Barraclough's attitude toward his predecessor is not altogether so simple as it appears at first glance. He warmly appreciates Toynbee's "serious attempt to revive, on new foundations, the old conception of universal or world-history," and he accepts wholeheartedly many of Toynbee's leading ideas, such as the philosophical equivalence and contemporaneity of civilizations (pp. 15, 230-34). But he objects strenuously to Toynbee's Procrustean techniques, thinks he has got his facts wrong over and over, and accuses him of the cardinal historical sin, lack of "the historian's characteristic piety toward the past." Toynbee's questions are right, but his answers are unsatisfying "because they are in the end mere intuitions which lack—by comparison even with Spengler—the fire and compulsion of inner necessity."[4] There is something of Mumford in Barraclough's attitude toward Toynbee, in other words—but perhaps something of Geyl as well, if he means what he appears to mean when he writes that "Ranke's admonition to view past generations with the eyes of God" was "an astounding and unpardonable presumption."[5] At any rate, he has read enough of Herbert Butterfield to be keenly conscious of the presumption inherent in all attempts to make judgments about the past, and thereby to play God (pp. 184, 204).

The Olympian attitude, the sudden and single leap into a synoptic view of all history, is not for Barraclough. For him there is a more modest and more practical way. This is to see "Europe in Perspective"

[2] *Toynbee and History*, ed. by M. F. Ashley Montague, Boston, 1956, p. 145.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 368.
[4] Barraclough, in *ibid.*, p. 121.
[5] "The Larger View of History," *loc.cit.*

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(to borrow the title of one of his essays). This is the way of a group of revisionist historians upon whom Barraclough draws heavily: Ludwig Dehio, brilliant editor of the *Historische Zeitschrift*; R. Grousset in France; Geoffrey Bruun, Oscar Halecki, and Walter Prescott Webb in the United States; Herbert Butterfield and Humphrey Sumner in England; with Tocqueville and Burckhardt, Seeley and Meinecke, Spengler and Toynbee, hovering in the background as prophets of the larger view of European history. The villains of the piece are the historicists: Ranke, J. B. Bury, H. A. L. Fisher, and Ernest Barker. To see the history of Europe in its world setting, as part of the warp and woof of world history rather than as its predetermined center—this is "the most profitable line to pursue," one gathers, rather than to sketch out vast "Studies of History" (p. 17).

From this perspective Barraclough is led to question "the historical justification for the assumption of the existence of a specifically western European civilization." As a medievalist interested primarily in the Empire, he insists that the Slavonic East has always been an integral part of "Europe" and that "the cult of a common western European civilization" is a divisive and dangerous idea. In spite of local variations there is "one civilization throughout Europe," and it includes Russia, the heir of Byzantium, which in turn had a better claim to call herself the heir of classical civilization than did Western Europe. Conversely, the continuity between "Europe" and contemporary America has been somewhat exaggerated, he believes. Both the USSR and the USA are continuators of European civilization, but Barraclough emphasizes the original elements in American civilization and ridicules the "magnificent audacity" of the United States in posing since 1945 as the heir of a European civilization "different in formative conditions and in historical evolution from its own" (p. 172). Clearly the eastern boundary of "Europe" is the Urals, not the Carpathians or the Elbe. Whether the western boundary is the Atlantic or the Pacific is not altogether clear.

As with spatial boundaries, so with temporal Barraclough is critical and stimulating rather than constructive and systematic. He suggests three or four mutually inconsistent schemes for re-periodizing European history, but underlying all of them is the conviction that European history from about 900 to 1945 is a unity and that the term "Middle Ages" should be abolished—or applied to the years 1300 to 1789 (p. 61). He seems to have a sharper sense of chronological limits than Toynbee: "Somewhere, on an unknown date, back in the fourth century of our era, a new civilization was born . . . which for the first time we may rightly term European" (p. 161); some day the Second World War may

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appear as "the decisive conflict in which Europe, committing suicide, surrendered mastery to the colored peoples" (p. 183).

Barraclough's objection to the traditional definitions of Western civilization in time and space is the sound one that they were "parochial." Europe's little balance of power between half a dozen "great powers," which lasted roughly from Columbus to the Kaiser, was thought of as a microcosm of world developments, whereas actually what happened outside Europe broke every historical "rule" that explained what happened inside Europe. Europe preserved her independent states and multiplied them, while great conglomerations of power were built up outside (pp. 182-84). (Barraclough conveniently forgets the destruction of small sovereignties in Germany and their preservation in South America.) "The old parochial division of history into 'ancient—mediaeval—and modern'" was "a meaningless time-scheme which makes nonsense of the past," particularly when applied to the history of other areas such as China (p. 231). Europa never was the center of world history to the extent that she imagined, and since 1945 the hollowness of her claim is more evident than ever. Barraclough is much taken by Walter Prescott Webb's thesis in *The Great Frontier* that Europe's great age from 1492 to 1914 was essentially something evanescent, peculiar, and abnormal in world history.

What all this amounts to saying is that in order to serve a global age, historians must rewrite European history so as to include Byzantium and Russia, and direct more attention to the impact of the outside world on Europe than to that of Europe on the outside world. This is surely important, but an American may be pardoned some mild amusement at the disparity between Barraclough's clarion call to a "new view" of history and the view actually outlined. "The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Ranke" blows loudly, but not really with such revolutionary overtones as John Knox's original blast. On this side of the Atlantic it all sounds a bit more familiar and a bit less radical as a program of historical revision than it may sound on the other side. Barraclough refers twice to a kind of conversion experience which he had during the Second World War, vaguely parallel to Toynbee's famous experience in 1914 of the contemporaneity of Thucydides: "For me, it was the Russian victory at Stalingrad in 1943 that made a total revision of European history imperative" (pp. 9, 181). His university training in England and Germany had left him ignorant of Eastern European history, and so presumably incapable of understanding the background or significance of the victory. The heart of his

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professional crusade since then has been the inclusion of Eastern Europe and Russia in European history.

The wider significance of Barraclough's book lies, I think, in its personal quality—perhaps even in what some might call its naïveté about how new an old view can be. The plain fact is that writing universal history is a moral as well as an intellectual problem. The reviewers of Toynbee have made everyone conscious of the intellectual problem, and Toynbee himself is perfectly aware of it: the masses of documents, the stacks of monographs, the tangles of technical problems waiting to trap or overwhelm the hardy soul who sets out to rise above specialization and attain a "synoptic" view. We have paid too little attention to the moral problem. It is not enough to see with the mind that a global age must have a global historiography, as one sees that two plus two inevitably make four. The question for professional historians is, are *you* going to devote *your* life to writing it—in the face of specialist criticism, public misunderstanding, national prejudice, and cultural chauvinism? "It is one of the tragedies of our time," writes an Oxford historian, "that for over thirty years the prodigious gifts with which Dr. Toynbee is unquestionably endowed . . . should have been devoted to the futile pursuit of this Will-o'-the-wisp."[6] It takes a considerable head of moral steam to drive a professional historian on over the years toward the shadowy goal of writing universal history. The cases of Toynbee and Barraclough suggest that it may take a real "conversion" to generate this steam. In any case it is well not to be supercilious about historians who confess in autobiographical glimpses that they acquired their original drive toward the larger view of history from a vision that might be called religious. It may require such a drive to spur twentieth-century historians on to purge contemporary historiography of national and "Western" parochialism.

Toynbee's drive stems from what seems to be a religious syncretism compounded of Christianity and Mahayana Buddhism. In the opening chapter of his recently published Gifford Lectures he offers a brilliant sketch of the historian's calling as that of progressively correcting the "self-centredness" deep-rooted in human nature, thus relating the moral to the intellectual aspects of the historian's task.

The moral dynamic is not so clear in the case of Barraclough. His crusade for a "new view" of European history is more cautious and more feasible than Toynbee's, but it is fired no less by moral zeal. It is dangerous to diagnose men's motives from a distance in such a case,

[6] Lawrence Stone, in *Toynbee and History*, p. 114.

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but I would judge that the driving force behind his essays on the historian's profession is a secular, cosmopolitan humanism, affiliated both to the ideals of scientific inquiry and (more remotely) to Christian faith. "It is only a history that is universal in spirit—a history that looks beyond Europe and the west to humanity in all lands and ages —that can serve our purposes" today, he writes (p. 27). Perhaps the utilitarian reason is enough: only universal history can serve the purpose of uniting a dangerously divided but interdependent world. But I fancy Barraclough has other reasons in mind. A truly universal history can help the individual "to know where he stands and to understand his situation as neither good nor evil in itself, but as necessary" (p. 184). It cannot solve problems or predict the future; it cannot even provide "lessons" or reveal a teleological plan (pp. 25, 184, 204). Ultimately, he says, "we must seek for history an end outside itself—as it had, for example, when it was viewed as a manifestation of the working of God's providence. That statement is not intended to imply a return to a theological view of history (which, whether desirable or not, I regard as impracticable today); but it does mean that its study should have a constructive purpose and a criterion of judgment, outside and beyond the historical process" (p. 29).

Just what this purpose and criterion are, Barraclough never tells us. He is convinced that history is essentially cyclical, but this does not mean pessimism. We stand where the Romans did under the Gracchi, he says. There can be no question of any more great painting or music or architecture. "Yet for a sound and vigorous generation that knows its limitations, there is much worth doing to be done" (p. 237). There may even be an Age of the Antonines ahead. This cautious, mellow, stoical optimism appears to be the deepest root of Barraclough's universalism. Is it enough? St. Augustine was not half the historian that Barraclough is, but he knew far better *why* history must be universal. The cosmopolitan humanism of our best scientists today is a precious possession, and Barraclough has a good share of it. But it is at least doubtful whether this humanism can produce the same sustained drive toward conceiving and writing a truly universal history which was once produced by the belief that One God is the Father of all men and that all men are therefore brothers. If we must "seek for history an end outside itself" in order to write truly universal history, then all too many in the twentieth century will find this end in the Marxian dialectic—unless historians like Barraclough can be a bit more specific about their "criterion of judgment outside and beyond the historical process."

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ON COMPARATIVE HISTORY

By BERT F. HOSELITZ

Rushton Coulborn, ed., *Feudalism in History*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956, 439 pp. $8.50.

WHEN John Stuart Mill composed his *System of Logic*, he maintained that valid application of the comparative method to problems in the moral or social sciences is impossible, or, at best, inadmissible, since it must be based on *a priori* judgments. Mill founded his objection to the use of this method in social science on two essentially interrelated propositions: the uniqueness of each social event, and the multiplicity and variety of causal factors which may be considered as having a determining influence on these events.[1] Although this conception of the special nature of social events has, on the whole, remained unchanged, social scientists have freely applied the comparative method to the analysis of social problems. History has been outstanding among the social sciences in rejecting longest the application of this method. The main argument against its use was derived from the description of history formulated by Ranke and his school, a description which was endowed with a philosophical underpinning by Windelband and Rickert, who classified sciences according to method into a nomothetic and an ideographic group. History was the ideographic science *par excellence*, and with the strong historical emphasis that was placed in Germany upon other social sciences as well, there was a tendency to return to the viewpoint of Mill and to regard as scientifically suspect generalizations in social science based on the application of the comparative method.

But while German philosophers were busy elaborating rules of scientific method for the cultural sciences, German legal historians engaged freely in applying what James Bryce called the "comparative method in jurisprudence,"[2] and the members of the younger historical school in economics delineated a series of stages of economic evolution, a procedure which required comparison of different historical epochs, as well as abstraction from the unique characteristics of a single historical event or chain of events. The contrast between the logical system of scientific classification, on the one hand, and the practice of social scientists and students of law, on the other, apparently disturbed no

[1] John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, 8th ed., New York, 1895, pp. 610-13.
[2] James Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, New York, 1901, pp. 619ff.

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one, until it flared up around the turn of this century in the dispute released by Karl Lamprecht's partisanship of a genetic *Kulturgeschichte*.[3]

The intervention of Max Weber resolved the dilemma. In three essays on the methodology of the social sciences which appeared between 1903 and 1906, he dealt not only with such problems as the distinction between preference statements and factual statements, the conditions and limitations of "objectivity" (*Wertfreiheit*) in social science, and the nature of *verstehende* sociology, but also—and indeed, above all—with the problem of the relation between history and generalizing social science, and the rules applying to the comparison of social events and, more importantly, of social systems and parts of social systems.[4] Although Weber's methodological teachings have not found universal acceptance—the most conspicuous group of students of society who reject them are the Marxians—they form the basis of a large section of social research today. They influence much of the thinking in current social research, sometimes openly and consciously, but more often through the pervasive role they play in the general methodological and evaluative attitudes of modern social scientists.

In the last two decades these methods of research have begun to penetrate the field of history, and if in the United States and elsewhere political history is still largely carried on along the lines set out by Ranke and his followers, the generalizing method, employing ideal types and their comparison, has been found useful in social and economic history. No less an authority than N. S. B. Gras has supported the use of ideal types as tools in economic history for the study of comparative stages of economic systems, and in more recent years numerous applications of this method have been made in the literature of social history. Among examples from different countries and periods are a

[3] The classic exposition of the Rickert-Windelband thesis is contained in Heinrich Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, 5th ed., Tübingen, 1929, and *idem, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, 3rd ed., Tübingen, 1915. This position is ably summarized by Maurice Mandelbaum, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge*, New York, 1938, pp. 119-47. Lamprecht's position is expressed in his work, *What Is History?*, New York, 1905. The philosophical background of his theory is expounded by Erich Rothacker, *Ueber die Möglichkeit und den Ertrag einer genetischen Geschichtsschreibung im Sinne Karl Lamprechts*, Tübingen, 1911. Cf. also James W. Thompson, *A History of Historical Writing*, New York, 1942, II, pp. 422-28.

[4] Only two of these essays have appeared in English translation, in Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, ed. and trans. by E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch, Glencoe, Ill., 1949. These two studies are "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," and "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences." The third essay, "Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie," appeared first in three installments in *Schmollers Jahrbücher*, Vols. 27, 29, and 30, and is reprinted in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen, 1922.

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series of articles on entrepreneurial roles exercised by members of the nobility in various European countries, which appeared in *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*; a symposium on Irrigation Civilizations published under the auspices of the Pan American Union; and a series of volumes on the comparative aspects of various social institutes, published by the Société Jean Bodin in Brussels.[5] The list could, of course, be greatly extended.

The most recent contribution to this branch of historical study is *Feudalism in History*, edited by Rushton Coulborn. This book has the distinction of facing squarely the problem of method involved in the study of comparative history. Although, like the other works listed in the previous paragraph, it contains a series of essays in which the phenomenon of feudalism in different societies is treated comparatively, it concludes with a long section by the editor in which the possible application of the method of comparative history to the study of feudalism is expounded and analyzed in detail. Before entering into a more extensive discussion of the contribution made by this book, it may be in order to ascertain the significance of comparative history for the study of international relations.

That historical research forms an important branch of the study of international relations will be generally admitted. The history of diplomacy or of interstate relations forms an old and well-established specialty in the field of international relations. Another related matter of interest to students of international relations is the analysis of the historical development of some "institution," such as an internationally relevant ideology, an international organization, or a body of social action in the international sphere. Under the first heading would fall histories of pacifism or of international law; under the second, histories of such international bodies as the League of Nations or the United Nations; and under the third, histories of war or imperialism, or of the persistent objectives in the international field pursued by one country which have sometimes been designated as a country's persistent national interest. I believe that, especially in this last series of topics, the usefulness of comparative history may be made manifest and, indeed, that it has been applied to advantage in the past.

Rather than a discussion of this problem in purely abstract terms, the introduction of one or two examples may prove helpful. Among works

[5] Cf. *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*, VI (1953-1954), Nos. 2 and 3; Julian H. Steward, ed., *Irrigation Civilizations: A Comparative Study*, Washington, D.C., 1955; Société Jean Bodin pour l'histoire comparée, *Receuils*, Vols. I-VII, Brussels, 1936-1956.

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in the field of internationally relevant institutions, Quincy Wright's *A Study of War* and Joseph A. Schumpeter's *Imperialism* are generally recognized as contributions of great merit.[6] Both may be regarded, in part or in full, as studies in comparative history. In the case of *A Study of War*, the use of this method is exhibited in its most manifest form in some of the tables in the Appendices, but it is visible throughout the main text of the work, especially in the first volume.[7] Schumpeter's essay, which admittedly is a study in the sociology of international politics, may be regarded as a straightforward application of the method of comparative history to a problem in international relations. Schumpeter asks what constellation of social forces makes for imperialist aggression, and then tests his answer by applying it to a series of historical situations in which such aggression has taken place. I will not enter here into a detailed discussion of whether Schumpeter succeeds in proving his hypothesis, or whether his explanation has met with general approval. Nor will I at this time attempt to say whether Wright's classification of the warlikeness of different civilizations and the general correlations of factors which contributed to or distracted from this feature of the peoples whom he studies have found common acceptance. These questions are certainly relevant, and they will be touched upon later. But regardless of whether or not Wright and Schumpeter have the "right" answers for the questions they raise, it is indubitable that their use of the method of comparative history led to a deeper penetration of the subject than would have been possible without it, and new and significant questions were posed and possible solutions for them proposed which further our understanding of the functioning of social systems in inter-system relations. I believe that the overwhelming opinion of those who have reviewed or examined the writings of Wright and Schumpeter—and of others using the same method of enquiry—has been that fruitful prospects were opened to scholarship by these contributions.

It appears justifiable, therefore, to examine more carefully two problems that arise in connection with a work which has as its explicit basis a theme in comparative history. First, what kinds of problems can be investigated by means of the method of comparative history, and in what way do we have to pose questions in order to make them amenable to the application of this method? And second, what kind of find-

[6] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols., Chicago, 1942; and Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, New York, 1955.

[7] See, for example, appendices xiv, xv, and xvi in Vol. 1, but also chapter 15 (pp. 372-405) in the same volume.

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ings can we expect from its use, and in what types of enquiry would such findings be useful?

The origins of *Feudalism in History* are very similar to those of many other experiments in comparative history. It grew out of a conference at which specialists in the history of civilizations that exhibited feudalistic or quasi-feudalistic periods presented papers on each of these episodes, and in which one man—in this case, the editor of the volume—attempted to sum up and generalize from the body of material presented in these papers as well as in other pertinent writings on the cases under consideration. The book thus consists of two main parts. In one are presented eight essays by various authors on feudalism, and especially feudal political institutions in Western Europe, Japan, China, ancient Mesopotamia and Iran, ancient Egypt, India, Byzantium, and Russia. In the second, Coulborn summarizes and describes such uniformities as may be found in the cases under discussion.

Little need be said about the eight essays which form the first half of the book. Though they vary somewhat in excellence—as is inevitable in an enterprise of this sort—they are all of unusually high quality. The authors were aware that they were writing for an audience which had little specialized knowledge of the intricacies of the civilizations they were discussing, and they achieved a most admirable balance in their presentation between the rigorous demands of scholarly specialization and the scarcely less difficult task of presenting often uncertain and disputed material to persons relatively unfamiliar with the frontiers of research in a given historical specialty. This portion of the book, therefore, makes fascinating reading, and it is a difficult task to decide which of the eight essays deserves the highest praise. But if I were forced to give prizes, I would give them to Derk Bodde's essay on China, William F. Egerton's on Egypt, and Burr C. Brundage's on Mesopotamia and Iran, in that order.

Given the high quality of these eight essays, Coulborn had a difficult task in maintaining the discussion on a commensurate level. Unfortunately his essay is long-winded and dull; the main thread of the argument is often disrupted. Whereas the eight essays which precede his dissertation hold one's attention consistently, his own work induces the mind of the reader to stray. Thus, while reading the first part of the book is a pleasure, reading the second part is a chore. But, more serious than this, Coulborn's interpretative summary suffers from two further defects. The first relates to his interpretation of the method of comparative history, and the second to his conception of feudalism.

We may assume that the problem of feudalism—rather than some

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other topic—was selected for a work in which the procedures of comparative history were to be tested because it offers a particularly suitable field of enquiry for an evaluation of this approach. The suggestion that an investigation of the different feudalisms might be a suitable problem for this purpose has been made several times before. It underlies the studies initiated by the Société Jean Bodin, since several volumes published by this organization deal with partial aspects of feudalism. Of equal importance perhaps is the suggestion made by Marc Bloch, who concludes his brilliant study on European feudal society with the proposal that feudalism may constitute a social type, and that the comparative study of real or alleged feudal systems might provide an important clue to the understanding not only of feudalism as a form of social organization, but also of the historical antecedents and conditions of development of a feudal social order.[8] Since Bloch's book may itself be regarded as a comparative study of feudalism in different parts of medieval Europe and throughout different periods of its existence, it is not surprising that he should have found it advisable to suggest an extension of this research to other societies and other periods of world history.

But in addition to explicit statements on the potential fruitfulness of testing the methods of comparative history by analyzing the phenomenon of feudalism, there was an important second reason why this topic deserved comparative analysis. That was the appearance of real or alleged feudal social systems in a number of civilizations. The concept of feudalism has tended to be applied more or less at random to societies in which agriculture was organized on a manorial basis, or in which a hereditary nobility held certain powers, or, finally, to societies in which agriculture, and especially large-scale agriculture, formed the foundation of economic activity. In this manner, writers talked about the "feudalism" of the American ante-bellum South, or that of the late Roman Empire in the West, as well as of the feudalism of early medieval Europe. It is clear that very different social systems were designated by a common term and confusion was rife. Thus, merely to clarify what feudalism is and in what societies one can find genuine features of feudalism was an enterprise well worth the trouble. It goes without saying that a comparative study of the history and internal functioning of genuine and alleged feudal systems would have achieved this clarification.

If this aim is to be achieved, one of the crucial tasks of a comparative

[8] See Marc Bloch, *La Société féodale*, Paris, 1940, II, pp. 241ff.

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analysis of feudal periods in the history of different peoples is the definition or description of feudalism. The book under review contains such a definition in the introductory essay contributed by Joseph R. Strayer and Rushton Coulborn. In this essay a very explicit description of feudalism is presented, and although this description is called "provisional," it is, in fact, maintained throughout the book, at least in the long summary essay by Coulborn himself. Here is the definition given by Strayer and Coulborn: "Feudalism is primarily a method of government, not an economic or a social system, though it obviously modifies and is modified by the social and economic environment. It is a method of government in which the essential relation is not that between ruler and subject, nor state and citizen, but between lord and vassal. This means that the performance of political functions depends on personal agreements between a limited number of individuals, and that political authority is treated as a private possession" (pp. 4-5).

I must take strong exception to this description. One might, of course, answer that a description or definition may be regarded as purely nominal and that the test of its "validity" is merely its usefulness for theoretical or heuristic ends. But it is precisely my contention that regardless of whether the description given by Strayer and Coulborn is "true" or not, its adoption is one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory results achieved in the summary essay. Whatever its merits, the chief reason why this description must be rejected for a research project in comparative history is the fact that it defines feudalism in such a way that this central object of research is not easily amenable to ordered analysis as a system of variables. If feudalism is merely a "method of government" and if it is said, *expressis verbis*, that feudalism is not a social system, only one approach in comparative history is possible: do the various civilizations in which feudalism has allegedly been found exhibit methods of government similar to that of early medieval Europe? If they do, they are feudal; if they do not, they are not. To pose the problem in this fashion is trivial, indeed; and it is not surprising that Coulborn, in order to carry through a more adequate analysis in the summary essay, roams over the large field of the general developmental conditions which brought—or did not bring—about this method of government.

These investigations in which Coulborn compares chains of events in different civilizations do not lead anywhere and are, in my opinion, an abuse rather than a proper application of the comparative method in history. The appropriate procedures for the application of this method were outlined originally by Max Weber in his discussion of

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economic or social stages or systems as ideal types. I cannot enter here into a detailed discussion of the analysis which Weber presents on this topic, nor should this be necessary, since a reasonably careful reading of his essay on " 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" would suffice.[9] The main result of Weber's discussion—and this is the relevant issue for us here—is that an ideal type, regardless of whether it is constructed for a "static" phenomenon which tends to maintain an equilibrium position or for a developmental sequence, must be set up as a system of interrelated variables which are capable of general treatment. In other words, the application of the comparative method to historical material is not possible if it is confined to a comparison of chains of events, since these are essentially unique in character, and any comparison between them becomes merely a detailing of analogous sequences. In order to apply the method of comparison to historical material it is necessary that social systems (or parts of social systems) be compared with one another, or that developmental sequences, expressed in terms of generalizable variables, be the object of comparative study.

It is strange that Strayer and Coulborn, apparently following German doctrine, adopted such a narrow definition of feudalism, especially since the conception of feudalism as a social system is quite common among historians. And it is stranger still that Strayer—in the face of the great work of Marc Bloch—can say in Chapter II that "Western European feudalism is essentially political" (p. 16).[10] It is not denied that the political nexus peculiar to feudalism—homage and vassalage—the fractionalization of political power, and consequent upon it the conception of political office as private property are important characteristics of feudal social systems. But the rationale for this fractionaliza-

[9] Cf. Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, pp. 50-112, esp. pp. 94-105.

[10] I do not wish to deny that the conception of feudalism as a predominantly or exclusively political phenomenon, from which certain social and economic consequences may be derived, has a very respectable ancestry. I believe that the main protagonists of this idea were the German legal historians and those influenced by them. For example, Frederick Pollock and F. W. Maitland (*The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I*, Cambridge, Eng., 1898, I, pp. 66ff.) tend to favor this interpretation, and it can also be found in numerous German writings on the feudal period. It is clearly marked in as recent a book as the last (fourth) edition of Heinrich Mitteis, *Der Staat des hohen Mittelalters*, Weimar, 1953, *passim*. I believe that this conception of feudalism is antiquated. Its adequacy was questioned even in Germany by such men as Alfons Dopsch and Georg v. Below. In France it began to be abandoned when Joseph Calmette published *La Société féodale* (Paris, 1923), and it received its final blow in the brilliant work of Marc Bloch. In England the old interpretation also has been replaced, and F. M. Stenton in *The First Century of English Feudalism* (Oxford, 1932) treats feudalism as a social system rather than as a form of political organization. I am persuaded that a survey of the literature on feudalism, especially in English and French works of the last twenty years, will show a predominant interpretation of feudalism as a social, rather than a governmental, system.

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tion of power lies not in the fact that feudalism is a special method of government, but rather that the forms of social integration under the technological and economic conditions in which feudal systems developed made necessary such a distribution of political power. This accounts also—as Coulborn does not tire to point out in the final essay—for the fact that feudal systems usually develop at a time when a large, centralized empire is disintegrating. At the same time, the lord-vassal relationship, so characteristic of feudalism, is not merely a form of social stratification. It implied much more in European feudalism than a chain of command. Homage, i.e., an expression of deference, and the fief, i.e., an expression of an economic nexus, were inseparably bound up with this relation. The interpersonal bond upon which the feudal political order was based thus embraced a much wider set of social relationships than those with merely political relevance. This wider social aspect of feudalism also manifests itself in most of the other cases which are discussed in *Feudalism in History*. Although the authors of the various essays in the first part were asked to discuss their topic on the basis of Coulborn's and Strayer's description, some of them presented a picture of feudal social relations, rather than of forms of political organization characteristic of feudalism. This is especially manifest in Bodde's paper on China and in E. O. Reischauer's paper on Byzantium. Since the latter is based predominantly on the writings of A. A. Vasiliev and George Ostrogorskij, it would be strange if the predominantly socio-economic outlook of these two writers did not find a reflection in Reischauer's work.

Let us apply the test of the usefulness of this definition of feudalism by Strayer and Coulborn to a special case, that of Byzantium. In his evaluation of Byzantine history, Coulborn concludes that this empire did not experience a feudal period, chiefly because "it lacked the inherently changing character of feudal society" and because in spite of the fractionalization of powers beginning under the Comneni "the system . . . was too much a system; it was potentially stable in itself, provided that an effective central government could be restored to confirm the potential stability" (p. 356). This statement appears fully opposed to the analysis given by George Ostrogorskij, one of the greatest living historians of Byzantium, who, in a recently published work, attempts to establish the typically feudal character of Byzantine society.[11] This interpretation is also diametrically opposed to Bloch's evaluation of English feudalism. In England, where feudal social institutions

[11] George Ostrogorskij, *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine*, Brussels, 1954, esp. pp. 9-258.

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were imported by the Normans, they attained a singularly pure form; but the power and stability of the central government were rarely in question, and even at the time of John Lackland or during the Wars of the Roses royal power and prerogative suffered only a relatively slight and temporary setback.[12]

If Coulborn's definition of feudalism is not very satisfactory, his application of the method of comparison for the discovery of uniformities in history is equally deficient. As already pointed out, these uniformities are looked for in analogies of events rather than in similarities between systems of relevant variables. One prominent example must suffice to show some of the shortcomings of the method applied by Coulborn. One of the chief actors in his account of the rise of feudalism is the ghost of an old empire. The similarity of the roles of this ghost and of that in *Hamlet* is striking, though not intentional. In somewhat less fanciful terms, what Coulborn wishes to show is that feudalism tends to occur in large states which succeed a large empire—an empire which, incidentally, was a centralized bureaucratic unit rather than the fractionalized entity which makes a feudal state. Now there were two empires which are recognized by Coulborn as clearly feudalistic, the medieval European and the Japanese. But Japan never formed a great empire before the beginning of the Kamakura period, when feudalism is generally acknowledged to have set in. So Coulborn has to bring in the Han empire of China, whose ghost he claims inspired Japanese feudalism. Why the ghost of Han did not likewise inspire feudalism in China, either before or after the revival of a centralized empire under the T'ang, remains unexplained and perhaps inexplicable. The whole history of feudalism in China is further confounded in that the very definite feudal or feudal-like developments in the late Chou period cannot be regarded—except by some fanciful reconstruction of history—as a revival of a ghost empire, in this case the empire of the Shang period. In spite of the rather unanimous verdict of historians of China—including Derk Bodde, H. G. Creel, Henri Maspero, and Owen Lattimore—that the existence of a unified great empire of Shang is more than doubtful, Coulborn attaches himself to a small number of chance straws in Chinese historical narratives which speak of an early "great empire." But he himself has to admit that with respeect to the problem of whether feudalism is inspired by the ghost of a former empire, or whether it may stand at the beginning of a historical evolution that is developing a centralized empire, "no answer to this large

[12] Cf. Bloch, *op.cit.*, I, pp. 289ff.

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question has been found in this study" (p. 253). Yet his further account is dominated by the assumption that feudalism follows the disintegration of a large empire. But it is clear that this assumption can be upheld only because the problem of Japanese feudalism has been shifted so as to make Japan the spiritual heir of the Chinese Han dynasty, and because the problem of the origins of actual feudal or feudal-like periods in early China, Mesopotamia, and elsewhere is beyond the pale of evidence, since the preceding empires out of whose ashes these feudal states are supposed to have developed are shrouded in the mists of pre-history.

I believe that this account clearly exhibits the weakness of the method of comparison of chains of events which Coulborn applies. If the comparative method in history cannot produce better and more convincing results, it should not be employed. But it will also be clear, I believe, that the fault is not with the method as such, but with its misuse for a purpose for which it is not fitted. If, instead of asking what are the "invariant" antecedent events of a feudal period, Coulborn had asked what is the constellation of variables which makes for the likelihood of calling into life a feudal social system, he might have saved a good deal of ink and arrived at somewhat surer and more convincing results.

In spite of the rather meager results of his summary, Coulborn comes up with a strong endorsement of the method of comparative history, or the search for "uniformities in history," as he prefers to put it. With this verdict I am in full agreement, and I should like to conclude this paper by merely noting that because of a somewhat different conception of this method the results reached by Schumpeter and Wright in the two studies referred to earlier appear to be more satisfactory than those reached by Coulborn in his concluding essay. The difference in the methods applied is perhaps best exhibited in the work of Schumpeter. Schumpeter, who grew up under the general impact of Weberian methodology, applies the method of historical comparison by means of ideal types in a clear and unmistakable manner. He begins by posing a problem: what are the reasons for the repeated flare-up of imperialist powers and policies, i.e., "an aggressiveness that is kindled anew by each success . . . an aggressiveness for its own sake . . . expansion for the sake of expanding, war for the sake of fighting, victory for the sake of winning, dominion for the sake of ruling"? Schumpeter then goes on to explain how he will examine this phenomenon and says: "Our method of investigation is simple: we propose to analyze the birth and life of imperialism by means of historical examples which I regard as

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typical. A common basic trait emerges in every case, making a single sociological problem of imperialism in all ages, though there are substantial differences among the individual cases."[13]

In carrying out this task, Schumpeter examines the general social organization of peoples at the time they entered into imperialist ventures. His historical sweep is as wide as that of the authors of *Feudalism in History*. He cites the experience of the Egyptian empire after the expulsion of the Hyksos, the Persian empire from Cyrus to Darius, the Assyrians, the Arabs during the first centuries of Islam, the Franks, and a number of other instances. He examines "positive" as well as "negative" cases, just as do Coulborn and his associates. But he is not interested in analogies of chains of events, nor is he interested in methods of government or organization. He tries to penetrate the deep underlying structural determinants which promise to offer an explanation of the typical phenomenon—"the ideal typical developmental sequences," in Weber's terms—which is the object of his investigation. And he arrives at the answer that imperialism is a phenomenon that arises if in a society there develops for various reasons and by various means a social class, or a "machine," which, "created by wars that required it . . . now creates the wars it required."[14]

Such an insight can be applied to other instances as well which escaped the attention of Schumpeter. For example, he has little to say about India or China, or even about the Mongols and Turks. But given his analysis—and regardless of whether we regard his findings as constituting a "theory" or merely a set of propositions of heuristic value—we can apply it to these other societies and test its wider validity or learn about ways in which the "theory" gained by this process has to be modified or even abandoned. The analysis which has been made here of the character of the work of Schumpeter could be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the contribution of Quincy Wright; I refrain from entering into it because this would constitute a tedious casuistry.

Now Coulborn could reply that what Schumpeter and Wright were after are sociological generalizations, whereas what he was trying to do was to apply the method of comparison to historical material. Disregarding the fact that such a dispute might end in a mere quibbling over whether a piece of research is called history or sociology,[15] a rather

[13] Schumpeter, *op.cit.*, pp. 5 and 7. (All references to this work are to the paperbound edition in Meridian Books, New York, 1955.)

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[15] In spite of the extended dispute over methodology in history and social science and the boundary between these disciplines, as well as the precise nature of cultural history (*Kulturgeschichte*), which clutters up the pages of German journals in social

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more profound issue is raised. And this brings us back to the point from which we started, the distinction between generalizing social science and history as an ideographic discipline, and to the problem posed still earlier by Mill of whether the comparative method can meaningfully and validly be applied to social problems at all. I already have stated that the answer to this question must be sought by applying procedures outlined and supported methodologically by Weber. That the concrete application of ideal-type constructs to the materials of history is not easy cannot be denied. That the pitfalls which confront the researcher, and to which Mill already drew attention—above all, the pitfall of engaging in *a priori* reasoning—are ever present dangers is also acknowledged. But the proper application of this method to historical materials may bring results which other research procedures do not yield. It may turn out that these results sometimes do not exhibit the grandeur and magnificence of the philosophical or prophetic speculations which have occupied some historians. But, as Crane Brinton said in the introductory chapter to one of his books, in which he traced a set of "uniformities in history": "A literary saw, now almost folk wisdom, but still pretty literary, is scornful over the mountain which labored and brought forth a ridiculous mouse. That mountain has perhaps never had due recognition for what is surely a rather remarkable biological feat. Moreover, the mouse was at the least alive. Most mountains, when they go in for this sort of thing, produce nothing better than lava, steam, and hot air."[16]

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science and German doctoral dissertations, the problem has apparently not been definitely solved. One result appears to be that cultural history or history of civilization tends to be regarded as a special field in German and also Dutch scholarship. For example, the editors of the *Collected Works* of the Dutch historian Jan Huizinga divide his essays between the fields of "general history" and "cultural history." Another symptom of this uncertainty of the proper place of cultural history is a work by Alfred Weber, *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie* (Munich, 1951), which is intended by him to be a contribution to sociology, but which most American social scientists would doubtless regard as a work in history.

[16] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York, 1952, p. 27.

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A NEW FUTURE FOR WORLD WAR II?

By BRIGADIER GENERAL S. F. GIFFIN, USAF

Asher Lee, *Air Power*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1955, 200 pp. $3.75.

MAHAN wrote protractedly about sea power, although certainly not more than his notable subject deserved, without using an unqualified "Sea Power" as the title for any of his works. His "Sea Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812," for example, was published in two volumes totaling 860 pages.[1] Held against this standard of thoroughness, any book entitled "Air Power" and running a modest 200 pages should perhaps be suspect at the outset. The purchaser should nevertheless be entitled to anticipate that such a book would in fact concentrate on discussing air power, that air power would be defined and placed in perspective as an instrument of policy, and that knowledgeability would be exhibited with respect to existing and projected national air forces. The reader might also expect a full awareness of the scientific and technological revolution now proceeding at so accelerated a pace that air power in some respects has to repeat its coming of age almost annually. Some expectation might be justified that the author would make his own contribution toward concepts and philosophy touching the use of air forces and the place of air power. If the author was English, as is Mr. Lee, the reader could also confidently expect some appreciation of future British air power, more especially as the United Kingdom has unequivocally replaced its ancient reliance on sea power with a new reliance on air power as the military fulcrum of its national strategy.

Mr. Lee satisfies none of these expectations in a book which is really a generalized discussion of specialized functions performed by the aircraft of armies and navies as well as of air forces, and primarily as those functions were performed during World War II. Through frequent disparagement of the capabilities of nuclear weapons, concerning which Mr. Lee displays a whimsical ignorance, an unreal and ghostly preview of future warfare is presented. As might be anticipated, however, the author in numerous connections looks queasily over his shoulder at a nuclear specter which proves never to have been wholly exorcised.

[1] Boston, 1905.

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A passage from the Introduction begins the process of exorcism: "The general use of the hydrogen bomb would of course shatter any current conception of the use of air power. When a bomb has the explosive force of millions of tons of ordinary T.N.T. it can make the consecutive use of communications to operate air forces virtually impossible. Air planning under a central command may not be feasible. Such things as target intelligence might be absurd. Air power as it is normally conceived would disappear. Small scattered flights of bombers could become the chief instrument of military power. This book assumes that the hydrogen bomb will not be used in war but will contribute largely to keep the peace" (p. 11).

The hydrogen bomb is thus disposed of on the forthright basis that a nuisance would result for the operations of aerial warfare should it be used. In passing, can Mr. Lee really believe that a modern air force is unprepared for communication difficulties, targeting problems, and—in fact—the fog of war?

On page 45 the following passage occurs: "There are several sizes of atomic bombs, as well as equivalents of the British-designed 'Tallboys' and 'Grand Slams'. These heavy bombs would be pertinent in a future struggle, for there is ample proof that Russia is building underground workshops and heavily concreted submarine pens against such bombing attacks."

Here, the words "these heavy bombs" are used virtually to equate atomic bombs with the ten-ton blockbusters of World War II. Elsewhere on the same page the statement is made: "There was not only the U.S. atomic bomb, but also the U.S. napalm incendiary which had such a devastating effect in the 1945 raids on Japanese cities. . . ." The choice among atomic bombs, ten-ton high explosive bombs, and tanks of jellied gasoline is accordingly made to seem a choice among weapons having reasonably comparable destructive effect. It would therefore appear that really nothing in aerial weaponry has changed significantly since the bombing raids on Germany!

Aside from the reality that even a "nominal" atomic bomb of the twenty-kiloton variety cannot be equated with a ten-ton or a napalm bomb, there exists here a curious unawareness of the variety and character of today's atomic arsenal, the dimensions of which have officially been more than merely suggested. The hydrogen weapon of smallest yield is certainly different in kind from a small atomic weapon. But atomic, or fission, weapons contain a wide spread in explosive yield and the largest fission weapons also become almost different in kind from the smallest fission weapons, verging in their destructive power on that

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of "small" fusion weapons. There simply is no clear-cut means of discriminating, except technically, between atomic and hydrogen weapons. If distinctions are to be made concerning one or another use of nuclear weapons in war, these will surely stem practically from the political decision that certain targets may be attacked while others must be spared. If a target is selected for attack, however, it would surely be no part of wisdom to inhibit a military selection of the optimum means of attack. Nevertheless, exactly this kind of inhibition is supported by Mr. Lee, who follows in this regard the pattern of wishful thinking prevalent recently in Western Europe and especially in England.

Although Mr. Lee concerns himself with prospects for a war involving the United States and the Soviet Union as principal adversaries, he seems at times also and even more greatly concerned with the prospect of a remilitarized and hostile Germany. Thus on page 31 he makes this surprising statement: "The Germans, who have had the greatest experience in the making and building of long-range rockets, may well be the first nation to make the strategic military rocket." This presumably is the intercontinental ballistic missile into which the United States is now putting more resources than went into the Manhattan Project, on which the Soviets are exerting at least comparable effort, and into which the Germans are presently putting no measurable effort at all. The final sentence of the book offers this further unsupported and quite irrelevant assertion: "Germany—technocratic, energetic, nationalistic and hungry to regain her lost territories—remains, perhaps, the greatest danger to peace."

This reviewer cannot avoid the impression that Mr. Lee is resorting to that device of science fiction which assumes the existence of alternate or parallel worlds. Thus, the parallel world of Mr. Lee is one in which fission and fusion weapons do not really exist and Germany is again the proximate enemy, so that what may be looked for in future global conflict is at best or worst only a sort of technically improved version of World War II.

It would be idle to pretend that this reviewer can here offer remedies for the several deficiencies he finds in this slight book. A few points may be made, however, on the subject of air power, one of which should be to suggest what it is.

Field Marshal Montgomery, visiting the Air War College in the fall of 1955, accepted with interest the following terse definition then offered for his consideration: "Air power is the hard core of any modern defense organization. It comprises those military resources, together with their effective command, control and employment, which enable

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a nation to use the air for its own purposes and to deny its effective use to an enemy." (After his return to SHAPE near Paris, the Field Marshal mailed to the Air War College the following suggestion for a paragraph to be added to this definition: "The greatest asset of air power is its flexibility. For this reason command and control must always be centralized at the highest level. So long as this is done, and the organization is flexible, it will be comparatively simple to decentralize whenever the situation so demands.")

If air power enables a nation to use the air for its own purposes, then how should the air be used? Obviously, it might be used solely to exploit the capabilities of a national air force, as the United States did during the Berlin Airlift, or as is sometimes done for disaster relief purposes, or as can be done in certain situations involving outright hostilities. In respect to situations involving hostilities, one in particular exerts a compelling influence on the structure of air forces, and indeed on the whole structure of power. This is the situation of total nuclear warfare which we may with some confidence hope our own proper air preparedness will contribute to prevent. Proper preparedness here of course demands that an air force be organized, equipped, and deployed so that no enemy attack, however sudden, can deprive it of the retaliatory ability to penetrate enemy defenses and virtually destroy the enemy home base. If, as Mr. Lee assumes, "the hydrogen bomb will not be used in war but will contribute largely to keep the peace," it will be very largely *because* of this kind of preparation, and few things in the realm of power and politics need to be understood so well. The incredible inversion of Mr. Lee is first to assume the hydrogen bomb out of use, and then to assume that air forces may organize, equip, and deploy much as if high-yield nuclear weapons were actually never to be used, held aloof perhaps as an act of their own will from employment in warfare.

But a nation whose air power makes its situation sufficiently commanding need not use this strength solely for the exercise of its air forces. Within a protective framework of air power, whether used or used in part or only poised for use, land and sea forces may be employed for every benefit to national interest which such employment can produce. Except in the event of a struggle for survival, these benefits remain today hardly less considerable than they have proved in the past when air power did not exist. However, the costs in land and sea forces of obtaining these benefits should moderate, in a relative sense, as air power is recognized to have absorbed or eliminated various intelligence and combat functions traditionally associated with the

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operations of surface forces—even to include functions having to do with the security of such forces.

In truth, any nation capable of doing so should today adopt a national strategy of air power, exactly as Britain in the appropriate circumstances adopted a national strategy of sea power. The analogy is exceedingly close between these strategies, each for its time, for each has the design of exploiting a medium of movement in order to dominate that medium and, to the extent necessary or desirable, any other medium of more restricted and laborious movement.

The reader will readily recall instances when the British Army was employed, never in large numbers and sometimes rather clumsily, like the braided stinging tip of a sea power whip. The Crimean and Boer Wars were such instances, as was the Peninsular action against Napoleon. Prior to World War I, in fact, modern England generally employed soldiers only as her sea power advantage might suggest, and admirers of the gallant Hornblower have had this concept dramatically illustrated by his creator, Mr. C. S. Forester.

The possession of formidable air forces is not in itself sufficient to ensure that a nation will pursue a national strategy oriented to air power. Its leadership must possess appreciation of the vitality and flexibility inherent in such a strategy. There must be a conscious determination to utilize whatever form of military force is appropriate to a situation requiring the use of force, but always as an extension of air power and under the sanction of its potential full application. A failure on the part of its leadership to understand this new and profoundly significant relationship among military forces at the disposal of a great nation could be disastrously more serious to that nation than have been similar failures of modern times. Such failures in conceptual understanding have nevertheless proved on occasion to be serious enough. Evidence is readily at hand in the recent case of Japanese error, a cogent and perceptive appraisal of which is offered by Masatake Okumiya in his preface to *Midway*: "The Pacific War was started by men who did not understand the sea, and fought by men who did not understand the air. . . . Because she judged the sea by land standards and applied to air warfare the concepts of sea fighting, Japan's tragic failure was foreordained."[2]

A strategy of air power would evidently be both feasible and economical for a nation which possessed transcendently superior air forces and a significant superiority in nuclear weapons. What of the situa-

[2] Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, *Midway*, Annapolis, Md., 1955, p. xvi.

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tion when an air power nation does not know itself to possess these advantages? This question lies at the heart of earnest debate, for it is the situation faced today by the United States and presumably also by the Soviet Union. (*Presumably*, as respects the Soviet Union, because the possibility exists that the secretive Russians may see evident what is no longer evident to Americans, a significant United States superiority in nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union may not yet possess an atomic arsenal sufficient, if effectively delivered, to cripple the United States.)

Between great and competitive powers some approach to military parity is entirely normal, and a disparity such as that which existed during the brief period of the United States atomic monopoly occurs but rarely. If only because of forcible restraints threatened by other powers, great powers are therefore normally unable to exercise their muscles with total disregard for the consequences. The consequences nowadays, it is true, seem more awful than ever in history, although they might not appear so to the departed spirit of an Apache Indian or a citizen of Carthage. But the restraints upon a total use of military power should prove correspondingly great, and the greater these restraints the more latitude may come to exist for lesser forms of armed conflict.

Limitations on warfare which may not be exceeded without provoking total nuclear warfare can of course be defined only in the light of each specific situation, and then imprecisely. Whatever these limitations, they will certainly press most painfully upon the freedom of action of any great power which possesses in combination with its staunch allies any less than the best in air power. This best must be sufficient in quantity and quality to achieve dominance of the air where and when necessary, while retaining a posture of preparedness for, and hence perhaps deterrence of, total nuclear war. Short of total nuclear war, this best need not demonstrate, by fighting, that it is sufficient to achieve dominance of the air globally and for extended periods. Such a control of the air, and therefore of the situation, will of course have to be fought for and won in a general war.

Monopoly of air striking power, as opposed to reasonable superiority, is accordingly not requisite to the adoption of a strategy of air power, and the Korean experience provides a case in point. A superior air power there established local dominance of the air, provided complete protection of its own land and sea forces from air attack, and furnished extensive assistance to surface forces intent upon combat operations in their more restricted media of movement. At the same time, this air power maintained preparedness for a total war which was thus deterred. Whether enemy capabilities at the time might otherwise have

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permitted his resort to all-out nuclear warfare is beside the point. In its military undertakings the side with superior air power *acted* as a superior air power, but also as though both sides possessed capabilities for extensive nuclear destruction. It appears reasonable to assume that it could do no less in another situation of limited warfare when both sides definitely possess such capabilities, and this should again be at least sufficient to achieve limited political ends.

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AFRICA: SCHOLARSHIP AND POLICY

By LLOYD A. FALLERS

Calvin W. Stillman, ed., *Africa in the Modern World*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1955, 342 pp. $6.00.

THE current attempt by European and American scholarship to come to grips with Africa is bound to be frustrating work for some years to come. The continent is vast and varied; Western knowledge of it is, for the most part, recent and superficial; and yet the demand for understanding, arising out of Africa's increasing importance in world affairs, will not wait for the slow process of maturation which scholarship normally requires. Policies must be made and points of view arrived at, and it is no use complaining that the stock of information and ideas out of which these policies and points of view must be fashioned are the premature products of half-digested thought. At the same time, it is clear that it is in such circumstances as these, where standards are non-existent or only half-formed, that the academic charlatan and the purveyor of facile formulae thrive. The more long-term goals of orthodox scholarship may be in danger of being sacrificed to the search for quick answers.

These are the somewhat contradictory thoughts which come to mind as one considers the papers delivered at the Twenty-ninth Institute of the Norman Wait Harris Foundation, published under the title *Africa in the Modern World*. This is not to suggest, of course, that there are charlatans among the contributors to this volume, but there are among them honest men who find the task of synthesizing in a scholarly way the material relating to a particular subject or region in Africa more than they can handle. Equally, however, it is clear that, given the pace of events in Africa, the attempt at synthesis must be made. In evaluating these papers, it is only fair to keep in mind both the immediate need for ideas and information and the ultimate interests of sound scholarship.

As scholarship, the volume is extremely uneven. There are only three really successful efforts to cover the continent from a particular point of view: Rudin, a Yale historian, provides an over-all account of the history of Europe's relations with Africa; Whittlesey, a geographer from Harvard, outlines the continent's natural resources; while Lewis, a Manchester economist, summarizes patterns of economic development. It is obvious that each is closely familiar with African materials

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in his field and each succeeds in summarizing these for the non-specialist. Lewis' paper is particularly notable for its eclectic and common-sense treatment of the factors underlying the slowness of African economic growth. Rather interestingly—and we will return to a consideration of some of the reasons for this in a moment—the weakest "over-all" papers are those of the sociologists and anthropologists: Frazier of Howard, Balandier of the International Research Office on Social Implications of Technological Change, and Herskovits of Northwestern. The writers of all three papers know Africa—or, at any rate, substantial parts of it—at first hand, but all three fail either to provide a connected descriptive account of the different patterns of social life which characterize various parts of the continent or to throw new light on the processes of change which are under way there. Urbanization, conflict of values, cultural marginality, and the break-up of the family are described as processes common to all areas, but the treatment is unsystematic and scrappy. This judgment is perhaps unfair to Herskovits, who does distinguish between the ways in which some of these processes work out in different areas—in the areas of European settlement, for example, as compared with the non-settled areas.

Another group of papers represents more intensive political and economic studies of particular areas. Of these, the most successful are the account by Robinson of Nuffield College, Oxford, of political development in French West Africa and the study of democracy in the Gold Coast by Apter of Northwestern. Robinson's paper is particularly welcome because of the paucity of studies in English of non-English-speaking African territories, but by any standard it is a scholarly and (within the limits of a rather long conference paper) detailed analysis, yielding insight into the actual working-out in practice of the French policy of integration and its intimate involvement with French domestic politics. Apter's paper is almost the only one in the volume which attempts to make use of African materials in more general theoretical argument. Using data from the Gold Coast, he addresses himself to the problem of the preconditions for the successful transfer of popular allegiance from tribal to modern democratic political institutions. In the process, he throws a good deal of light upon Gold Coast politics and at the same time helps to close the unnatural gap which has developed between sociological and political science ways of looking at the problem of order.

The other local studies include accounts of East Africa by Noon of the United States Information Service; of the former Italian colonies and Ethiopia by Baum of the American University, Washington; of the

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Belgian Congo by Carpenter of the National Council of Churches; and of Mozambique by Mondlane, an African student from that territory who has been studying in the United States. These papers seldom rise above the level of sound factual reporting, but they are quite consistently good by that standard, providing perhaps as satisfactory a set of regional summaries as might easily be found. A final paper in this group, by Samuels of Witwatersrand, gives an interesting historical analysis of the South African economy, with particular reference to the conflict between white South Africa's desire to keep native Africans at arm's length and its simultaneous need for their labor in an expanding economy.

What does a review of these papers reveal concerning the state of scholarship with regard to Africa? (Three papers remain undiscussed, but these may be more appropriately considered when, in a moment, we take up the policy relevance, as distinguished from the scholarly aspect, of the volume.) Assuming them to represent a fair sample of those now engaged in African research, it would appear that the fields in which it is easiest for scholars to work in terms of Africa as a whole are those least concerned with Africans. Among the contributors to this volume, it is the geographer, the economist, and the historian of Europe's relations with Africa who are able to provide us with a continental outline. The sociologist, the anthropologist, and the political scientist are good only when they are local and intensive; when they try to fill a larger canvas, they become platitudinous and begin to tread water. This in spite of the fact that, until quite recently, it was the anthropologists who had devoted most attention to Africa.

The reasons for this difference do not, one suspects, have to do with degrees of virtue on the part of either men or disciplines, but rather with the kind of place Africa is and, consequently, with the kind of problem it presents to the different disciplines. For the man who studies natural resources or the behavior of goods and services in money economies or the external relations of Western nations, Africa presents no problems which are outstandingly different from those encountered elsewhere—at any rate, elsewhere in the non-Western world. The indigenous ethnic and political structure of Africa, which forms the material of the sociologist, anthropologist, or political scientist, is, however, different in kind from that of, say, Latin America or Asia. For the basic indigenous political and ethnic units in Africa—the tribes—have on the one hand not been effectively erased, as in Latin America, to make room for new units modeled after the Western nation-state; nor have they, on the other hand, been large enough individually to provide

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the foundations for modern-type political units. In either the Latin American or Asian case, the result has been a social-political unit which fits into the nation-state pattern—a unit about which one can generalize culturally and politically. However much heterogeneity may remain in Mexico or India, and of course there is a great deal, still in either case there is a unity to which one can reasonably give the name "Indian" or "Mexican." In hardly a single territory in sub-Saharan Africa is this true in anything like the same degree (Belgian Ruanda-Urundi and the British South African High Commission Territories, taken singly, come to mind as possible exceptions, but none of these is administered as a really independent unit and none has favorable prospects of achieving independence). The tribes, numbering in the thousands and very different one from another, have persisted as self-conscious units alongside, and often in opposition to, the modern Western-type units created by the colonial powers. Too small to survive in independence, yet they frequently block the creation of units which might survive. To the social scientist they present a diversity which no one has yet succeeded in reducing to an orderly classification.

What, in this situation, is to be the unit of study? What, indeed, is the "real" unit, the unit which "*matters*"? Is it the tribe, because the colonial territory is simply an artificial boundary enclosing a congeries of peoples who feel no mutual loyalty or kinship, held together only by the superior force of a European power? Or is it in fact the colonial territory, because the tribes are too small and their institutions too foreign to the nation-state pattern to have a future—and because, in any case, the new Westernized elite are beginning to think of themselves as Nigerians or Congolese? Social scientists of different disciplines of course tend to lean in one direction or the other. The anthropologist favors the tribe because it has cultural unity, while the political scientist tends to prefer the colonial territory because it looks more like a nation-state. Looking at the "facts," the scales appear to be weighted on one side or the other in various territories, but nowhere is the answer clear. In Nigeria and the Gold Coast, where nationalism based upon the colonial territory has been strong enough to carry them to the brink of self-government, tribal particularism has nevertheless intervened and threatened to destroy all the unity that had been created.

The fact is that an understanding of both tribe and colonial territory is, and will continue to be, required for an appreciation of the reality of African life and that, consequently, the proper study of African affairs necessitates a new kind of relationship among the social sciences. This is not simply the old platitude about the virtue of interdisciplinary

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cooperation. It is not a call for more multi-disciplinary teams on the doubtful theory that if you rub two specialists together you will get a spark of wisdom. On the contrary, the interesting thing about Africa is that it fails to fit neatly into the traditional categories and that therefore what is needed is not more specialists but more social scientists with broader interests. In many (if not most) parts of Africa today, the anthropologist who cannot interest himself in political parties and civil service systems or the political scientist who is not willing to understand clan and lineage organization is simply wasting his time. Understanding cannot be reached through cooperation between specialists in these various institutional complexes because it is never clear where one begins and the other ends. And it is not, after all, such a radical suggestion that a social scientist interest himself in both clans and political parties. The range of institutional interests required is one which would have surprised Maine or Vinogradoff or Weber not a whit. (It is for these reasons that Apter's paper on the Gold Coast stands out in the volume under review. He deals with the relationship between traditional and modern Western-type institutions and in order to do this he has been willing to make himself half anthropologist.)

There are many other facets to this question of the proper approach to scholarship in Africa which one would like to explore, but one further point must suffice. There is a vital need for more historical research, for one of the causes of the superficiality of our understanding of Africa is that we know so little of her past, either recent or remote. With the exception of Ethiopia and the Arabic intrusions in the north and along the east coast, traditional sub-Saharan Africa was, of course, non-literate. On the one hand, however, the literature produced by these Arabic (and later, of course, Portuguese) forays was by no means insignificant. Just how significant it was we do not yet know, for the material in Hausa, Swahili, Arabic, and Portuguese is only beginning to receive proper attention, but there is every indication that much of the supposed isolation of the "Dark Continent" before the period of nineteenth-century empire-building will turn out to be a figment of the Anglo-Saxon imagination. And on the other hand, in many areas where there was in fact no writing before the end of the last century, both Europeans and mission-trained Africans began almost at once to produce a body of material which has now become truly formidable. Once again, the need is for historians who are half anthropologists or for anthropologists who will train themselves to make disciplined use of documentary sources. Again, also, there is the problem of the small versus the large canvas. In many areas, there is the material for at least

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one hundred years of history, but much of it is tribal in orientation and it is often written in local African languages. Like the student of contemporary Africa, the historian must work both with the tribe and with the emerging wider network of relations.

The upshot of all this is that Africa presents social scientists with exciting and challenging new problems associated with working out adequate concepts and methods for dealing simultaneously with tribes and with the new nation-state units produced by imperialism. Finding the answers will require time and it will require that scholars be allowed to devote substantial effort to local areas which, however, to a world newly interested in Africa and hungry for information may seem of insufficient significance. The universities that employ the scholars and the foundations that pay for their research may sometimes tend to be impatient of intensive local studies because they in turn are, or imagine themselves to be, under pressure from the public or from policy-making officialdom to produce ideas and information on a continental scale.

Why the sudden pressure for information? This takes us back to the other aspect of *Africa in the Modern World* which must be considered —its policy relevance. This side of things is the major concern of the three papers not yet discussed—those of McKay of Johns Hopkins, Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, and Lord Hailey, a British colonial administrator who on this occasion represented the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Unfortunately these papers were delivered almost three years ago (publication was delayed for two years) and there is a temptation to view them in the light of subsequent events. Already editor Stillman's Preface, in which he gives *his* view of the relevance of the volume to practical affairs, seems a trifle dated: "About five years ago public interest in the United States turned to Africa. The reason is plain: after the long series of losses in Asia, Americans as members of the Western world wondered if the Asian experience might be repeated anywhere else. There was only one place left; it was the continent of Africa" (p. v).

Today, after a period of what now seems to be generally accepted as a thaw of some degree in Soviet-Western relations, the whole matter seems a bit less urgent. Then, too, the spotlight has shifted to the Middle East and the relative postures of the various Western nations have rearranged themselves. Nevertheless, the basic situation out of which this feeling of urgency arose undoubtedly still exists and it is of interest to examine the views of the contributors to the volume concerning Western, and particularly American, interests in the light of it.

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McKay and Morgenthau, the two Americans, outline the familiar dilemma of recent United States policy with regard to colonial areas: on the one hand, the Cold War requires that the United States appear to colonial peoples as the champion of liberty in order to counter the attractions of communism; on the other hand, the same Cold War requires that we maintain the closest possible relations with the European powers against whom the resentments of colonial peoples are directed. McKay suggests that the tendency of some powers, notably Britain, to encourage the development of self-government in their colonies may help to resolve this dilemma. Morgenthau feels that, even so, the United States has yielded on colonial issues to pressure from her European allies rather more than was required by her interests in the Cold War situation.

Such questions of grand strategy are really beyond the competence of this reviewer (one would, incidentally, have appreciated a paper in this volume giving a straightforward evaluation of the military-strategic significance of Africa; such arguments are constantly being offered and the layman has no basis for evaluating them), but one *is* struck, both in these papers and in one's day-to-day experience of the American impact in Africa, with the seemingly single-minded emphasis upon American *interests*. Africans' welfare must be enhanced and their liberties promoted, not because these things are good in themselves, but because America's interests require it. No doubt this is a sound, hardheaded way to reason about foreign policy. No doubt, also, the best policy is the policy in which virtue and self-interest coincide. But the constant and public repetition of this sort of reasoning is not the way to win friends abroad. To many, it appears that the United States has shifted from a prewar position of simple-minded and uninformed anti-colonialism to a policy of cynical self-interest. Of course this view is unjust, but it is believed and it can only be countered by greater emphasis upon welfare and liberty for their own sakes. Significantly, in this volume it is left to Lord Hailey, the imperial Briton, to raise the simple argument of conscience: "The Western world is now recognizing its obligation to give assistance to all backward and underdeveloped peoples. Its reasons may not always be altruistic, and there may be at least that element of self-interest which comes from a recognition that lasting peace can only come in a more balanced world—a world which has gone some way to level up the vast discrepancies in the standard of life of its various peoples. But history has given us a very special obligation toward Africa, and I pray that, when in some far future the scroll of the world's story is unrolled, it will bear witness that we in our genera-

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tion have done our best to make Africa forget the wrongs done to it by our forefathers" (p. 13).

This is not only better prose than that written by most of the American contributors; it is also more humane. The reason, perhaps, is that, imperialism or no imperialism, Africa is to Lord Hailey a familiar place whose peoples and problems are real. For most Americans, Africa remains too distant and unfamiliar to be more than a piece on the international chessboard. Greater familiarity, perhaps, will bring greater sympathy and for this, as much as for any other reason, conferences such as that which produced *Africa in the Modern World* are to be welcomed.

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THE CRISIS OF MODERN SOCIALISM

By KURT L. SHELL

Joseph Buttinger, *In the Twilight of Socialism: A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1953, 577 pp. $6.00.

R. H. S. Crossman, ed., *New Fabian Essays*, London, The Turnstile Press, 1952, 215 pp. 15 shillings.

Paul Sering, *Jenseits des Kapitalismus*, Vienna, Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1948, 288 pp. 10 Austrian schillings.

Socialist Union, *Socialism: A New Statement of Principles*, London, Lincoln-Prager Press, 1952, 64 pp. 3 shillings.

IT would be a mistake to view the intellectual and political movement of socialism as a clearly identifiable and neatly circumscribed historical structure. Out of the many strands which have gone into the making of "socialism" it is possible, by simplifying the complexity of the process, to select at least four broad sources of socialist inspiration and thus four different versions of the socialist goal. These different concepts of socialism are not to be identified with specific historical figures or groups or movements, but represent rather the basic social and psychological elements which combined in varying degree to form the socialist movements known to us. The crisis of modern socialism—as exhibited in the books under consideration—is due to the fact that each of these concepts, for different reasons, has reached a dead-end from which advance toward any one goal means retreat from others also previously embraced.

The authors whose views have given rise to the following reflections provide a representative sample of the diverse strands of socialism at mid-century, unified by their common compulsion to reevaluate the premises and policies of the movement. Joseph Buttinger, former chairman of the underground organization, Revolutionary Socialists (formed after the dissolution of the Austrian Social Democratic Party by Dollfuss in 1934), most poignantly reflects the loss of faith in the Marxist theory of historical progress and the potentialities of human nature for infinite improvement. His disillusionment—which led him to adopt a position of political quietism (for which the present book represents a detailed apologia vis-à-vis his more "engaged" friends)—is a measure of the depth of his previous emotional commitment to the socialist vi-

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sion of a radically transformed society. Paul Sering, member of the German Socialist Party prior to Hitler's coming to power and of the German socialist *émigré* organization subsequently, attempts to salvage Marxist theory from the blows dealt to it by Keynesian economics and the bitter Soviet experiment. Socialist Union—a group of intellectuals in the British Labour Party dedicated to "re-thinking"—is consciously anti-Marxist, stressing a humanist and ethical approach to socialism which, however, frequently leads to distressingly platitudinous and indecisive conclusions. The contributors to the *New Fabian Essays* (running from ex-Communist John Strachey to right-winger C. A. R. Crosland) point up many of the problems facing contemporary British socialists (and socialists elsewhere) as a result of the partial success achieved by the Labour Party during its tenure of office, without, however, being able to contribute much to the solution of these problems; a solution which they recognize to be prerequisite to the resumption by socialist parties of their traditional role as parties of movement and inspiration. The failure, common to these diverse spokesmen of European socialism, to reconstruct a socialist edifice matching that erected by their predecessors of the nineteenth century leads to the conclusion that—to use some convenient Marxist terms—"inevitable historical forces" and/or "inherent contradictions" have caught up with socialism itself.

The first of the four tributaries to socialism referred to had its origin in the subjective experience of the industrial proletariat of nineteenth-century Europe, in its experience of economic privation and insecurity, its lack of power vis-à-vis the "boss class," and its inability to extract a "just wage" from the employing class. The mass of industrial workers, rendered capable of organized political effort by the new factory civilization, were drawn into struggles whose foremost aim was the alleviation of these most pressing hardships. The second source, which might be termed that of "humanitarian socialism," aimed at the political and economic emancipation of the working class primarily for ethical reasons. The postulate of individual self-development and of the inherent equality of men appeared to be denied by a class system in which economic and political power were monopolized by one class and used to circumscribe the chances of the members of the industrial working class. Equality of opportunity was an intrinsic part of this faith. And equality of opportunity was deemed incompatible with gross economic inequalities. Adherents of this position, though they accepted collective means and rediscovered the worth of community and the

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state, shared instincts and values which were individualist, libertarian, essentially middle class.[1]

The most characteristic feature of the third approach, that of Marxist "scientific socialism," was the combination of egoistical and ethical aspirations—expressed by and on behalf of the proletariat—in a system closely related to the historical process. It put responsibility for the attack on the existing system squarely on the working class itself, endowing the aims of that class with historical (and therefore, to Marxists, ethical) justification; and linked it to a promise of an otherwise undefined future of social justice in which "the last shall be first." The political effectiveness of Marxist doctrine lay in its ability to concentrate resentment and to inspire it by a message of historic mission. The theory of "scientific socialism," though in essence a working hypothesis about the relation between economic institutions and social organization, was put forth—and widely received—as the prophecy of inevitable developments deducible from the definition of existing class relations. The deceptive clarity lent to the theory by its use of lapidary definitions and of dialectical dichotomies corresponded to a fighting mood engendered by the misery and turmoil of emerging industrial capitalism. In the Marxist forecast of the future socialist order only the negatives stand out clearly: capitalism will *collapse*; exploitation of man by man will *cease*; the state will *wither away*. For Marxists the war was more important than its aims. Speculation about the concrete outlines of the future society was discouraged, in part because it was assumed that a profound change in economic relations would create its own forms of social life inconceivable to men raised and confined in bourgeois society; in part because preoccupation with the shape of the future society would detract from the proletariat's concentration on the present struggle and create divisions where hatred of the existing systems had created a feeling of solidarity. Three tacit assumptions underlay the Marxist theory: that the future society, being proletarian—or, more correctly, classless—would inevitably represent an improvement, materially and spiritually, over the existing bourgeois one; that the correct ordering of the economic relations of society would inevitably free mankind from the problems of power as well as want; and that man, free for the first time in history, would use this freedom rationally and beneficially in the service of his own happiness and spiritual growth.

The gap which "scientific socialism" refused to fill could not, however, remain unfilled. For some socialists, at least, the negative stimulus

[1] This approach is strongly reflected by the intellectuals of the British Labour Party in the Fabian Society and Socialist Union.

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of class antagonism had to be supplemented by a more definite vision of a just society. The vague hints put forth by Marx and Engels needed amplification if men were to give of their generous best. Socialism, for these visionaries, became a "new Jerusalem," where abolition of private property was a means to the transvaluation of all values, to the release of all that was highest in human nature. With the elimination of material self-aggrandizement, all the dross of human selfishness would be discarded. Honesty instead of hypocrisy; cooperation instead of selfishness; spirituality instead of materialism; rationality instead of irrationality—these qualities would distinguish socialist man and socialist society from their present-day models. Spontaneity and equality would replace the hierarchy and alienation characteristic of capitalist industrialism. In every instance, the features of the envisioned socialist society contrasted with those of the existing one. As the institutions and values of bourgeois capitalism were those of individualism, socialist utopianism was frequently linked to the contrasting notion of a collectivist order. Class and party, fulfillment of the individual through his submergence in the collectivity, these came to be viewed as worthy of replacing the existing bourgeois values. Out of this emphasis arose the insistence on "socialist honor," on *Haltung* in socialist ranks. The demand for ruthless frankness and unselfishness in the relations of party members toward each other, and for a—seemingly irrelevant—abstinence from nicotine and alcohol represented a protest against the "corrupt" bourgeois way of life.[2]

In the nineteenth century the industrial proletariat had been assigned the role of economic, political, and social pariah. The revolt against this status gave energy to the working-class movements of Europe, a revolt simultaneously directed against the power of the ruling class and the economic misery which was deemed to flow from class domination. Any explanation of the slackening of socialist energy must take into account, above all, the emancipation of the working class from its former pariah position.

The physical environment in which the worker moves—the factory, his home, his community—has now been transformed. The taint of social inferiority has been largely removed and equality of opportunity realized to a considerable degree. The voice of industrial labor, organized in massive trade unions and large political parties, is heard loudly in the land. The improvement in working-class living standards—reflected not only or even primarily in higher wages, but in shorter work

[2] This combination of "scientific" and utopian socialism is graphically depicted by Buttinger, reared in the Marxist tradition of Austrian socialism.

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weeks, longer paid vacations, and an extensive system of social security —has done more than merely alleviate the most pressing miseries of the past. It has, in many instances, progressed far enough to create a problem novel to the working class: how to dispose meaningfully of the surplus of time and money accruing to it. As Roy Jenkins points out in his contribution to the *New Fabian Essays*,[3] incomes have been equalized (under the impact of working-class power) to the point where admittedly further measures in the same direction would have no significant redistributive effect. And social services have been extended to the point where they, too, are ceasing to act as an equalizing element and have come to resemble merely a collective self-insurance system or a means of securing the aid of more fortunate *individuals* (as distinct from classes) for their less fortunate fellows. And in response to the widespread demand for economic security—a demand made effective by the power of political organization—the autonomy of the economic sphere, the market's claim to self-regulation, has been superseded by the acknowledgment of the community's right to judge the economy in terms of its results for the nation's welfare and to regulate it accordingly. This process of transformation has led many socialists—to the evident disgust of their more radical comrades—to speak of the present as the "age of socialist fulfillment."

The growing working-class satisfaction with the development of contemporary society has been accompanied by disappointment about a number of prophecies based on socialist (particularly Marxist) theory. Capitalist economies have failed to collapse as inevitably and rapidly as anticipated, and socialists like Strachey or Sering have had to come to terms with an awareness that Keynes may have provided the tools for the permanent stabilization of an essentially capitalist order. The polarization of the social structure into a mass of exploited proletarians and a small minority of exploiting capitalists has not taken place; and consequently the subjective feeling of class consciousness has failed to emerge as predicted. Lastly, where capitalism was severely modified or superseded, as in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the emergent system did not exhibit the features anticipated by socialists.[4] These de-

[3] "Equality," pp. 75-76.

[4] The ambiguous theoretical and emotional position toward the Soviet Union that convinced Marxist Social Democrats occupied between the two wars appears to have been finally resolved with the theoretical help of James Burnham (who, as an ex-Marxist writing in the Marxist idiom, has had a remarkably powerful influence on European socialists) and the practical assistance of the Red Army and Stalinist policy after 1945. See, e.g., chapters 2, 3, and 6 in Sering's book for his analysis of Soviet totalitarianism and bureaucratization.

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velopments undermined socialist theory at three fundamental points: they destroyed the clear-cut concept of the working class as the bearer of historical destiny; they raised a question as to the inevitability of historical progress toward socialism; and, most significantly, they exposed as a fallacy the assumption shared by socialists of all hues that the subordination of private economic power automatically brought in its train a society of free and happy men.

The strength of socialist theory had been that it contained specific assumptions about the relation between economic organization, social power, and human freedom—as well as between human freedom and human happiness. The confusion of present-day socialists is the result of their loss of confidence in the correctness of these assumptions. Socialism, engaged in *exploring* these relations instead of *assuming* them, is, for the first time, forced to become truly "scientific" instead of merely ideological; but thereby it also commits itself to the judgment of empirical evidence. It is forced to surrender a theory providing it with clear-cut signposts (at least to the major goals) and is left with only a set of values, idiosyncrasies, and verbal and organizational commitments.

These "socialist" ideals may be summarized as "freedom," "equality," and "participation." However, the appropriation of these values and their implementation by socialists raise several obvious and fundamental problems.

Socialists have habitually linked freedom to economic security. With the realization of a full employment economy and growing output, the framework for individual freedom has been established. What specific socialist measures are required beyond these economic achievements? Does the concept of freedom have a distinctly socialist meaning which sets it apart from its traditional, liberal, individualistic connotations? Is the intermediate goal of efficient planning compatible with an increase of individual liberty? If socialists today have come to see in the managerial society rather than in capitalism the most dangerous enemy of human freedom,[5] can socialists commit themselves to measures involving the extension of state power? There is a dim awareness among socialists that "freedom to develop one's personality fully" as conceived by socialists must differ from the bourgeois "freedom to develop one's personality fully," whose results are by no means approved by socialists. To be "socialist freedom" it must possess a social dimension. But an

[5] This is done by R. H. S. Crossman in "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism" (*New Fabian Essays*, p. 27) and by the authors of *Socialism: A New Statement of Principles.*

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answer beyond the vague assertion of the necessity for "fellowship"[6]—the fulfillment of an individual through his identification with others—is lacking. By increasingly stressing consumer freedom—expenditure of economic surplus by means of putting higher wages in the hands of individual wage earners rather than on the basis of collective priorities[7]—socialists avoid the taint of potential totalitarianism inherent in the collective determination of private wants. But they simultaneously abdicate their insistence on "remaking" man through a new set of economic institutions. In the past, socialists had few doubts that in the "new Jerusalem" social and collective values would rank above "petty personal and material ones. Yet the simplicity, the self-sufficiency, the self-abnegation, and even the Puritanism which characterized the traditional socialist *Haltung* are unlikely to resist corrosion by a greatly increased capacity to spend funds for personal purposes; and socialist purists already note and denounce the growing *embourgeoisement* of present-day leaders and members alike.

The difficulties that socialists have encountered in implementing the goal of equality—perhaps the most characteristically socialist of all goals—spring from their failure to resolve the contradiction between equality defined as equality of opportunity—with its implication of rewards as widely divergent as the differences in the "marketable" qualities possessed by individuals—and equality conceived as a true community of equals. Forced to apply themselves to the practical task of maintaining and increasing industrial production, socialists have generally accepted the permanent need for material incentives, and assume that differential wages, like prices, will have to be retained as a means of allocating labor in a complex industrial civilization. Under the pressure of the need for administrative efficiency, as well as the traditional, liberal, individualistic strain representing one aspect of the socialist intellectual tradition, socialists today generally restrict the meaning of equality to "equality of opportunity." Yet, the utopian spark, the vision of a non-competitive society of equals in which men are not valued and rewarded according to their economic usefulness, has not been completely extinguished. A feeling of uneasiness remains at the thought of identifying with socialism the type of society in which each individual is rewarded strictly according to his deserts. The urge for social justice

[6] *Socialism: A New Statement of Principles*, p. 35.

[7] See, e.g., C. A. R. Crosland, "The Transition from Capitalism" (*New Fabian Essays*, p. 63), and Roy Jenkins (*ibid.*, p. 76). Trade union pressure also operates to maximize distribution of surplus income in the form of freely spendable and differentiated wage packages.

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is not exhausted by the distributive concept which in its crudest form is expressed by the slogan: he who does not work shall not eat.[8] The concept of the "equal dignity and worth of all men" which socialism shares with Christianity has radical implications. But the noble ideal of brotherhood is in conflict with the equally noble ideals of striving for perfection (which depends on the recognition of a hierarchy of values) and efficient performance. Thus the ideal of a brotherhood of equals remains in contemporary socialist thought merely as a vague aspiration, a weak trace. It still finds expression in the socialist—though by no means exclusively socialist—insistence on maintaining at a decent level the weak, the ineffectual, and the useless; in a tendency to diminish the span between top and bottom incomes; in the demand for simple and unostentatious living by party leaders; and in the continued quest for a meaning which would carry equality of opportunity beyond that of a race in which all are encouraged "to scramble up the ladder of ambition, with the strongest and most unscrupulous winning all the prizes."[9] Where large accumulations of wealth have survived war, inflation, and inheritance taxes, or where—as in Britain—strong remnants of a social caste system exist, the socialist demand for equality of opportunity and parity of esteem still expresses itself in concrete policies. But on the Continent an extensive system of general public education, coupled with a leveling of incomes, has largely met the demand for an order in which careers are open to the talented and has thus exhausted the socialist impetus toward an egalitarian society.

The third of the socialist goals, the insistence on participation as giving concrete meaning to democracy and overcoming the "alienation" suffered by modern man in a mass society, was expected to find expression in socialist implementation of "industrial democracy." Here, too, socialists appear to have reached the limit of what they deem compatible with the efficiency of a productive economic system and are generally unwilling to accept the notion—propounded by rare mavericks like R. H. S. Crossman—that socialism demands maximum distribution of responsibility and participation even at the price of sacrificing economic efficiency. On the contrary, the distance between the managerial elite and the mass of workers is increasing through the integration of the trade unions into the management stratum, the development of a group of "socialist managers," and the corresponding growth of a

[8] Thus Sering still adheres to the ultimate ideal of goods allocation "to everyone according to his needs" and welcomes social welfare measures which approximate this ideal in existing welfare states.

[9] *Socialism: A New Statement of Principles*, p. 32.

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feeling on the part of the workers that they are subject to manipulation by distant and irresponsible powers.[10]

The growing uncertainty about the fundamental principles of socialism has been accompanied, naturally enough, by an abandonment of the traditional sharp dichotomy between capitalism and socialism and thus also of the anticipation of a sudden transformation—peaceful or violent—of the one system into the other. The welfare state, characterized by full employment, planning, controls, housing programs, social security, health services, and progressive taxation, is recognized as a structure *sui generis*, neither capitalist nor socialist. But if it is a transitional structure, do socialists know the boundary which divides the transitional stage from the socialist one? The slowness of change, no longer resented as a source of frustration, is now extolled by many socialists as an integral part of the goal itself, as a guarantee of its values and durability. The definition of "class" has become fuzzy and the state has ceased to be viewed merely as an instrument of class rule. If society is no longer divided into two irreconcilable camps but is conceived of as a multiplicity of partly competing, partly cooperating social groups, a case for compromise and coalition has been established. The atmosphere of the political struggle has been transformed; the class enemy whose elimination was once viewed as the condition of socialist triumph has become the political opponent, and co-existence with him is accepted as a prerequisite of political democracy.[11] Socialist parties become parties "like all the others," forced into continuous political compromises, attempting to gain new members and voters from various strata unacquainted with socialist values and traditions. This has brought with it an erosion of the former insistence on socialist *Haltung*, of the view that socialism implies cultural as well as economic changes, and that there are or should be specifically "socialist forms of living."

In this "period of fulfillment" the enthusiasm and idealism which used to be expended in the service of the cause—on occasion, indiscriminately and intolerantly—are today without an objective and even without encouragement. Socialist leaders tend to be embarrassed, even frightened, by "enthusiasm." They stress that the present is not the

[10] The disenchantment with nationalization of industries prevalent among the European working class—attested by many, even friendly, observers and reflected in the socialist parties' slackening drive for further nationalization measures—is largely due to the failure of such measures to alter substantially the hierarchic, coercive management structures characterizing modern mass industry. "Workers' control" and "industrial democracy" are other—perhaps utopian—aspects of traditional ideology dear to many socialists which the exigencies of responsible government have exposed as unrealizable.

[11] This observation applies primarily to Continental (Marxist) socialist parties.

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time for prophets, teachers, dreamers, or fighters, but for prudent and realistic planners and administrators. Where they are members of government coalitions or exercise power and influence, they necessarily accept responsibility for the existing system and defend its achievements as a justification of their exercise of power. Dissatisfaction with these achievements, comparison of reality with anticipation, inquiry into the reasons for disappointment, these are frequently felt by leaders to be criticisms directed against themselves and their policies. Independent efforts at "re-thinking" are more often frowned upon than encouraged from above.[12]

Having abandoned past attachment to a more or less rigid ideology and refusing to undertake or encourage serious reexamination of socialist theories and policies, the parties' responses have become increasingly tactical, rhetorical, opportunist and, as a result, haphazard and unintegrated. The lack of direction flowing from the uncertainty as to basic principles has largely emasculated socialist parties as parties of fundamental reform. The most practical questions of everyday politics, as R. H. S. Crossman has pointed out, cannot be resolved intelligently unless the party realizes clearly where its ultimate goals lie: "Are food subsidies and price controls temporary war-time expedients to be dispensed with as soon as we can return to the price system; or are they part of the structure of a socialist state? Does democratic socialism involve the permanence of a mixed economy and, if so, should profit-making in the private sector be encouraged or limited? Should wages be left to find their own level through collective bargaining, or is it the function of a Labour Government to modify the wages structure in the light of national interests and social justice? Is a centralized public corporation a more socialist method of running a public utility than municipal or co-operative ownership? Does socialist principle demand that we should receive our spectacles and dentures free, but pay for travelling on nationalized railways?"[13]

Once a welfare state has been created in which the goals of full employment and equal opportunity have been broadly accepted and realized, socialist parties apparently lose their drive for further significant changes. Their primary concern becomes to consolidate and round out

[12] An outstanding example of this attitude is the refusal of the Austrian Socialist Party to discuss—or even to take notice of—the problems raised by Buttinger in his challenging book. To the best of my knowledge, no Austrian socialist publication has, since its appearance in 1953 (in a German edition), referred to it or reviewed it.

[13] Crossman, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

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these gains rather than to move toward a fundamentally different social order. Formulating actions increasingly in response to internal and external pressures, socialist parties have largely exhausted their capacity to provide creative solutions to basic problems and have ceased, therefore, to be a source of inspiration to their followers.

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